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BEYOND ANTITRUST
By Paul L. Joffe*

Before he converted and became the New Deal's trustbuster, Thurman
Arnold said that the chief effect of antitrust rhetoric is "to promote the
growth of great industrial organizations by deflecting the attack on them
into purely moral and ceremonial channels. ..."I
These sentiments are not in vogue today. Enthusiasm for antitrust has
returned to Washington with all the fervor of the revival of an old time
religion. In 1976 Congress passed the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act, 2 dealing primarily with enforcement procedure. Among
other things, the Act gives state attorneys general the power to bring treble
damage suits on behalf of consumers. 3 Antitrust advocates have advanced even more far-reaching proposals. Among the most controversial
was one to split up the major oil companies, 4 which passed the Senate
6
5
Judiciary Committee in 1976. Deregulation in the aviation, natural gas
7
and other industries is imminent.
* A.B., Harvard College, 1969; J.D., Yale Law School, 1972. Mr. Joffe practices law
in Washington, D.C. He is a member of the District of Columbia, Connecticut, and American Bar Associations.
1. T. ARNOLD, THE FOLKLORE OF CAPITALISM 212 (1937).

2. Act of Sept. 30, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat. 1383 (1976) (codified in scattered
sections of 15 U.S.C. (1976)). The Act has three major provisions: authorization for state
attorneys general to bring treble damage suits on behalf of consumers injured by certain
antitrust violations; increased authority for the Department of Justice in investigating alleged violations of the antitrust laws; establishment of a pre-merger notification requirement
for major mergers. 15 U.S.C. §§ 15(c) to 15(h), 18(a) (1976).
3. 15 U.S.C. § 15(c) (1976).
4. S.2387, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., (1976), 121 CONG. REC. 29645 (1975). This highly
controversial bill would have split up the 18 major oil companies by requiring them to select
one of three areas of operation-production, transportation, or refining and marketing--and
to divest themselves of all other operations. In addition, the bill prohibited major oil refiners
from owning or operating retail service stations or other marketing assets which they did not
own prior to January 1, 1976. For additional legislative proposals, see note 375 and accompanying text infra.
5. See the Air Transportation Regulatory Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92
Stat. 1705 (1978) (amending 49 U.S.C. §§ 1401 to 1552) which represents an effort to foster
more open competition in the airline industry.
6. See the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-621, 92 Stat. 3351 (1978).
7. See [1977] ANTITRUST & TRADE REO. REP. (BNA), at A-I to A-5 (Jan. 11, 1977).

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 28:1

The reborn interest in antitrust shows signs of its long genealogy. President Carter's appointee as chairman of the Federal Trade Commission is
Michael Pertschuk. In testimony before the Senate Antitrust Subcommittee, chaired by Senator Kennedy, Pertschuk sounded a theme older than
the Sherman Act-pervasive distrust of the concentration of power in a
few hands. 8 There is a heretical aspect, however, to the new enthusiasm.
When he convened his hearings in early 1977, Kennedy stated that "[tlhere
is a broad consensus of opinion that the economic and social objectives
underlying the antitrust laws have fallen, and continue to fall, far short of
attainment." 9 Witnesses responded with a proposal for "no-fault"
trustbusting.10 Some would rewrite section two of the Sherman Act' to
condemn firms with more than a specified share of any market unless they
could demonstrate that they attained it through superior skill, industry,
and foresight. 12 As diverse a group as Michael Pertschuk, Griffin Bell and
Ralph Nader told Kennedy's subcommittee that the Sherman and Clayton
3
Acts may be inadequate to deal with shared monopolies.'
The renewed interest in antitrust involves more than a questioning of
the old statutes. There is revived debate concerning the premises of antitrust. In orthodox economic theory, the justification for the antitrust laws
was the removal of artificial barriers to trade.' 4 Antitrust was viewed as a
8. See Hearingson OversightofAntitrust Enforcement by the FederalTrade Commission
and the Justice Department, Antitrust Division, Before the Senate Subcomm. on Antitrust and
Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) [hereinafter
cited as 1977 Oversight Hearings].
New antitrust action has also produced counteraction. Attempts to rein in the FTC
[1978] ANTITRUST
through budget cuts have been initiated by some congressmen. See, e.g.,
& TRADE REG. REP. (BNA), at A-7 to A-8 and A-II to A-12 (June 15, 1978).

9. 1977 Oversight Hearings,supra note 8, at 2 (opening statement of Senator Edward
M. Kennedy).
10. Id at 345, 492 (testimony of Donald I. Baker, Assistant Attorney General, Justice
Dept., and prepared statement by Hon. Griffin Bell, Attorney General). A related proposal
to abolish any requirement for demonstrating reprehensible behavior for persistent monopolies not attributable to economies of scale or scarce resources has also been suggested. The
proposal envisions the use only of government equity suits since it is considered to be unfair
to impose criminal sanctions or treble damages where reprehensible conduct is absent. 2 P.
AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW

623 (1978).

11. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976) provides:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty
of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding one
million dollars if a corporation, or if any other person, one hundred thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said punishments, in
the discretion of the court.
12. 1977 Oversight Hearings,supra note 8, at 345-47. (testimony of Donald I. Baker).
13. Id. at 457-63, 548.
14. See 2 AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 10, at 103.
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means to halt monopolization and collusion, and to assist in restoring competition. Under this theory, numerous competitors in the market were
necessary so that no single firm or group of firms could control prices. In
this situation, prices for a given commodity would be driven to the point at
which they just covered costs and a competitive profit. No one firm would
charge less since it would lose money, and no one firm would charge more
since it would lose customers to competition. Only if one firm cornered
the market or a group of firms conspired to do so would this system be
upset. At this point, the monopolist could restrict production and raise
prices, resulting in the misallocation of resources in the economy as a
whole. Such artificial restriction in the monopolized industry would force
the use of resources both inside and outside the industry in ways less productive than under competitive conditions.' 5 A properly functioning price
mechanism, however, would ensure "allocative" efficiency in the sense that
the price of goods would reflect all the sacrifices the economy must make
to satisfy consumer preferences.
Although trustbusting has emphasized the allocative efficiencies gained
from breaking up monopoly, some authorities have argued that "productive" efficiency is often enhanced by the increasing scale of big business.16
In this view, indiscriminate trustbusting threatens to undermine the economic growth and consumer welfare attributable to productive efficiencies.
In response to these assertions, others have cautioned that efficiency should
not be purchased with the sacrifice of social and political values. 17 They
argue that efficiency has never been the sole objective of antitrust enforcement but rather has co-existed with other goals, including opposition to
15. Id. at 403; F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 8-38 (1970); G. STIOLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE 176-215 (3d ed. 1966). Realworld examples of such conspiracies and their drastic effect on prices are not uncommon.
In the 1960's the international quinine cartel raised prices up to 600 percent. M. GREEN,
THE CLOSED ENTERPRISE SYSTEM 162 (1972). There were also overcharges in the electrical
equipment conspiracy that sent a Westinghouse vice-president and others to jail. Id. Critics of the oil industry argue that the major companies took advantage of the Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Countries' (OPEC) price increases and hiked prices even further, reaping unwarranted monopoly profits. J. BLAIR, THE CONTROL OF OIL 320 (1976). See Wash.
Post, July 28, 1978, at 1, col. 3, for a report that Gulf Oil will pay the United States government $42.2 million in settlement of alleged overcharges related to the Arab oil embargo. It
was also reported that the Department of Energy has brought claims for violations of price
regulations totaling over $1 billion against various oil companies.
16. This point is elaborated upon in R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 104-06, 19297 (1978). Allocative efficiency is the distribution of resources throughout the economy so
as to ensure their use in those areas where their output is most valued by consumers. Productive efficiency denotes the effective use of resources by particular firms. Id at 91. For a
more detailed discussion of allocative efficiency and its antitrust implications, see SCHERER,
supra note 15, at 18; 2 AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 10, at 402b.1.
17. See, e.g., Scherer, Book Review, 86 YALE L.J. 974, 976-81 (1977).
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concentrated economic power. 18 Thus, the tensions in antitrust enforcement have often reflected the divided American psyche-in quest of both
material abundance and political liberty. 19
0 antitrust scholar and forIn his recent book, The Antitrust Paradox,2
mer Solicitor General of the United States Robert Bork submits a brief on
behalf of efficiency. He reconciles the dilemma of values by arguing, in
effect, that liberty is the freedom to grow to efficient scale. The task, in his
view, is to resist a trend whereby "the political order moves against the
private order. '' 2 1 This trend is brought on by grasping for the unattainable
goal of equality. The result of such misguided effort is the destruction of
wealth and a shift of power to government "because of the necessity for
increased governmental incursions into the private sphere if greater equal''22
ity of condition is to be achieved.
Illustrating the contrary view is The Treatment of Market Power23 by
William G. Shepherd, scholar of industrial organization and former Special Economic Assistant to the Assistant Attorney General for antitrust.
Existing industrial policies, concludes Shepherd, "often seem to be dubious ceremonials, which are ripe for revision or possible abolition. ' 24 Applying cost-benefit analysis to industrial policy, he argues that not only do
the traditional economic goals of efficiency and equity matter, but that so25
cial goals, such as the value of work opportunity, are also important.
18. Although the Sherman Act was born in an age of populist political ferment, the
American fear of concentrated power and its potentially corrupting effect on democratic
politics is a fear even older than the Sherman Act. In a letter to James Madison written
from France, Thomas Jefferson urged that the proposed constitution contain a bill of rights
providing for "freedom of religion, freedom of the press, protection against standing armies,
restriction against monopolies .. " W. GARRETT, THE WORLDS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON
129 (1971). Moreover, in vetoing the bill to recharter the Bank of the United States, Andrew Jackson asserted that the bank favored "a few hundred of our own citizens, chiefly of
the richest class." S. MORISON, THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 439
(1965). As a result, Jackson said he refused to permit the "prostitution of our Government
to the advancement of the few at the expense of the many." Id
19. The controversy has been one among legal scholars (see authorities cited in notes 16
& 64 and 2 AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 10, at 104); economists (see authorities cited in
notes 23, 61, & 101 infra); judges (see'notes 72-77 & 90-102. and accompanying text infra)
and enforcement officials (see note 28 infra).
20. See BORK, supra note 16.
21. Id at 423.
22. Id
23.

W. SHEPHERD, THE TREATMENT OF MARKET POWER 3 (1975).

24. Id
25. Id at 5. Shepherd offers a number of proposals to achieve these multiple goals.
Among other things, he recommends a progressive tax on market share, a public investment
bank to counter what he perceives as an alliance between large banks and large firms that
keep capital from smaller competitors, and increased use of public corporations to create
more competition. Id at 183-224. For other discussions of the multiple goals of antitrust
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Achievement of an appropriate relationship between economic and political power has been a recurring but elusive goal of antitrust policy. 26
Responding to questioning at the time of his nomination to the Federal
Trade Commission, Chairman Pertschuk said, "[e]fficiency is important,
but so are such non-economic goals as maintaining multiple decision centers and structuring institutions in which democratic habits and life styles
can thrive. '27 Recognition of the multiple objectives underlying antitrust
has come as well from the retiring Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, Donald Baker. He told Senator Kennedy's Judiciary Subcommittee
that the case for new legislation to achieve deconcentration rests "at least
as much on Jeffersonian political beliefs as economic proof under the pres'28
ent state of knowledge.
The revival of interest in the political implications of antitrust policy
confronts antitrust advocates with a central failure in the antitrust tradition. The Sherman Act was called a charter of freedom, 29 but beyond this
and other bromides, antitrust doctrine never developed an analytical
framework for ensuring that economic power did not distort the political
system and undermine political liberty. Implicitly, it was assumed that
the decentralization mandated by antitrust in the economic sphere would
foster a healthy democratic political system. But the guardians of antitrust orthodoxy never paused to consider what characteristics of economic
decentralization made it desirable. Consequently, as pressure has
mounted to depart from the decentralized market, antitrust affords little
30
guidance to those who still adhere to its political goals.
see Symposium, The Goals ofAnitrust.A Dialogue on Policy, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 363 (1965)
[hereinafter cited as Bork, Bowman, Blake & Jones]; Symposium, Antitrust Jurisprudence A
Symposium on Economic, Politicaland Social Goals of Antitrust Policy, 125 U. PA. L. REV.
1182 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Flynn, Elzinga, Sullivan & Gary]; Brodley, Book Review,
24 STAN. L. REV. 1155 (1972).
26. See note 30 infra.
27. Hearings on March Nominations Before the Senate Comm on Commerce, Science
and Transportation, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 65 (1977).
28. 1977 Oversight Hearings, supra note 8, at 347. See also Address by Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, John H. Shenefield, to the Los Angeles Bar Assoc. (Jan. 30, 1978),
reprinted in [1978] ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. RaP. (BNA), at A-14 (Feb. 9, 1978). Pertschuk's comments hark back to a theme which finds classic expression in Judge Learned
Hand's 1945 remarks in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir.
1945). Hand stated that while it might have been adequate to condemn only those monopolies which could not show they were efficient, "that was not the way Congress chose; it did
not condone 'good trusts' and condemn 'bad' ones; it forbade all. Moreover, in so doing it
was not necessarily actuated by economic motives alone." Id. at 427. Hand further reasoned that for social and moral reasons, Congress rejected a system "in which the great mass
of those engaged must accept the direction of a few." Id. Yet Judge Hand's decision has not
been followed in its literal sense. See 2 AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 10, at 104.
29. Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 359-60 (1933).
30. One of the few serious discussions that attempts to address the political goals of
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Considerations of efficiency may impel policy-makers to abandon the
old antitrust desire for deconcentration and preservation of numerous
competitors. Large scale organization or government intervention may be
the price paid for efficient production or the achievement of other social
objectives. Even when an industry contains enough firms to be reasonably competitive by antitrust standards, however, the industry may wield
undue influence in the political process. Moreover, economic influence in
the political arena is not necessarily constrained by deconcentration, and,
as with the pervasive influence of advertising on social attitudes, it may be
undisturbed by trustbusting. For all these reasons, antitrust policy has increasingly failed to come to grips with significant instances of economic
influence on politics.
This failure, however, does not require the abandonment of traditional
antitrust concerns about the relationship between economic and political
power. Behind the origin of the antitrust laws lies a skeptical regard for
economic power and an accompanying effort to constrain and hold it accountable. Though the law may be transformed, the policy should survive. Thus, this article will suggest an approach to furthering the political
goals of antitrust when its traditional means are not available. It will examine the historic tension between the economic and political goals of antitrust and explore the reasons for antitrust's failure to provide guidance
when efficiency and other pressures impel abandonment of orthodox antitrust approaches. Through an analytical model, it will provide an approach to minimizing unwarranted economic influence on politics when
the traditional private market mechanism becomes inadequate or attenuated. It will examine specific policy alternatives to orthodox antitrust and
inquire whether they hold any promise for achieving the political goals of
antitrust in an era which, of necessity, must move beyond antitrust solutions.
antitrust appears in Bork, Bowman, Blake & Jones, supra note 25 The emphasis, however,
is on the value of antitrust in avoiding more intrusive forms of government intervention in
the economy and on entrepreneurial opportunity for small or rising businessmen. Little
attention is given to whether antitrust goals can survive the demise of decentralized markets.
Rather, the authors respond to criticism of antitrust on efficiency grounds by arguing that
the occasional sacrifice of efficiency to political goals in antitrust cases is justified in order to
maintain decentralized markets. Id at 382-84, 425-36. By contrast, the present article focuses on the influence of economic power in the political process, especially when there is
pressure to depart from decentralized markets. The task here is not so much to defend
antitrust when it has preserved decentralization, but to inquire whether the antitrust concern
with undue economic influence in the political process can still be implemented when traditional antitrust approaches fail.
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AN OLD DILEMMA

Current debate regarding the sometimes conflicting political and economic goals of antitrust is but a revival of a controversy that has ebbed
and flowed since the origin of the Sherman Act. Over the years, its economic and political objectives have been recognized simultaneously and
have remained in continuous tension.
On March 21, 1890, John Sherman of Ohio took the floor of the United
States Senate to answer critics of the bill which eventually bore his name:
The popular mind is agitated with problems that may disturb social order, and among them all none is more threatening than the
inequality of condition, of wealth, and opportunity that has
grown within a single generation out of the concentration of capital into vast combinations to control production and trade and to
break down competition. These combinations already defy or
control powerful transportation corporations and reach State authorities. . . .If we will not endure a king as a political power we
should not endure a king over the. . . necessaries of life. If we

would not submit to an emperor we should not submit to an au31
tocrat of trade.
He called the roll of the great trusts of the day: "the cotton trust, the whiskey trust, the sugar refiners' trust, the cotton bagging trust, the copper
trust, the salt trust, and many others .... -32 But it was unnecessary to
list them all, said Sherman, for they had "recently been made familiar by
'33
the public press."
The debate in Congress reflected a spectrum of diffuse antitrust sentiment in the country. One element in the background of the Sherman Act
was the concern with economic influence in the political process. A year
before passage of the Sherman Act, W.S. Morgan summarized twenty
years of agrarian protest in his History of the Wheel and Alliance, and the
Impending Revolution: 34 "The agricultural masses," he argued, "are
fleeced by the exorbitant exactions of numerous trusts. .

.

.Monopolies

exist by law, are chartered by law, and should be controlled by law. A
31. 21 CONG. REc. 2456-62 (1890).
POLICY 180 (1954).
32. 21 CONG. REC. 2456-62 (1890).

See also H. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST

33. Id The sentiment against the trusts was so strong that opposition to Sherman was
marshalled principally on the issue of the constitutional power of Congress to reach monopoly under the commerce clause. Only Senator Stewart seems to have challenged the antitrust principle itself, urging that combination "is the foundation of all civilized society."
THORELLI, supra note 31, at 190. The experience in England with laws aimed at regulating
combinations, said Stewart, was "that legislation would not reach the subject, but that it
simply retards trade. . . ." Id
34.

W. MORGAN, HISTORY OF THE WHEEL AND ALLIANCE, AND THE IMPENDING

REVOLUTION (1889).
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trust is a conspiracy against legitimate trade. . . . It is demoralizing in its
influence, inconsistent with free institutions and dangerous to our liber35
ties."
In the same year, the conservative Grover Cleveland also suggested the
corrupting influence of economic power on government. In his fourth annual message: President Cleveland told Congress,
We discover that the fortunes realized by our manufacturers are
no longer solely the reward of sturdy industry and enlightened
foresight, but that they result from the discriminating favor of the
government. . . . Corporations, which should be carefully restrained creatures of the law and the
servants of the people, are
36
fast becoming the people's masters.
Despite the concern over economic influence during the years just prior
to passage of the Sherman Act, an ambivalent sentiment existed regarding
monopoly. By some, it was skeptically regarded only if "procured
through the arbitrary exclusion of competitors. ' 37 If based on efficiency,
however, some thought monopoly a "positive advantage to the commu38
nity."
It is well-known that enforcement of the Sherman Act was lax in its
early years. 39 With the first dramatic efforts at serious enforcement came
a resumption of the controversy regarding the potential conflict between
efficiency and the deconcentration believed necessary for political liberty.
Thus, when Theodore Roosevelt used the Sherman Act to strike down a
railroad merger, the conflict in antitrust policy surfaced. Justice Holmes,
dissenting in Northern Sec. Ry Co. v. United States, pointed out that "if
the restraint on the freedom of the members of a combination caused by
their entering into partnerships is a restraint of trade, every such combination, as well the small as the great, is within the act." 4°
It was this dissent which is supposed to have provoked T.R.'s comment
with respect to his appointee to the bench: "I could carve out of a banana a
judge with more backbone."'4 1 Nevertheless, Holmes' implicit view that
efficiency considerations were forcing the collectivization of business 42 is
35. Id. at 15-17.
36. Fourth Annual Message to Congress from President Grover Cleveland (Dec. 1888),
quoted in R. HOFSTADTER, THE AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION 183 (1948).
37. Gunton, The Economic andSocialAspects of Trusts, 3 POL. Sci. Q. (1888), cited in
THORELLI, supra note 31, at 129.
38. Id.
39. THORELLI, supra note 31, at 371-410.
40. 193 U.S. 197, 410-11 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
41. Quotedin C. BOWEN, YANKEE FROM OLYMPUS 370 (1944).
42. See Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 104, 44 N.E. 177, 179 (1896) (Holmes, J.,
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one that T.R. did not really reject. In the campaign of 1908, T.R., the
legendary trustbuster, urged reliance on "[flederal control over all combinations engaged in interstate commerce, instead of relying upon the foolish
anti-trust law. .... 9M3
The fear that departure from the antitrust approach might have unacceptable political consequences, however, remained strong. Four years
later, Woodrow Wilson rejoined that under T.R.'s approach, "there shall
be two masters, the great corporation, and over it the government of the
United States; and I ask who is going to be master of the government of
the United States?" 44 The monopolies controlled the government, said
Wilson, and it was no solution to say that the government would control
the monopolies. The answer was antitrust.
Although the two great Progressives differed over means, they agreed
that the industrial upheavals of the nineteenth century confronted the
country with great dangers. A "combination of combinations," said Wilson, had put power "in the hands of a few men" who "chill, check and
destroy economic freedom. ' 45 Roosevelt argued that, sheltered by a reac46
tionary judiciary, business stood immune from public supervision.
Thus, augmentation of the power of the state, perhaps even to the point of
controlling industrial prices, was necessary to protect labor and consumers. 47
Dominating the antitrust landscape of the Progressive Era4 8 was the
Supreme Court's decision in the case against the Rockefeller empire, Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. UnitedStates.49 The company was dismemdissenting). Justice Holmes, in his dissent, argued that even the most superficial reading of
industrial history supports the contention that "free competition means combination" and
that the might and scope of combination is ever increasing. 167 Mass. at 108, 44 N.E. at
181. So fundamental is the axiom, thought Holmes, it would be "futile to set our faces
against this tendency." Id
43. Quoted in G. MOWRY, THE ERA OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT 134 (1958). Thus
Roosevelt put more faith in direct regulation of business than in the antitrust approach. He
turned to the latter only when his congressional initiatives toward regulation were stymied.
Id at 133-34.
44. Quoted in HOFSTADTER, supra note 36, at 257.
45. Id at 254.
46. MOWRY, supra note 43, at 271-72.

47. Id at 290.
48. The antitrust enforcement efforts of the Progressive Era were remarkably extensive,
although the ultimate results were less impressive. Between 1906 and 1920, in addition to
the attack on railroad mergers, nearly every major instance of high market share was challenged, including a majority of the ten largest industrial corporations. The list included
tobacco, oil, gunpowder, corn products, cans, steel, telephones, meatpacking, sugar, shoe
machinery, and farm equipment. Oligopoly, as opposed to monopoly, was not the prime
target, and after 1913 dissolution rarely resulted. SHEPHERD, supra note 23, at 188.
49. 221 U.S. 1 (1911). Coercion of railroads into granting preferential rates, price dis-
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bered and Justice White's long and involved opinion became a landmark
for its enunciation of the "Rule of Reason." Justice White declared that
the operation of a competitive market would itself be "the most efficient
means for the prevention of monopoly." 50 He proposed a "standard of
reason" by which courts in the exercise of their judgment would protect
the operation of the market and discern those arrangements which fostered
monopoly. 5 ' Freedom of contract was to be protected, but only when "not
52
unduly or improperly exercised."
It remained to state what exercise was unreasonable, undue, or improper. Justice White concluded that the expansion of the New Jersey
company to dominate the market created a primafacie showing of intent
which was confirmed by the predatory practices. 53 From this a reader
might infer that a dominant firm would not be condemned in the absence
of predatory practices. Absent such practices, the market mechanism
would prevent monopoly from arising. 54 If this were true, then conversely, only those practices could be condemned as predatory which were
inconsistent with market efficiency. In this reading, StandardOil's rule of
reason and the efficiency test are one and the same. 55
It is not clear from Standard Oil, however, what Justice White would
have done if confronted with an example of a firm which rose to dominate
an industry without engaging in Rockefeller's practices. His understanding of the objectives of the antitrust laws was such that he might have
sacrificed productive efficiency to control massive size. The law, he said,
was designed to protect competitive conditions, develop trade, protect the
general public as well as the rights of individuals, and also prevent practices which would enhance prices.5 6 So stated, the objectives of the law
are too broad to conclude that White's single aim was efficiency. 57
crimination, spying, rebates, local price cutting, operation of bogus independent companies,
market division, and restrictive agreements with competitors were some of the notorious
practices covering 57 pages of the complaint filed against the trust. Id at 42-43.
50. Id at 62.
51. Id at 60, 62.
52. Id at 62. Thus, the Sherman Act could not be struck down on the claim that it
would annihilate all contracts and thus all trade. See Northern Sec. Ry. Co., 193 U.S. at
410-11 (Holmes, J, dissenting) and text accompanying note 40 supra.
53. 221 U.S. at 76. In rejecting the notion that the trust lacked an intent to monopolize,
Justice White concluded that exclusive control over the transportation, marketing and distribution of oil "lead[s] the mind up to a conviction of a purpose and intent which we think is
so certain as practically to cause the subject not to be within the domain of reasonable
contention." Id at 77.
54. See text accompanying note 50 supra.
55. See BoRK, supra note 16, at 34.
56. 221 U.S. at 58.
57. See id at 42-43. The idea that White might find occasion to condemn monopoly
unaccompanied by predatory practices finds support in his discussion of those practices. He
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Probably the Court's grasp of the matter was intuitive and cannot be
fitted into the mold of rigorous economic theory. Groping for standards
to implement the broad terms of the Sherman Act, the opinion continued
to bind in an uneasy relationship the objectives of efficiency and the protection of some vaguely defined interest of "the general public" and "the
rights of individuals. '58 Unfortunately, by emphasizing the flagrantly
predatory behavior of Standard Oil as evidence of its intent, Justice White
appeared to be distinguishing between "good" and "bad" trusts. If this
were true, under StandardOil, a monopoly might not be condemned if its
rise to power were more cautious and unaccompanied by the practices in
issue. The subsequent failure of the government's case against U.S.
Steel 59 seemed to confirm these fears. In contrast, if intent were important, even a firm whose size was justifiable on efficiency grounds might run
afoul of antitrust zealots because, by some definition of wrongful intent, its
purpose in expanding was illegal. 60 Thus, the proponents of antitrust enforcement thought White had emasculated the Sherman Act, but business
interests thought he had set them adrift on a sea of doubt and uncer6
tainty. '
The result was a series of compromises which gave rise to the Clayton
Act 6 2 and Federal Trade Commission Act.63 The echoes of StandardOil

were apparent in the public discussion. Anybody who read the newspapers, said Woodrow Wilson, knew what the evil practices were and "any
decently equipped lawyer" could propose legislation "by which the whole
business can be stopped." 64 Thus a list of forbidden practices found its
stated that not only was there a prima facie case against Standard because of its size, but
culpable intent was confirmed by the predatory practices. Id. at 75. He insisted, however,
that these practices were considered not for whether they were illegal in themselves, "but
solely as an aid for discovering intent and purpose." Id at 76. This suggests that culpable
intent might exist even without such practices.
58. 221 U.S. at 58.
59. United States v.. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417 (1920). See also text accompanying notes 71-77 infra.
60. See BORK, supra note 16, at 38.
61. See G. STOCKING, WORKABLE COMPETITION AND ANTITRUST POLICY 20-23 (1961).
62. 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1976)).
63. 38 Stat. 717 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-57 (1976)).
64. W. WILSON, THE NEW FREEDOM 172 (1913), quoted in STOCKING, supra note 61, at
21. Others, however, were less sanguine about this approach and more fearful that the
resourceful captain of industry could circumvent any list of specified forbidden acts. The
solution was the creation of the Federal Trade Commission which could assess "the competitive effects likely to result from various dodges that powerful firms might adopt in their
quest for market power." A. NEALE, THE ANTITRUST LAWS OF THE U.S.A. 179 (2d ed.
1970). It did not escape the defenders of business, however, that such an arrangement
might not be all bad. One of J.P. Morgan's partners had told the Senate that what was
needed was "a business court or controlling commission, composed largely of experienced
businessmen," which would license corporations, immunizing them from antitrust attack.
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way into law via the Clayton Act.6 5
The stress on specific kinds of business practices may have fit the
temperment of the Wilson era and the President's own penchant for a moralistic approach to public policy. Apart from the merger provisions which
were soon gutted by the Supreme Court, 66 the Clayton and Federal Trade
Commission Acts focused on business behavior rather than predominant
size. 67 Perhaps no phrase better expresses the continuing tension in antitrust goals than does Wilson's declaration that he was "for big business"
and "against the trusts."' 68 It turned out that Wilson favored a return to a
society of small business units no more than Roosevelt. Moralist that he
was, Wilson's alternative to both fragmentation and regulation was amelioration of business behavior. Not free competition, but illicit competition, was at the root of monopoly. A business that grew large through
69
superior industry and skill deserved to survive.
Thus, while much ink had been spilled, it was not evident that during
the Progressive Era the law had advanced beyond the Standard Oil decision. Wilson and White apparently both cherished the belief that dangerous size would not exist in the absence of bad behavior. Should this belief
prove wrong, however, large firms might emerge without engaging in the
forbidden practices. Under the guise of efficiency, the economic chilling
effect on freedom feared by Wilson might spread. This seemed to be the
Hearingson S.Res. 98, Before Senate Comm. on Interstate Commerce, 62d Cong., 1st Sess.
1092 (1911) (testimony of G.W. Perkins).
65. The Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12 to 27 (1976), forbids one corporation to acquire
the stock or assets of another corporation when the effect of such an acquisition may be
substantially to lessen competition between them. The Act also deals with tying arrangements, exclusive dealing agreements, and requirement contracts.
66. Two notable decisions undermining the merger provisions of the Clayton Act were
International Shoe v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291 (1930) and Arrow-Hart & Hegeman Elec. Co. v.
FTC, 291 U.S. 587 (1934). In International Shoe, the court narrowly defined the lessening
of competition necessary to trigger the Clayton Act prohibition. Although competition
might have been reduced by the merger, since a large portion of the business of the two firms
was in different markets, there was no antitrust violation. See NEALE, supra note 64, at 181
n.l. In the Arrow-Hart case the Supreme Court stated that the Clayton Act addressed acquisitions of stock not assets, and that the FTC could not deal with an asset acquisition even
if it arose out of a stock acquisition. One commentator concluded: "Thus ended, for most
practical purposes, any potential section 7 ever possessed as a limitation on mergers." L.
SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 590 (1977).
67. The stress on behavior expressed itself for many years in the preoccupation of the
FTC with unfair and deceptive practices. Ironically, these appear more frequently in the
most competitive industries. See Address by J. Miller, Fordham University Wilson Centennial Lecture (April 26, 1956), reprinted in THE PHILOSOPHY AND POLICIES OF WOODROW
WILSON 141 (E. Latham ed. 1958) [hereinafter cited as Miller].
68. Quoted in HOFSTADTER, supra note 36, at 256.
69. Miller, supra note 67, at 137.
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lesson of United States v. United States Steel Corp.70
U.S. Steel was an agglomeration of one hundred and eighty previously
independent firms. At the time of trial it controlled forty-one percent of
the market and was America's first billion dollar corporation, making it
"the greatest combination that had come out of the country's greatest combination movement."' 7 1 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court refused to condemn the steel company because "the law does not make mere size an
offense or the existence of unexerted power an offense. It, we repeat, requires overt acts. .... 72 The government had urged that even if U.S.
Steel did not exercise its power over prices "the power it may have, not the
exertion of the power, is an abhorrence to the law." Further, it claimed
that the wrongful purpose present in StandardOil was merely a "matter of
aggravation. ' 73 But the Court could not swallow this. Characterizing the
government's proposition as "paternalism," the Court asked whether it
would not lead to a situation in which business activities were "encouraged
when militant, and suppressed or regulated when triumphant because of
74
the dominance attained."
Thus, where power was unexercised and the "brutal" 75 practices of the
Standard Oil Company were lacking, the trust would not be condemned.
It appeared that the question left open by Justice White in Standard Oil
was resolved. Without bad behavior there could be no antitrust violation.
Another aspect of the law that seemed clarified was the relevance of efficiency-at least as the Court now understood the term. Counsel for the
company specifically referred to the aim of achieving economies of scale as
the basis for the combination. 76 It was "a vision of a great business...
70. 251 U.S. 417 (1920).
71. STOCKING, supra note 61, at 139.
72. 251 U.S. at 451.
73. Id at 450.
74. Id.
75. Id at 455.
76. Id at 443. The Supreme Court gave weight to this argument in a way that had
portent for the future. See note 102 infra and accompanying text. Although the Court
noted that size alone was no offense, it nevertheless admitted that there was some appeal in
the government's argument. 251 U.S. at 451. Thus, the Court proceeded to other grounds
for its refusal to dismember the company. It was an equitable concern, said the Court, that
prosecution had not been commenced until ten years after the origin of the combination.
Id at 451. The consideration was not one of time, but "the many millions of dollars spent,
the development made, and the enterprises undertaken; the investments by the public that
have been invited ... ." Id at 453. Moreover, the Court found the government's proposed
remedy unworkable and inconsistent. The government would have exempted the foreign
steel trade from the decree. The Court responded that it could not see how the Steel Corporation could be such a beneficial instrumentality in the trade of the world and yet have such
an evil effect on United States trade as to merit destiuction. Id. The Court therefore concluded that destruction of the combination would risk injury to the public interest, including
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which by reason of the economies thus to be effected . . . could success77
fully compete in all the markets of the world."
The New Deal no more than the Progressive Era could find a satisfactory solution to the conflict between efficiency and the political goals of
antitrust. This was not, however, for want of enthusiasm or effort. It is
difficult in retrospect to recall the public animus toward business that
could impel a president to excoriate "entrenched greed" and "resplendent
economic autocracy. '78 Seriatim, the New Dealers tried a variety of
weapons to bring business into line with what the second Roosevelt called
government's obligation to create "a democracy of opportunity. '79 The
results, however, were equivocal. First came the proponents of the National Recovery Administration (NRA).80 If the vicissitudes of the market
produced depression, and if large scale and coordinated action produced
efficiency, then perhaps by replacing the rigors of the market with cooperation, NRA could end the depression. But even before the Supreme Court
invalidated the NRA, 8 ' the Act was in trouble, not least from those who
were most critical of business. Both the antitrusters and liberal planners
a material disturbance and serious detriment to foreign trade. Id at 457. It was not the
last time that a judge claimed the impracticality of the proposed remedy as a grounds for
forebearance, or hesitated before accepting the responsibility for a possible destruction of
wealth and investments. Thus in this garb the efficiency criterion prevailed.
The ruling of the steel case was reaffirmed in United States v. International Harvester Co.,
274 U.S. 693 (1927) (size alone does not serve to indicate monopolistic practices). For the
next decade, the Justice Department's efforts against monopoly were idle. E. GELLHORN,
ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS 144 (1976). Serving as a retrospective on the demise of
antitrust efforts in the Progressive Era is George Stocking's summary of the steel case:
The extent to which this interpretation emasculated the Sherman Act as an instrument for preserving a competitive industrial structure in the American economy is,
I believe, not generally understooa. . . . [Tihe Great Combination Movement...
created the modem problem of oligopoly. . . . But unless their conduct is predatory, combinations falling short of monopoly under the rule of reason as originally
enunciated are beyond the statute's reach.
STOCKING, supra note 61, at 140. The original rule of reason, with its emphasis on intent,
"left undisturbed some of the greatest of the industrial combines. It is scarcely an exaggeration to say that it validated the new industrial structure." Id at 139.
77. 251 U.S. at 443.
78. E. HAWLEY, THE NEW DEAL AND THE PROBLEM OF MONOPOLY 156 (1966); J.
BURNS, ROOSEVELT: THE LION AND THE Fox 228 (1956).
79. BURNS, supra note 78, at 272.
80. The National Recovery Administration was established by the National Industrial
Revovery Act, ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195 (1933), as amended by S.J. Res. 113, 49 Stat. 375 (1935).
81. The Supreme Court invalidated the NRA in Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). Under the NRA, the President was authorized to formulate
codes for fair competition in any industry when necessary, in order to effectuate the policy of
the Act. In Schechter, the Court invalidated a criminal prosecution for violation of the Live
Poultry Code issued under the NRA. The Court stated that the virtually unfettered discretion of the President in approving and prescribing codes was an unconstitutional delegation
of legislative authority. Id at 542.
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found the NRA the worst of both worlds because it permitted cartelization
without seeming to advance either consumer welfare or democratic political goals. 82 The reason was not far to seek: since the codes were the result
of bargaining among existing groups, the well organized, usually business,
83
were favored.
After the demise of NRA, the play shifted to the trustbusters. Broadly
speaking, they included not only those who wielded the power to enforce
the antitrust laws, but a phalanx of New Dealers who believed in the decentralization of wealth and power. Their program included legislative
86
85
reform of banking, 84 the utilities companies, and securities regulation,
and it reflected high aspirations for redistributing wealth through taxation.8 7 The centerpiece was the trustbusting of Thurman Arnold, but in
the end the policy of decentralization did not prevail. Arnold's position
embodied the old dilemma of the trustbusters. He was willing to countenance concerted action for the sake of efficiency. Small was not beautiful
when the country faced continued depression. Large organization was
good if it was efficient and seemed to benefit the consumer. 88
82. Although the NRA encouraged the growth of new trade associations, it also fostered
collusion and cartelization. As most planners viewed it, however, tacit government acceptance of private monopolistic schemes merely worsened the economic imbalance brought on
by the depression. This imbalance resulted in reduced purchasing power, higher prices, and
lower profits, and also fostered inefficiency. HAWLEY, supra note 78, at 132-33, 277.
83. Id. at 71, 136. Since the highly organized groups had formulated a cohesive set of
demands, it naturally followed that the political bargaining process would favor their position over the unstructured and less organized. Comprehensive planning never had the support necessary to make it a reality apart from wartime. In piecemeal planning the pressure
groups involved were usually producers and accordingly regulation often imposed restrictions on competition. This was true in agriculture where the aim was to support higher
prices and reduce output and in labor relations where the aim was higher wages and job
security. It was also true in natural resources and transportation where often the result was
to foster inefficiency. Id. at 277. Similar difficulties were encountered with central planning
in wartime. See note 255 infra. See also text accompanying notes 211-13 infra.
84. Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (codified in scattered sections of 12
U.S.C.).
85. Public Utility Act of 1935, ch. 687, tit. I, 49 Stat. 803 (codified in scattered sections
of 15 U.S.C.).
86. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, tit. I, 48 Stat. 74 (codified in scattered sections of 15
U.S.C.).
87. HAWLEY, supra note 78, at 344-59.
88. Id at 428. Moreover, the momentum dissipated during World War II. The power
to grant antitrust immunity was given to the War Production Board and the Antitrust Division cancelled investigation of major industries, including steel. Id at 442. Political pressure groups often were more interested in exemption from competition than in enforcing it.
The necessary support for prosecution could be mobilized only against groups that had precipitated widespread public hatred or in instances of conflict within business' own ranks.
Id at 302.
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For all this, the fruits of the Arnold period were significant.8 9 Foremost
was the decision in the suit against the Aluminum Company of America
(Alcoa). 90 Alcoa gave rise to an opinion by Judge Learned Hand that
marked a new attempt to reconcile the economic with the non-economic
goals of antitrust doctrine. Denying the argument that Alcoa could not be
condemned because it had not earned monopoly profits, Judge Hand
stated that the Sherman Act has "wider purposes than maintaining a lid on
profits." 9 ' Although Congress might have condemned only those monop-

92
olies which could not show they "had adopted every possible economy
. . . that was not the way Congress chose; it did not condone 'good trusts'
and condemn 'bad' ones; it forbade all."' 93 Then the judge explicity ad-

dressed the grounds for the purported sweeping condemnation of the
trusts: those not necessarily based on economic motives alone. 94 Hand
recognized the possibility that Congress might prefer, because of its indi89. The years between 1938 and 1952 stand beside those of 1906 and 1920 as the second
great wave of antitrust prosecution. Although the firms challenged were not as uniformly
dominant as those subject to the first wave, the list included nearly all major firms with
shares of the market over 50%. The assault was mounted in the aluminum, communications, motion pictures, cans, shoe machinery, fruit, tobacco, cellophane, and data processing
industries. NBC had to divest the "network" that became ABC. National Broadcasting
Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943). Pullman divested its sleeping car business.
United States v. Pullman Co., 50 F. Supp. 123 (E.D. Pa. 1943), afl'dpercuriam, 330 U.S. 806
(1947). Paramount's vertical integration was dismembered. United States v. Paramount
Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948). DuPont was forced to give up its General Motors holdings. United States v. E.I. duPont deNemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957). DuPont was
acquitted in the cellophane case, however, United States v. E.I. duPont deNemours & Co.,
351 U.S. 377 (1956), and cases against Western Electric and IBM were abandoned. Again,
oligopoly did not feel the brunt of the effort, and virtually no dissolution in manufacturing
resulted. SHEPHERD, supra note 23, at 185-89.
90. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). The Second Circuit acted as a court of last resort because there was no quorum on the Supreme
Court. Judge Hand's decision was later approved by the Supreme Court in American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 813-14 (1946). When suit was filed in 1937, Alcoa
was the only domestic producer of virgin ingot. The charge was a violation of section 2 of
the Sherman Act. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 44 F. Supp. 97
(S.D.N.Y. 1944).
91. Hand accordingly viewed the issue of profits as "irrelevant." 148 F.2d at 427.
92. Id This congressional approach would have implied "constant scrutiny and constant supervision, such as courts are unable to provide." Id.
93. Id
94. Economic reasons could be given for a blanket prohibition on monopoly, said
Hand. Id at 428. The unexercised power of a monopoly was as dangerous as the admitted
danger of a price fixing conspiracy. Id The distinction between power alone and power
accompanied by bad acts, he reasoned, was erased by the recognition in the Clayton Act that
"practices harmless in themselves will not be tolerated when they 'tend to create a monopoly.'" Id Moreover, the ban on monopolization stems from the further belief "that great
industrial consolidations are inherently undesirable, regardless of their economic results."
Id Thus he saw the aim of the Act as "to perpetuate and preserve, for its own sake and in
spite of possible cost, an organization of industry in small units .... . Id at 428-29.
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rect social or moral consequences, a system of small producers over "one
in which
the great mass of those engaged must accept the direction of a
5
9

few."

Perhaps all of this discussion was meant only to provide the grounds for
a presumption against size. Hand immediately conceded that the existence of monopoly did not necessarily mean there had been the "monopolization" forbidden by the words of the Sherman Act. The company "may
''
not have achieved monopoly; monopoly may have been thrust upon it. 96
Intent might therefore still be relevant. It turned out, however, that the

kind of intent for which Hand would search was not the flagrant practices
relied upon in Standard Oil. Size "magnified" to a monopoly and "utilized" for abuse was sufficient. 97 "[N]o intent is relevant except that
which is relevant to any liability, criminal or civil: i e., an intent to bring
'98
about the forbidden act."
Alcoa has been attacked for arrogating to the judiciary the power to
make decisions regarding social and political objectives which, if made at
all, can only be at a cost to consumers. Such non-economic objectives are
said to be inappropriate, in any event, for judicial decision because they
lack clear standards and should be left to the political process. 99 In his95. Id. at 427.
96. Id at 429.
97. Id. at 416. The "abuse" was not the equivalent of Rockefeller's behavior. Assuming no "moral derelictions," the only question was whether Alcoa had achieved monopoly
without seeking it. The answer was clear:
It was not inevitable that it should always anticipate increases in the demand for
ingot and be prepared to supply them. Nothing compelled it to keep doubling and
redoubling its capacity before others entered the field. . . . [Ilt face[d] every newcomer with new capacity already geared into a great organization, having the advantage of experience, trade connections and the elite of personnel ....
Id at 431.
98. Id at 432.
99. BORK, supra note 16, at 51-55, 82-84. Alcoa has also been attacked on the grounds
that Judge Hand violated the teaching of the Steel case which, in his view, ruled that "[tihe
successful competitor, having been urged to compete, must not be turned upon when he
wins." 148 F.2d at 430. See also Director & Levi, Law and the Future. Trade Regulation, 51
Nw. U.L. REv. 281, 286 (1956). The opinion has also been criticized on the grounds that it
invites oligopolistic behavior by discouraging successful firms from engaging in vigorous
competition as they acquire dominant market position. GELLHORN, supra note 76, at 148,
150.
The contention that Judge Hand had invited oligopolistic behavior simply points up a
central dilemma in the antitrust laws. Faced with a choice between monopoly and oligopoly, the law has chosen the latter as the lesser evil. It is a cliche that General Motors plans
its conduct with one eye on the enforcement agencies lest it be blamed for eliminating American Motors. Hand simply confronted the riddle that Justice White had avoided by assuming that competition would inevitably prevent monopoly. The question was what to do if it
did not.
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toric context, however, Alcoa's implications seem less extreme. ioo The actual record of enforcement after Alcoa does not warrant great alarm. The
difficulty of dismembering a giant corporation has been compared to the
task of unscrambling eggs, and the courts have paused before wielding the
ultimate trustbusting weapon.' l0 Thus, although Alcoa altered the emphasis in the antitrust tradition, it hardly revolutionized the law or American industrial structure. The presumption in favor of size which had been
announced in the steel case was finally laid to rest and perhaps reversed,
but antitrust doctrine still vacillated between the poles of efficiency and
02
social criteria staked out by Hand.
Merger law well illustrates the continuing tension between efficiency
and social criteria in antitrust. After the Supreme Court's emasculation of
the Clayton Act's merger provisions in the early 1930's,10 3 antimerger activity was quiescent until the FTC warned in a 1948 report that unless
something was done about a perceived trend toward corporate concentra100. Although Hand "turned upon" the successful competitor with his rhetoric, he declined to dissolve the monopoly because no one could predict its survival beyond the disposal of Alcoa's plants, leased to it by the government during the war. 148 F.2d at 446-47.
Dissolution of Alcoa never occurred. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 1954
Trade Cas. (CCH) 67,745 (S.D.N.Y.). For the view that the courts have performed reasonably well in balancing economic and social criteria, see Dewey, The Economic Theory of
Antitrust."Science or Religion, 50 VA. L. REV. 413 (1964).
101. ELZINGA & BREIT, THE ANTITRUST PENALTIES: A STUDY IN LAW AND ECONOMICS
50-54 (1976). The matter was explained by Judge Wyzanski in United States v. United
Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 347-48 (D. Mass. 1953), a'dpercuiam, 347 U.S. 521
(1954):
Judges in prescribing remedies have known their own limitations. They do not ex
officio have economic or political training. . . . They are not so representative as
In the antitrust field the courts have been
other branches of the Government ....
accorded, by common consent, an authority they have in no other branch of enacted law. . . . [Judges] would not have been given, or allowed to keep, such authority in the antitrust field, and they would not so freely have altered from time to
time the interpretation of its substantive provisions, if courts were in the habit of
proceeding with the surgical ruthlessness that might commend itself to those seeking absolute assurance that there will be workable competition, and to those aiming at immediate realization of the social, political, and economic advantages of
dispersal of power...
102. In United States v. Grinnell Corp., Judge Wyzanski suggested that the day might
come when market dominance would be presumptively illegal. 236 F. Supp. 244, 248
(D.R.I. 1964), af'dexcept asto decree, 384 U.S. 563 (1966). The Supreme Court responded,
however, that the record showed conscious acquisition of power and therefore the Court had
no reason to say whether a showing of monopoly power imposes a burden on the defense to
demonstrate that the dominance is due to industrial skill-i.e., efficiency. Areeda and Turner conclude that despite the dicta in Alcoa, efficiency criteria have generally prevailed in
the case law. I AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 10, at T 104 (1978). Accord, Flynn, Elzinga,
Sullivan & Gray, supra note 25, at 1204. But see Bork, Bowman, Blake & Jones, supra note
25.
103. See note 66 supra.
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tion, "the giant corporations will ultimately take over the country."' 1 4 An
amended and strengthened Clayton Act 0 5 was applied in a series of stringent Supreme Court rulings.
In Brown Shoe Co. v. United States,10 6 the Court asserted that the basis
for the new antimerger law was not only the fear of concentration, but a
belief in the "desirability of retaining 'local control' over industry and the
protection of small businesses." 10 7 The antimerger rules became so strict
that in UnitedStates v. Von's Grocery Co.,108 Justice Stewart remarked that
"[tihe sole consistency that I can find [in the cases] is that in litigation
under [section] 7, the Government always wins.'' 09 Nevertheless, in
United States v. GeneralDynamics Corp., I 10 the Supreme Court returned
to a more balanced consideration of whether specific market shares would
actually have an anticompetitive effect. The antimerger campaign of the
1960's appears, therefore, to have abated."'
104. See GELLHORN, supra note 76, at 304.
105. Pub. L. No. 63-212, 38 Stat. 730 (1914), as amended by Act of June 19, 1936, Pub. L.
No. 74-692,49 Stat. 1526 (1936), as amendedby Act of Dec. 29, 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-899, 64
Stat. 1125 (1950).
106. 370 U.S. 294 (1962). In Brown, the Government sought to enjoin the merger of two
corporations on the grounds that it might substantially lessen competition in violation of § 7
of the Clayton Act, as amended in 1950. The Court looked to the legislative history of the
1950 amendments in concluding that Congress intended that a variety of economic and
other factors should be considered in determining whether a merger was consistent with the
provisions of the Act. The 1950 amendments to the Clayton Act were designed to prevent
corporations from acquiring another corporation by means of the acquisition of its assets.
See generally H.R. REP. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949). Prior to the amendments,
the law prohibited only the acquisition of the stock of a corporation. Since the acquisition
of stock often resulted in control of the corporation's underlying assets, the Court stated
Congress believed that a failure to prohibit the direct purchase of corporate assets abrogated
the spirit of the law.
107. Id at 315-16.
108. 384 U.S. 270 (1966). Justice Stewart's lengthy dissent charged the Court with turning its back on the two basic principles underlying the Clayton Act. First, Stewart argued,
corporate acquisitions are to be viewed in light of the current economic context of the relevant industry. Second, § 7 of the Clayton Act was intended to protect competition, not
competitors. Id.at 281-82 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
109. Id at 301.
110. 415 U.S. 486 (1974). In GeneralDynamics, the Government charged that the acquisition of a large producer and supplier of coal by another coal producer was a violation of §
7 of the Clayton Act. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's finding that the acquisition did not violate the Act and that while the Government's evidence-primarily statistical-supported a finding of "undue concentration," the district court was justified in
considering other pertinent factors affecting the coal industry. Id at 508-10. The Court
looked to pre-acquisition evidence relating to changes and patterns of the coal industry
which indicated that no substantial lessening of competition would result from the acquisition. Id at 504.
111. Moreover, it is arguable that, by itself, a strict antimerger approach does not disturb,
and may even consolidate, the position of dominant firms. The dominant firm has less to
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Thus, the picture of antitrust that emerges from this historical survey is
Janus-faced. Now, as from the beginning, it sometimes looks in opposite
directions. Robert McCloskey wrote that in the field of constitutional law,
the American delegation of power to the courts reflects a compromise between the doctrine of popular sovereignty and the doctrine of natural
law." 12 Likewise with antitrust, Congress and the electorate have delegated to the courts the resolution of conflicting American desires for material abundance and a society structured to preserve political and economic
liberty. The result has been a mild restraint upon business behavior with
little disturbance of its underlying structure. Whether this is sufficient to
preserve either abundance or liberty is doubtful.
In the case law, efficiency criteria have generally prevailed. 113 If other
antitrust goals were implicitly recognized, it was assumed, as in Standard
Oil, that the deconcentration necessary to achieve market efficiency would
also achieve the social objectives of antitrust. Thus, as pressure mounted
to depart from the deconcentration approach of antitrust, antitrust doctrine provided no principled way to decide whether the arguable efficiencies of large scale should be sacrificed in the name of other antitrust
objectives. Even Alcoa, which explicitly recognized the non-economic
efficiency,
goals of antitrust, stated only that in the case of a conflict with
114
social goals might prevail and divestiture might be ordered.
In failing to analyze why deconcentration was socially desirable, antitrust doctrine provided no guide and suggested no alternative when the
pressure to abandon the deconcentration approach became too strong to
override or ignore. Moreover, in relying on deconcentration to achieve its
political goals, antitrust doctrine simply ignored industries in which the
number of firms was sufficient to foster competition and yet the industry
was able to wield undue influence in the political process. In short, the
cases either ignored the political goals of antitrust or failed to adumbrate
an analytical framework to fulfill the underlying policy objectives of the
law.
For the reasons which follow, the failure of the case law to deal with the
conflicts in antitrust doctrine has become an increasingly serious problem.
In a simplistic model of antitrust, economic and political goals might be
attained simultaneously. The emphasis on deconcentration and preservafear from consolidations that might confront it with countervailing power.
supra note 23, at 102 n.23, 118-19.

SHEPHERD,

112. R. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 12-13 (1960).

113. See I AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 10, at 104, and note 102 supra.
114. See notes 94-95 and accompanying text supra. For a discussion of cases in which
efficiency has arguably been sacrificed to political goals and an argument that such sacrifice
is appropriate, see Bork, Bowman, Blake & Jones, supra note 25, at 382-84, 425-36.
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tion of numerous competitors might also minimize the influence of economics on political power. A situation of truly free enterprise would
result. In a search for criteria to guide industrial policy, there is a certain
appeal in the simplicity of this model of antitrust.' 5 Yet, this standard of
the market was, in many instances, long ago abandoned, often because the
price and efficient allocamarket failed to operate to yield the competitive
6
theory.1
by
tion of resources portrayed
Moreover, although a considerable body of academic learning supports
the proposition that large scale is not necessary for economic efficiency and
that competition, rather than regulation, is the optimum approach,1 7 large
115. Where the market standard is abandoned, doesn't one "set sail on a sea of doubt" as
Judge Taft wrote in 1898 in United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir.
1898). Thus, experience in regulation of public utilities indicates how difficult it is by nonmarket means to set rates which are not so low as to deny a fair return to investors or so high
as to cheat customers. Most troubling, perhaps, is that the more commodities and services
are priced by non-market means, the more difficult it becomes to set rates. Fewer reference
points or prices exist which accurately reflect the sacrifices the economy must make to produce the item for which the government agency wishes to set rates. Is it possible to arrive at
a reasonable rate for electricity when the price of oil to run the generators and produce the
electricity is also fixed by non-market means? This raises the problem of so-called second
best analysis. See I A. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION 44,69 n.17, 195-98 (1970).
For general discussion of the economic defects of regulation see SHEPHERD, supra note 23, at
148-54, 225-58 and C. WILcox, PUBLIC POLICIES TOWARD BUSINESS 463-78 (3d ed. 1966).
116. It was recognized at an early date that the market would yield a "natural monopoly" in some instances. This accounts for the recourse to regulation in utilities like electricity. It was also recognized that there are certain goods which will not be supplied unless
they are supplied through collective effort. Examples of such goods are parks and national
defense. Such goods are characterized by the "free rider" problem, with respect to which it
is difficult for the producer to charge those who benefit. Those who refuse to pay, benefit
regardless from the results for which others pay. If reliance is placed upon the market no
one will find it worth his while to produce these so-called social goods. Samuelson, The
Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 REv. ECON. & STAT. 387-89 (1954).
Another situation of market failure which precipitates government intervention is that of
"ruinous competition," arising in situations of overcapacity and high fixed costs accompanied by low or decreasing incremental costs. The railroads exemplify this situation. Because plant investment in such an industry is enormous and immobile, when customer
demand fluctuated, pressure was created to compete for customers in the only way available-through price wars. This included resort to price discrimination and predatory pricing below cost. Thus, investments were wiped out through price rivalry; customers were
confronted with erratic prices and workers were faced with erratic employment. The pressures led to collusion and cartel. Jones, The Public Service Enterprise and the Deregulation
Debate, 45 ANTITRUST L. J. 197, 200 (1976). In a sense, the market was operating, at least
until cartel resulted; but the consequences of the market's operation were socially unacceptable and regulation was imposed. As will be discussed, something akin to the difficulties of
the railroads may be recurring today in the steel industry. See text accompanying note 198
infra. See also 2 AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 10, at 412 (ruinous competition).
117. See Asch, Industrial Concentration, Efficiency and Antitrust Reform, 22 ANTITRUST
BULL. 129, 131 n.10 (1977), and authorities cited therein. In many instances where the
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scale firms persist. 18 Although evidence indicates that some positions of
market power are subject to natural erosion, most significant market power
persists." t9 Eastman-Kodak and General Electric have held their dominant positions since the beginning of the century; Coca-Cola, Campbell
Soup and General Motors since the 1920's; Kellogg and Procter & Gamble
since the 1940's.120 In spite of the theoretical possibility of smaller units of
efficient scale, a number of factors militate in favor of large scale and but12
tress entrenched market power.
orthodoxy of competition was abandoned, there is now a clamor for a return to the faith
through "deregulation." Regulatory agencies are accused of colluding with industry at the
expense of the customer. It seems apparent, for example, that easier entry into the airline
and trucking industries would yield benefits to the public almost immediately. See Weaver,
Unlocking the Gilded Cage of Regulation, FORTUNE, Feb. 1977, at 179. Nevertheless those
who seek sweeping deregulation face a paradox in the persistence of many large scale firms
discussed in the text.
118. Ten to fifteen percent of all manufacturing relates to military and space production
and is, therefore, not even directly subject to market forces. At least half of American
manufacturing takes place in industries where the leading four firms control 40% or more of
the market-in other words oligopolistic industries. SCHERER, supra note 15, at 59-60.
Without entering the debate over whether industrial concentration is increasing, it can be
remarked that in 1962 the 100 largest manufacturing corporations held nearly half the total
assets in the country. J. BLAIR, ECONOMIC CONCENTRATION at 68, 74 (1972). In three-fifths

of all industries, the 200 largest firms employ, on the average, nearly half the workers. Id
SCHERER, supra note 15, at 99, states that since World War II concentration has decreased in
producer goods industries but increased in consumer goods. See also note 369 infra.
119. SHEPHERD, supra note 23, at 113-20, 129.

120. Id. at 117.
121. First, although production economies of scale are not thought to account for the
existing large size of corporations, they are important in new industries. SHEPHERD, supra
note 23, at 218. Furthermore, while more firms might exist in mature industries, the picture
is still not one approaching the image of the classical market, populated by a forest of competitors. As long ago as 1951, economies of scale indicated the possibility of as few as 40
United States plants of optimal scale in the steel industry and 10 in automobiles. SCHERER,
supra note 15, at 83.
The prevalence of managerial and research and development (R & D) economies of large
scale is debatable, but it seems likely that they are significant in some instances. A
respected management concern called the Boston Consulting Group (BCG) advises clients
to concentrate only on markets in which they are or can become one of the top three in
market share. This approach seems to be based in part on findings that companies with
high market shares have lower costs because they have greater experience. Unless You Can
Be a Winner, Don'tPlay, FORBES, Oct. 15, 1977 at 132. See also Winter, CorporateStrategies
Giving New Emphasis to Market Share, Rank, Wall St. J., Feb. 3, 1978, at 1, col. 6; Symposium on the Economics of InternalOrganization,6 BELL J. OF ECON. (1975). With respect to
the relationship between market share and profits, see SHEPHERD, supra note 23, at 41-44,
92-105, 197-200.
Prevailing wisdom says that research and development is not a source of scale economies
because small firms are likely to be the most innovative. Large firms may attempt to reap
continued benefits from monopoly positions in the old technology. Yet, often it takes the
resources of a large firm to develop the potential of an innovation initiated by a small firm.
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Not the least important reason for this persistence of market power is
the caution of the courts in dealing with such power. 122 Whatever the
theoretical possibility of massive trustbusting, such an effort has not materialized. The caution of judges is reinforced by disagreement among
economists. It is argued by some that a merger or increase in scale which
achieves even minor decreases in costs will offset significant price increases, resulting in a net efficiency gain. 123 Others assert that efficient
scale varies from firm to firm, and that whatever a firm's size may be is the
size efficient for that firm.' 24 Economists Elzinga and Breit, however, con25
clude that efficiency provides no clear guide to divestiture policy.'
Accompanying the caution against dismemberment of large firms is the
argument that the persistence of large firms and oligopolistic industries
does not produce the evils envisioned in the orthodox model of antitrust.
"Workable" competition, it is said, can take place with only a few firms in
Thus, major advances in efficiency of diesel engines were only made after General Motors
bought out two small companies that initiated the technical improvements. SCHERER, supra
note 15, at 357.
A significant force encouraging large-scale may be the imperfection of capital markets. It
has been argued that large firms develop ongoing relationships with large banks and that a
bias is created against lending to smaller firms. SHEPHERD, supra note 23, at 27-28. A
wave of banking mergers between 1950 and 1963 created a highly monopolistic structure in
banking which may tend to "replicate itself' in the industries with which the banks have
relations. Id at 29, 174.
There is substantial consensus that advertising, especially TV advertising, and design and
model changes, contribute to concentration in consumer goods industries. See BLAIR, supra
note 118, at 308-38; W. COMANOR & T. WILSON, ADVERTISING AND MARKET POWER
(1974). The same is true of patents, sundry grants and privileges received from the government. BLAIR, supra note 118, at 372-402; SHEPHERD, supra note 23, at 218-19.
Finally, as old regulatory forms wither, contemporary views regarding the tolerable side
effects of market functioning create new pressure to displace the market. In effect, many
goods and services which were previously left to the market are now considered social goods
with which the market does not deal satisfactorily. Housing, urban mass transit, health
care, energy resource development and pollution control may fall into this category. The
list of these social goods seems to lengthen as society becomes more complex and social
attitudes evolve. Thus, the prospects increase for greater displacement of the market. See
note 174 and accompanying text infra. In some instances the efforts to ameliorate social
problems actually aggravate other tendencies toward increasing corporate size. For instance, compliance with pollution control requirements can now amount to 10% of investment for new plants in the steel industry, thereby increasing the difficulty of obtaining
necessary capital in an industry already characterized by enormous capital costs. W. HoGAN, THE 1970s: CRITICAL YEARS FOR STEEL 34 (1972).
122. See note 101 supra.
123. ELZINGA & BREIT, supra note 101, at 101.
124. Id at 106.
125. ELZINGA & BREIT, supra note 101, at 106 concluded: "The conceptual underpinnings of the economics involved can be articulated with a modicum of precision, but the
application of this analysis to specific [divestiture] problems would be extremely complicated."
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the market. 126 The conclusion which emerges is that the old antitrust emphasis on deconcentration to maintain numerous firms in the market is
misguided because it reduces productive efficiency and because competition is "workable" with few firms.
From these conclusions emerges an argument for the presumptive legality of large size. Where there is doubt regarding the efficiency of a particular arrangement, the tie goes to the trust. "Cases may occur," states
Professor Bork, "primarily in the fields of horizontal mergers and horizontal ancillary restraints, in which chances seem roughly equal that the activity is beneficial or harmful."' 127 In such cases it would be the "sheerest
folly" to resolve the doubt by banning the conduct: "private restriction of
output may be less harmful to consumers than mistaken rules of law that
inhibit efficiency."' 28 Moreover, "when no affirmative case for intervention is shown, the general preference for freedom should bar legal coercion."129

Thus, in the guise of the efficiency argument, the old presumption in
favor of size, announced in the Steel case and interred in Alcoa, has been
exhumed. Efficiency, as always, is a two-edged sword. The trustbusters
invoke it to support their efforts, but so do those who contend that efficiency and large size are compatible. Proponents of antitrust may thus
look with suspicion on recent cases like GTE Sylvania,'3 0 which signalled
the Supreme Court's renewed emphasis on the efficiency criterion. While
126. See SCHERER, supra note 15, at 36, 408. Areeda and Turner assert that it is "highly
unlikely" that four-firm concentration ratios of150 to 55% will confer isubstantial market
power. 2 AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 10, at 407d. For a critique of the "workable
competition" doctrine, see STOCKING, note 61 supra.
127. BORK, supra note 16, at 133.
128. Id
129. Id
130. Continental T.V. v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36 (1977). Sylvania, in marketing its
television sets, required its franchised dealers to sell Sylvania products only from the location at which they were franchised. Following the rule of United States v. Arnold Schwinn
& Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967), the trial judge instructed the jury that it must find Sylvania's
practice illegal if it restrained Sylvania's dealers by limiting the locations from which they
could resell television sets. 433 U.S. at 40-41. No defense based on the reasonableness of
the restraint was permitted. In other words, Sylvania could not argue that the restraint
increased its competitive efficiency. The Supreme Court said this view of competition was
too shortsighted. Noting that since instituting its location policy, Sylvania had improved its
share of national T.V. sales from about two percent to approximately five percent, the
Supreme Court concluded that some restraint of trade among its dealers might make Sylvania better able to compete with other manufacturers and improve overall efficiency in the
market. Id at 38-39. See also United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486
(1974), discussed at note 110 supra; National Soc. of Professional Engrs. v. United States,
435 U.S. 679 (1978) (professional ethical canon which prohibits members from submitting
competitive bids on its face restrains trade in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act;
public interest considerations other than competition policy not relevant).
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in these cases, the Supreme Court has not given its imprimatur to the theory of presumptive legality of large scale, the emphasis on efficiency criteria may provide a basis on which proponents of the presumptive legality
theory can build. For example, defenders of the oil industry contend that
dismemberment of the major oil companies sought in the FTC's Exxon
case' 3 1 and in some pending legislation 132 would decrease efficiency and
result in increased costs to consumers. 133 Similarly, some proposals for
resolving current difficulties in the steel industry envision relaxation of antitrust merger law to allow steel to benefit from the supposed increased
efficiencies of larger scale operations. 34 If efficiency is to be the polestar
of antitrust policy, deconcentration in some industries may be doomed.
When, for efficiency or other reasons, pressure mounts for a departure
from the deconcentration model, the antitrust tradition provides little in
the way of guidance. In the past, when cases did not simply ignore the
political goals of antitrust, such goals were assumed to be consistent with
efficiency goals. Economic and non-economic objectives could be endorsed on the assumption that a program of deconcentration would
achieve both. When it can be demonstrated, however, that efficiency requires a departure from deconcentration, antitrust has little to offer beyond
the suggestion that efficiency goals may have to be sacrificed to social
goals. This is a legitimate contention; but this doctrine-the doctrine of
Alcoa-has never been fully implemented. 35 Now, distinguished authority asserts that the economic costs of any significant program to disperse
36
political power through antitrust enforcement would be prohibitive.
To the degree that this assessment of the effects of deconcentration overestimates the costs in efficiency, antitrust theory must still deal with the
131. In re Exxon, [1973-1976 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) $ 20,388 (July.
17, 1973).
132. See notes 4, 5 and accompanying text, supra.
133. Ritchie, Petroleum Dismemberment, 29 VAND. L. REv. 1131, 1155 (1976).
134. See notes 184, 193-95 and accompanying text infra.
135. See notes 100, 114 and text accompanying notes 103 & 111 supra.
136. Areeda and Turner state:
Reasoning about the possible utility of pursuing populist goals must begin with the
premise that antitrust policy is simply not going to sacrifice consumer welfare to
the point of guaranteeing a very large number of producers in every market ...
Once massive sacrifices of efficiency to preserve more numerous inefficient firms
are ruled out, what remains is not likely, even to a committed populist, to make
enough difference to be worth the effort....
IIa. The authors offer no proof for the assertion
2 AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 10, at
that "massive sacrifices of efficiency" would be required to achieve "populist" goals. Id at
111, 11la. Indeed, elsewhere in arguing the minimal significance of economies of scale,
the authors suggest efficiencies gained from large scale are not pervasive. Id at 408d.
Nor do they, in view of their conclusion that antitrust cannot achieve populist goals, offer an
alternative means to achieve those goals through industrial organization.
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contention that consideration of the political factor mandated by Alcoa is
no business of the courts. Professor Bork contends that Alcoa improperly
authorized unfettered discretion for courts "to do good as the judge sees
the good" with "no more guidance than that public injury is to be weighed
against private benefit .... -137 He argues that judges should not arrogate to themselves such "legislative" authority, and that consideration of
non-economic criteria results in the protection of inefficient firms and the
38
imposition of a tax on consumers.
The contention, however, that to weigh criteria other than efficiency protects inefficient firms and taxes consumers, even if true, merely restates the
problem. Such a formulation ignores the fact that human beings exist as
citizens as well as consumers and have interests in the former capacity as
well as the latter. 39 Failure to consider social and political criteria may
protect unwarranted political power and tax the citizen's political influence. Moreover, as the previous discussion of the historical record
reveals, actual implementation of non-economic considerations by the
courts has been relatively restrained. The dialectic in antitrust between
economic and social-political criteria has persisted. Although efficiency
considerations have predominated, the other goals of antitrust policy have
not been completely ignored. Such consideration of social-political criteria, as well as economic factors, appears to approximate the tenor of Congress and its diverse constituencies more closely than does some singlefactor approach.
Nevertheless, as has already been suggested, the antitrust approach may
not provide adequate protection against unwarranted economic influence
on politics for several reasons. Of primary significance is the existence of
economic and social pressure to depart from the market. Also significant,
and addressed at greater length below, is the possibility that the degree of
deconcentration consistent with the economic goals of antitrust may not
preclude the industry from wielding undue influence in the political process. Finally, there may be modes of economic influence on politics, such
as the effect of advertising on popular attitudes, which are simply not significantly constrained by the antitrust approach. To the degree that antitrust fails to surmount these obstacles to enhancing democratic politics, it
is therefore not enough to say that an antitrust court may legitimately consider the political goals of antitrust. Nor is it enough to assert that antitrust
increasingly fails in pursuit of its political goals. Some alternative must be
137. BORK, supra note 16, at 53. But see Dewey, note 100 supra.
138. BORK, supra note 16, at 53, 56.
139. ARISTOTLE, IX NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS ch. IX, § 3: "[N]o one would choose to
have all the good things of the world in solitude: man is a being meant for political association.. "
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found. 140
The obvious alternatives, however, are not attractive. The experience
of countries in which total government ownership of industry prevails indicates great inefficiencies in such an approach and raises the spectre of
concentrated governmental power and economic regimentation. 14 This is
the very opposite of Pertschuk's "pervasive distrust of concentration of
power in a few hands" and of Learned Hand's abhorrence of "the direction of a few."
The task for the antitrust enforcement agencies and for those concerned
about the influence of economic strength on political power is to weigh the
political factor in choosing among alternative forms of industrial organization. Especially when economic and social imperatives are moving policy
away from the market and away from deconcentration, it is necessary to
discover how the salutary political effects of the competitive market can be
reproduced without reliance on the classical market. The point is not that
the market can never be relied upon, but that when it cannot, the old political goals of antitrust should not be abandoned. In order to devise means
of avoiding unwarranted economic influence on the political system, however, it is necessary to consider the character of the influence which is to be
prevented-an inquiry to which we now turn.
II. ANALYZING ECONOMIC INFLUENCE ON POLITICS
Although the political goals of antitrust have not been clearly defined,
their significance in historical terms may have been crucial. Franz Neu140. Areeda and Turner argue that where efficiencies are the cause of large scale, antitrust efforts to maintain many small firms will be futile, since such efforts are contrary to
economic imperatives. They also contend that preservation of the small inefficient firms is
counterproductive in populist terms because it creates a special-interest pressure group seeking to retain its governmental protection. 2 AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 10, at 1 111,
11 lb. The first point, concerning the pressures to favor efficiencies over "populist" goals,
suggests the need to explore means other than antitrust to achieve those goals--the purpose
of the present article. The second argument-that preserving a dependent class of inefficient small firms conflicts with populist goals--is not self-evident. Populists might argue
that the pressure of many inefficient firms is preferable to the clout of a few giants and
furthermore that Areeda and Turner have set up a straw man. Populism might be satisfied
with a tie-breaker rule that favors deconcentration in doubtful cases. Even from the standpoint of efficiency, however, the self-correcting capability of a market composed of numerous competitors is likely to be greater than a concentrated market. Finally, to the degree
that antitrust or various social policies do result in maintaining special interest pressure
groups, it is necessary to examine how the wider interests of the public can be achieved by
other means. See notes 154, 167, 256 and accompanying text infra.
141. See J. BERLINER, FACTORY AND MANAGER IN THE U.S.S.R. (1957); R. CAMPBELL,
SOVIET ECONOMIC POWER 28-105 (2d ed. 1977); C. FRIEDRICH & Z. BRZEZINSKI, TOTALITARIAN DICTATORSHIP AND AUTOCRACY

MARKETS

65-75, 236-46 (1977).

177-236 (1956); C.

LINDBLOM,

POLITICS AND
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mann suggested in 1942 that the rise of fascism in Germany was facilitated
by the absence of an antimonopoly tradition. 4 2 The middle class did not
oppose cartelization, and labor, following socialist ideology, favored concentration. One result, according to Neumann, was a lack of opposition to
authoritarian control within the business world. 143 In this historical perspective, the recent excesses of American big business are particularly
troubling. For example, political campaigns inflated by illegal corporate
contributions have impugned the integrity of democratic electoral machinery. '4 One big company attempted to insinuate itself into the making of
foreign policy toward Chile in circumstances suggesting an effort to sub145
vert and negate a foreign election.
The antitrust tradition is ill-equipped to respond to these new abuses of
economic power, for it was an axiom of antitrust doctrine that decentralization in the economic sphere would further democratic political goals.
Although the assumption was never entirely true,146 as a rule of thumb, the
decentralization axiom was sound enough. But because the principal of
decentralization was considered axiomatic, antitrust doctrine contains no
analysis of its desirability from the perspective of politics.
This analytical gap might have been harmless if decentralization were
always possible. For reasons suggested above, however, this is not the
case. Accordingly, antitrust provides no general theory of the relationship
between industrial organization and democratic politics which would provide guidance when social and economic conditions impel a departure
from a policy of deconcentration. Even this might not have been a serious
failure if public policy other than antitrust reflected such a theory. To a
great extent, however, the limits of antitrust theory reflected the limits of
142. F. NEUMANN, BEHEMOTH
ISHMENT OF I.G. FARBEN (1978).

22-33 (1942). Seealso J. BORKIN,

THE CRIME AND PUN-

143. NEUMANN, supra note 142, at 22-33.
144. See generally Eilberg, Investigation by the Committee on the Judiciaryof the House of
Representatives into the Charges of Impeachable Conduct against Richard M Nixon, 48
TEMP. L.Q. 209 (1975); Symposium--United States v. Nixon, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1 (1974).
145.

See STAFF OF THE SENATE SUB.COMM. ON MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS, RE-

PORT TO THE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS: THE INTERNATIONAL TELEPHONE AND TELE-

COMPANY AND CHILE, 1970-71, 93D CONG., IST SESS. 17-20 (Comm. Print 1973); R.
STANFORD, THE MURDER OF ALLENDE 70-76 (trans. Andrele Conrad, 1976); Bock, The
Transnational Corporation and Private Foreign Policy, 11 Soc'Y 44-49 (1974). For a recent
official statement on the issue of the influence of large companies on foreign policy, see
GRAPH

COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON

U.S.

FOR-

EIGN RELATIONS AND MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS: WHAT'S THE CONNECTION? (Aug.

23, 1978).
146. A major shortcoming of the assumption was that an industry may be competitive in

economic terms yet wield undue influence in the political process. Moreover, there might
be modes of economic influence on politics, such as advertising, that are not significantly
constrained by trustbusting.
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broader political-economic theory.1 47
In the years following World War II, the weaknesses in antitrust doctrine did not cause much concern. Prevailing wisdom in political science took a serene view of economic influence on politics. 148 If the
antitrust tradition provided an independent caution regarding the effects of
economic power, it received little support from the social sciences. Indeed, not the least disturbing aspect of recent business malfeasance is that
it was largely unanticipated by the prevailing academic analysis of business influence on politics. One sophisticated team of scholars concluded
in 1963 that big business influence had declined during the preceding fifty
years;' 49 that its participation in the political process was relatively restrained; 50 that legislators were largely insulated from pressure tactics;' 5 '
147. Louis Hartz suggests that from the beginning, the "trust" problem reflected a pervasive tension between the America of liberal imagination and "a real social world that was
beginning to deny it .... ." L. HARTZ, THE LIBERAL TRADITION IN AMERICA 237-39
(1955). In this view, the trust became a Progressive obsession because Americans sought to
define economic reality in terms congenial to the inherited social orthodoxy of decentralization, familiar in liberal philosophers such as John Locke. Id at 232. Whatever the realities
of industrial development, in theory, "[i]f the trust were at the heart of all evil, then Locke
could be kept intact simply by smashing it." Id
148. In 1955, surveying "The Age of Reform," the historian Richard Hofstadter said that
while the hopes of the Progressives had not been fulfilled, their fears had not materialized
either. The Progressives feared that beyond the expropriation of economic decision from
the entrepreneur lay the increasing possibility of expropriation of political decision from the
people. From the perspective of the 1950's, however, the picture looked rosier. For one
thing, aspirations had changed-few men felt the absence of opportunity for enterpreneurship as a great deprivation. Big business was thought to be technologically more progressive compared with smaller units. The change in methods of capital formation was said to
have diffused the problem of the money trust. Labor had grown up as a countervailing
force opposed to capital. The new class of salaried managers had more humane objectives
than mere profits. R. HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM: FROM BRYAN TO F.D.R. 254-55
(1955).
With the elapse of another twenty years, the complacence of the 1950's seems a curiosity.
In inflationary times, the countervailing power of organized labor against capital often
seems to be transformed into a collusive force for raising prices at the expense of most
consumers. The identity between size and efficiency seems variable in the wake of the dramatic failures of Lockheed and others. As for the objectives of the managerial generation
that displaced the enterpreneurs, adventures in the overthrow of foreign governments and
the illegal bankrolling of political candidates revive the nightmare of the Progressives-strangulation of democracy. Finally, and perhaps most important, there has been a
resurgence of individualism and a resistance to the crushing collectivism of industrial and
political bureaucracy. Regarding the conflicts between the demands of these bureaucracies

and individual desires for self-expression, see D.

BELL, THE CULTURAL CONTRADICTIONS

(1976) at xxv.
149. R. BAUER, I. POOL, & L. DEXTER, AMERICAN BUSINESS AND PUBLIC POLICY 488
(1963).
150. Id
151. Id. at 455.
OF CAPITALISM
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and that the all-powerful pressure group was a creature of myth. 152
These conclusions reflected a pervasive consensus in the orthodox political science of a dozen years ago concerning the nature of political power in
what had come to be called pluralist democracy.' 53 Even when they recognized a potential problem, the political scientists offered no remedy.
The market place was thought to be superior in formulating social policy
even as it was the best approach to economic efficiency. 154 In contrast
with some sort of "central decision-making model," a choice made
through competitive decision-making was believed to canvas more alternatives and reward those most interested in pursuing a goal. 55 The competitive decision-making approach was thought particularly well suited to
more complex social issues for which there could be no "public interest"
because they embodied many incompatable goals. Any choice by a central decision-maker among such goals would necessarily be arbitrary. 56
But was it not possible that a more inclusive representation of diverse
interests could be created? Moreover, what was to be done if social or
technological imperatives forced departure from the market? How then
would democratic values be preserved? Since prevailing orthodoxy recognized no problem, not surprisingly it proffered no solution. Only with the
return of concern over the impact of economic power' 57 has attention focused upon the spectrum of policy options available.
152. Id at 487-88.
153. Addressing the problem of the influence of wealth on politics in 1961, Robert Dahl
portrayed a political system redundant with checks and balances. R. DAHL, WHO GOVERNS
(1961). While urban politics was not as equalitarian as a prior rural America, it was more
so than in the old days of city oligarchies. Economic notables operated in an environment
of "dispersed" rather than "cumulative" inequalities. Id at 85. They might be particularly
influential on matters affecting business, but their influence did not extend much further.
They participated little in politics, and suffered from the "fatal defect" of small numbers.
Id at 76. Dahl suggested that although the "living conditions and the belief system of the
community" had not thus far generated demands for policies antagonistic to the goals of
businessmen, if such demands did develop, numbers would probably prevail and the notables would go down to defeat. Id at 84.
Dahl was at least addressing the issue of business influence. As he himself remarked,
although the issue produced "no dearth of important and even urgent questions... political scientists [did] not, by and large, seem to be searching for answers." Dahl, Business and
Politics:.- A Critical Appraisal of Political Science, in SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH ON BusINESS, PRODUCTION AND POTENTIAL 44 (1959). There were, of course, dissenters from the
prevailing view. See, e.g., H. KARIEL, THE DECLINE OF AMERICAN PLURALISM (1961); T.
Lowi, THE END OF LIBERALISM (1969); C. MILLS, THE POWER ELITE (1956).
154. E. BANFIELD, POLITICAL INFLUENCE 326-36 (1961).
155. Id at 334-35.
156. C. LINDBLOM, THE INTELLIGENCE OF DEMOCRACY 137-48, 151-52, 182, 332 (1965).
157. As William Shepherd notes, "doubts have multiplied" concerning the "central folk
belief" that the competitive enterprise system is unique and superior. SHEPHERD, supra
note 23, at 5.
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Political scientist Charles E. Lindblom has recently issued a revised and
deeply troubled report. In Politicsand Markets, he contends that business
occupies a privileged position in our society.158 Because "jobs, prices, production, growth, the standard of living, and the economic security of
everyone" rest in the hands of business, he argues that government cannot
be indifferent to business needs.159 Moreover, the market does not respond
spontaneously to supply and demand but must be carefully nurtured by
government. Thus, his argument indicates that the careful studies of the
last decade concerning business influence did not look far enough:
Any government official who understands the requirements of his
position and the responsibilities that market-oriented systems
throw on businessmen will therefore grant them a privileged position. He does not have to be bribed, duped, or pressured to do
so. Nor does he have to be an uncritical admirer of businessmen
to do so. He simply understands, as is plain to see, that public
affairs in market-oriented systems are in the hands of two groups
of leaders, government and business, who must collaborate and
that, to make the system work, government leadership must often
defer to business leadership. 16°
This underlying imperative is implemented through the superior organization and resources of business. The ease with which business executives
can channel funds into interest-group and electoral activity is a "remarkable feature" of market-oriented politics, with "no rationale in democratic
theory."' 16 1 Finally, beyond all these more or less concrete modes of influence, Lindblom discerns a pervasive business influence on public ideology
and belief. The public is indoctrinated through advertising and other
means to overlook business' privileged position, and business' attempts to
create a "dominant opinion" that will remove significant issues from debate. 162 Thus Lindblom concludes: "The large private corporation fits
1 63
oddly into democratic theory and vision. Indeed, it does not fit.'
158. LINDBLOM, supra note 141, at 175. See also Dahl, On Removing Certain Impediments to Democracy in the United States, DISSENT, Summer, 1978, at 310-24.
159. LINDBLOM, supra note 141, at 172.

160. Id at 175. For a thorough discussion of the bargaining relationship between government and business, see S. BEER, BRITISH POLITICS IN THE COLLECTIVIST AGE, ch. XII
(1965). For a recent example in the United States, see Bargain Offered Oil Firms, Wash.
Post, April 15, 1978, §A, at 7, col. 1. The proposed bargain contemplated increased oil company revenues produced by rewriting price regulations in return for support for the administration's proposed excise tax on crude oil.
161. LINDBLOM, supra note 141, at 194.
162. Id. at 203-04.
163. Id. at 356.
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It is a fair question for those satisfied with the existing order to inquire
into the supposed political dangers of concentrated economic power. The
authors of antitrust doctrine never really paused to analyze this issue.
Much of the concern with business influence on politics at the birth of the
Sherman Act seems to have been a concern that business was twisting government to obtain special economic advantages. Beyond this, however,
the critique becomes a diffuse denunciation of "plutocrats" and a lament
about the diminution of the isolated individual's integrity.164
The Progressives of twenty and thirty years later emphasized the additional concern that economic influence might be translated into control
over public policies other than those of a strictly economic character. The
investigations into war profiteering after the First World War evinced a
concern that business might be affecting the decisions regarding war and
peace.165 A full appreciation of the possible ultimate effects of the interlock of economic and political power awaited the emergence of totalitarian
dictatorships. 166
A third concern, overlapping the first two and yet more general, was the
concern that business dominance was preventing the emergence of policies
reflecting the public interest. In a book entitled The Public and Its
Problems, John Dewey argued in 1927 that the state had been captured by
large organizations which left the democratic public still inchoate and unorganized. Thus, Dewey long anticipated and answered the argument
that the public interest could only be defined arbitrarily. He argued not
for some absolutist definition of the public interest, but simply for the
democratic expression of a general interest wider than that of industrial
organization. The wider public, he said, could not yet identify itself in the
complexities of the age.' 67 Only through improved communication could
society identify common interests by clarifying the symbols which guide
public life. Dewey identified democracy with community and contended
that the prerequisite for a healthy democracy was the desire for and experience of shared existence. The great problem, he concluded, was to devise a means of communication which would bring to the fore shared
168
interests and overcome those that divide.
The revived concern with the problem of the public interest, as framed
by Dewey, is concisely stated by Lindblom:
164. See N. POLLACK, THE POPULIST RESPONSE TO INDUSTRIAL AMERICA 18-19 (1962).
165. See Special Senate Comm Investigating the Munitions Industry, Pt. 13, 74th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1934).
166. See FRIEDRICH & BRZEZINSKI, supra note 141, at 177-236.
167. J. DEWEY, THE PUBLIC AND ITS PROBLEMS 30-34 (1927).
168. Id. at 149, 173.
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The emerging peril to the survival of polyarchy [pluralist democracy] is that vetoes are increasingly cast not simply against proposed redistrubtions but against proposed solutions to collective
problems. A veto of a redistribution-say, of new school budgets-is disappointing to some groups. A veto of a solution to a
collective problem-say, of an energy policy-may put society on
69
the road to catastrophe.1
Moreover, if Lindblom is right, support for specific vetoes is fostered by a
more general influence of business upon the context of ideology and belief
through advertising and other means. Such influence may extend to the
vocabulary of the debate over democracy itself. Arguably, one of the
greatest achievements of business in this respect has been the identification
of the corporation with the individual, clothed with the rights won in the
70
long struggle for individual liberty.1
These, then, are some of the historic concerns which social critics have
voiced about the relationship between economic and political power.
There is a concern that economic influence will purchase economic advantage; that it will buy control over non-economic public policy; and that it
will constrict and exclude all attitudes and interests other than its own.
Having sketched the effects which economic influence can have on politics, the question of how to deal with these effects arises. A particular society's response to this economic influence depends upon its values. At a
minimum, a democratic society which seeks a government based on consent will be concerned that economic power not distort the mechanisms for
registering and implementing popular will. At a minimum, a society concerned to protect liberty, "the freedom to live as one prefers,"' 7' will desire
that no segment of society becomes so powerful that it could deprive indiLINDBLOM, supra note 141, at 347.
170. Thurman Arnold explained this identification when he noted that at the very moment when massive corporate organization most threatened individualism, people refused to
face up to the threat:
It is a familiar social phenomenon to see the symbols of the habits of pioneer times
transferred as a social philosophy to later institutions to prove that we still are
following the examples of our fathers. . . .The laissezfaire religion, based on a
conception of a society composed of competing individuals, was transferred automatically to industrial organizations with nation-wide power and dictatorial forms
of government.
ARNOLD, supra note 1,at 188-89. Thus, the present author believes Robert Bork falls into
what might be called the fallacy of personification in fearing, as noted earlier, a trend
whereby "the political order moves against the private order." See BORK, supra note 16, at
3-11. See also text accompanying note 21 supra. The difficulty for the "private" individual
is the emergence of organization everywhere--in business as well as government-and the
mutual adjustment of these organizations to exclude all interests but those defined by their
organizational imperatives.
171. See BELL, supra note 148, at 258-61 regarding various definitions of "liberty." See

169.
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viduals of the ability to exercise the essential rights which the society
equates with human dignity.
These statements of the minimum principles of liberal democracy conceal myriad potential conflicts regarding who is to give consent and how,
and who has what rights to be protected. How these conflicts are viewed
determines the extent and nature of the concern for economic influence on
politics. For example, if the right to engage in economic activity is viewed
as a primary one, then there may be less concern that the unrestrained
exercise of such a right may impinge on other rights.
A full adumbration of the principles that would guide the resolution of
these conflicting values has been called a "public philosophy."' 72 There
was a time when antitrust doctrine represented a keystone in the American
public philosophy regarding the proper relationship between economic
power and political liberty. Ideally, the abuses of economic power could
be checked by division. Individual initative, efficient production, and political liberty were all to be furthered simultaneously. If a distinction was
recognized between private wants and public needs,173 the collective action
necessary to achieve the latter was viewed as a necessary exception-but
still only an exception--to the self-regulating operation of the market.
The social context in which antitrust policy is imbedded has changed,
however. 174 In this new context the old antitrust concern with economic
influence on political power becomes more urgent than ever, since both
social and economic forces increasingly compel resort to the political
mechanism for allocative decisions in society. Alternatives to the market
mechanism are sought to foster social control. Traditional antitrust, however, does not provide a satisfactory guide to deflecting the old economic
threat to the political process in these new circumstances. It hardly could
also

B. BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 77 (1976); J.
RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE §§ 32, 38, 39 (1971); R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERI-

OUSLY

(1978).

172. BELL, supra note 148, at 251.
173. The distinction between wants and needs can be traced to Aristotle. This distinction might be summarized as one between necessities and luxuries. ld at 223-24, 254.
174. As Daniel Bell points out, societal commitment to conscious control of economic
growth, furtherance of science and technology, and the commitment to social welfare programs have expanded the public sphere. BELL, supra note 148, at 224-25. In this new
social context "the basic allocative power is nowpoliticalrather than economic." Id at 226
(emphasis in original). Characteristic of this situation is a struggle between the middle and
working class over allocation of the public budget. Id at 240. The public sphere becomes
"the arena for the expression not only of public needs, but also ofpriyate wants." Id at 226
(emphasis in original). The point is significant because it recognizes that merely shifting
decisions to the political process does not necessarily produce outcomes that are in the public interest. See text accompanying note 254 infra.
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be expected to do so because the new social context is so often inconsistent
with the market oriented premises of antitrust.
Thus, the current situation requires a new set of principles consistent
with liberal democracy that will define the appropriate relationship between economic and political power. The task is to find new rules of
thumb to supplement the market decentralization axiom of antitrust.
That axiom was based on the old American belief that the health of democracy depended on a distribution of resources, particularly wealth, so
that no single group could bring about the "prostitution of our Government to the advantage of the few at the expense of the many."1 75 Although in some important instances, market decentralization may be of
decreased relevance, the underlying antitrust concern with resource distribution is sound. In this respect, an old idea retains continued validity and
suggests a broader framework for analyzing the relationship between economic and political power.
Whether in a market or non-market political economy, resources are the
moving force of the political process, the "currency" of interaction., 76 Resources include not only wealth, but information, organizational and technical skill, and strategic position.177 Strategic position is used here to
mean the leverage gained by one participant in the political process over
others by possession of resources that others desire. An example, discussed below, is the capability of a faltering but enormous enterprise to
provide jobs to thousands of workers. Whether the firm is a government
firm or private company, politicians feel great political pressure to prevent
the firm from going out of business.
By itemizing the resources available to participants in the political process we have a simple conceptual tool of great utility. Unlike the more
general principle of decentralization, resource analysis can be applied to
various institutional arrangements. The method is to examine all these
arrangements, whether apparently centralized or decentralized, to deter175. See note 18 supra.
176. K. DEUTSCH, THE NERVES OF GOVERNMENT 117 (1966).
177. Resources have been catalogued under various labels by different authors. S.E.
Finer speaks of organization, riches, access, patronage (derived from the dependency of
others on the firm's largess), and "surrogateship" (performance of public tasks by the firm).
Finer, The Political Power of Private Capital, 3 Soc. REV. 287 (1955), discussed in, E. EPSTEIN, THE CORPORATION IN AMERICAN POLITICS 191-212 (1969). As employed in the
present article, the phrase "strategic position" seems useful to distinguish those resources
which are conditioned by multiple social and economic factors as opposed to those such as
wealth, which are typically thought of as tangible or intangible possessions. Thus, the influence of a given group may derive from its ability to provide jobs in a recession or military
necessities during war, even though the group possesses no more wealth than another group.
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mine whether or not resource distribution serves democratic purposes.178
This leads to the second analytical tool employed: role allocation analysis.179 Here, the inquiry focuses on the impact of industrial structure on
the allocation of roles in decision-making among voters, elected politicians, appointed administrators, and the managers and leaders of private
institutions. Role analysis is a way of determining who is responsible for
what-a central issue in the search for a democratic balance in society.
The nature of this balance becomes of increasingly greater concern to a
democratic society as more tasks are removed from resolution by market
forces to the political sphere.
In democratic theory, the appropriate roles are relatively clear. Government officials are responsible to the electorate. The choice among conflicting values and purposes is one that the lay voter and the lay politician
are as able to make as the expert familiar with industrial organization and
technology.' 80 Accordingly, in the governmental process the interest
178. There is, of course, no automatic relationship between resources and political influence. The impact of resources may be augmented or deflected by various other factors.
See EPSTEIN, supranote 177, at 191. Concentration of resources, however, has been viewed
in the antitrust tradition as the key variable. This theory has rarely been tested in a systematic way, but a recent study suggests some reasons for the significance of resource aggregation. Furthermore, it finds confirmation for the hypothesis by scrutinizing the relationship
between size of firm and effective corporate tax rates. Salamon & Siegfried, Economic
PowerandPoliticalInfluence."The Impact of Industry Structure on PublicPolicy, 71 AM. POL.
Sci. REv. 1026 (1977). As noted in the text, however, large scale business is not the only
source of difficulty for democratic politics.
179. It is recognized that variables other than resources and role allocation are relevant
in assessing the impact of economic influence on the political system. K. DEUTSCH, supra
note 176, at 140-42. G. ALMOND & G. POWELL, COMPARATIVE POLITICS 11-12 (1966); S.
BEER

& A.

ULAM, PATTERNS OF GOVERNMENT

63-68 (3d ed. 1962); Hammond, A Func-

tionalAnalysisof Defense DepartmentDecision-Makingin the McNamaraAdministration, 62
AM. POL. Sci. REV. 57 (1968); Lasswell & McDougal, Criteria/ora Theory About Law, 44
U.S.C. L. REV. 362, 387 (1971); McDougal & Lasswell, The Identification andAppraisal of
Diverse Systems of Public Order, 53 AM. J. INT. L. 1, 9, 17 (1959); Joffe, French LaborRelations: A FunctionalAnalysis, 82 YALE L.J. 806 (1973). Variables other than resources and
roles will be referred to below.
Due to the complexity of political systems, however, any effort to generalize about the
consequences for democratic politics of any particular industrial structure is necessarily incomplete. The same industrial structure might produce quite different political consequences, depending upon a complex of other variables in the political system. For instance,
the political consequences of government regulation of business differ in the United States
and England because of the greater coherence in England of political parties and the lesser
significance of the legislature in administrative oversight. S. BEER & A. ULAM, supra at 6263. A focus here on resources and role allocation, however, is only partly for purposes of
analytical simplicity. Additionally, it can be argued that these two variables are of primary
significance. Resources are the motivating force of the political process. Role allocation is
the essence of the democratic balance--who is responsible for what.
180. D. PRICE, THE SCIENTIFIC ESTATE 183-84, 194, 268-69 (1965). For a case study of
the relationship between the policymaking process and the balance between experts and
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group leader, bureaucrat or manager should carry no particular weight in
the ultimate choice of overall social objectives. Rather, these people are
the experts of production, organization and technical skill. They perform
the functions of assisting in identification of options and finding means to
match ends within the framework chosen by politicians.
The real world of democracy is a shadow of this ideal. There are, however, certain kinds of institutional arrangements which are more likely
than others to assist the electorate in performing its role as the ultimate
arbiter of social objectives. Mechanisms are needed to provide for the
widest participation and the broadest reconciliation of conflicting individual interests. Moreover, for the electorate to play its democratic role,
choices must be framed at a level of generality that makes the alternatives
understandable to the lay voter. Finally, the political process is the most
likely arena for expression of the sense of the community on those "social
goods" which depend upon collective action and which would not be produced by individuals or groups acting independently in pursuit of their
own interests. Accordingly, institutional arrangements are needed to facilitate the expression of these community interests, which would other8
wise be drowned amidst the clatter of contending special interests.' '
Taken together, the objective of these institutional arrangements can be
characterized as an expression of the public interest. The task of a liberal
democracy is to achieve the expression of this public interest and to strike
a balance between it and the rights and interests of individuals. The remainder of this article examines alternative approaches to industrial organization and control to determine their compatibility with these political
objectives. The occasion for this inquiry is the conviction, already expoliticians, see Joffe, DOPMA and Officer Manpower Law: The Policy Making Process, 28
JAG. J. 1 (1975).
181. It has been suggested that one reason for the important influence of business in the

American political process is the fragmented character of our politics. Salamon & Siegfried, supra note 178, at 1029. Integrative forces are weak and policy is commonly made in
subsystems linking bureaucrats, congressional committees, and organized clientele. Thus,
effective access is limited to those with the resources which can support key actors in the
process. Moreover, the predominance of administrative rulemaking, as opposed to legislative action, puts a premium on technical expertise which reposes with organizations, not the
lay voter or politician. Id at 1030 & n.15. This analysis indicates that concern over the
impact of economic power on the political process calls for scrutiny of such potential integrative mechanisms as more disciplined political parties, improved budgeting techniques
and more frequent resort to strategic programming. Since the present article addresses industrial organization and its impact on politics, rather than the political machinery itself, the
discussion of integrative mechanisms below is limited to economic policy programming.
The issue examined is whether the possibilities for a balance between the roles of layman

and expert, consistent with democratic theory, can be enhanced by improving the integrative
capability of economic policymaking and overcoming the perverse effects of a fragmented
political process.
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pressed, that the antitrust approach to this problem, with its preoccupation
with market deconcentration, is inadequate. To illuminate the inadequacies and the alternatives, three examples are discussed. First is the steel
industry, which represents a situation in which strong pressures exist to
depart from the decentralized market model. Second is the oil industry,
which, in spite of competition arguably sufficient to satisfy the economic
standards of antitrust, may nevertheless wield undue influence in the political process. Finally, the subject of advertising is addressed as an example
of economic influence which does not necessarily correlate with concentration and which may not be significantly constrained by trustbusting.
In examining each of these examples, resource and role analysis are employed. The method is to ask, with respect to the various alternative approaches to industrial organization and control, what effect is had on
resource distribution, and how the organization and resulting resource distribution affects role allocation. In particular, the inquiry focuses on those
approaches which are most likely to enhance the role of the electorate, and
which would foster expression of the public interest and the objectives of
liberal democracy.
A policy designed to minimize undue economic influence in the political
process cannot rely entirely on orthodox antitrust remedies. Thus, the
question posed is what industrial structure is congenial to democracy when
the market does not sufficiently promote democratic results or when departure from the market occurs. The brief consideration provided in the next
section cannot provide definitive answers; it can, however, attempt to illustrate the questions and begin the search for new rules of thumb regarding
the relationship between economic and political power.
III.

WEIGHING THE POLITICAL FACTOR

A.

Steel

"The tariff is the mother of trusts," went the old saying, but the steel
industry in the United States is now desperately seeking protection from
what it says is unfair foreign competition. Faced with what the New York
Times called the "worst crisis in the last two decades" in steel, the following actions, among others, were taken in the fall of 1977: Youngstown
Sheet and Tube announced severe cutbacks at the Youngstown, Ohio
plant accompanied by a permanent furloughing of 5,000 production workers; Bethlehem Steel and Armco Steel announced the closing of shops and
the elimination of 8,000 jobs in New York, Pennsylvania, and Ohio;
United States Steel, the giant of the industry, reported a fifty-two percent
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earnings drop in the first half of 1977.182 To help it get back on its feet,
the steel industry looked to Washington not only for the restriction of imports, but also for tax breaks to encourage investment, less government
interference on pricing decisions, and a relaxation of antitrust opposition
83
to mergers and joint ventures.
In June, 1978, the Attorney General rejected the recommendation of the
Antitrust Division and approved a merger of Lykes and Ling-TemcoVought (LTV), thus permitting creation of the fourth largest steel producer
out of the two firms' subsidiaries-Youngstown (Ohio) Sheet and Tube
and Jones & Laughlin Steel.' 8 4 Reports suggested that the prospect of
massive steelworker unemployment if Youngstown were allowed to fail
85
may have figured prominently in the merger approval.
The latest efforts to aid the steel industry were presented in a Treasury
Department Task Force Report to the President, 186 which recommended
the "trigger price" mechanism that was eventually adopted. 187 The report
182. Williams, Crisis Deepening in American Steel, N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, 1977, § 3, at 1,
col. 5.
183. Id See also Steel's Sea of Troubles, BUSINESS WEEK, Sept 19, 1977, at 66 [hereinafter cited as Sea of Troubles].
184. See business review letter and Department of Justice letter in 5 TRADE REG. REP.
(CCH) 50, 381 (June 26, 1978).
185. Wash. Post, June 22, 1978, § A, at 1; [1978] ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA),
at A-21 (June 22, 1978). The relationship between unemployment and antitrust policy was
recently highlighted in two other contexts. An FTC Administrative Law Judge denied a
motion by the American Federation of Grain Millers (AFL-CIO) to intervene in the cereal
case. F.T.C. Dkt. No. 8883. The union argued that some 2,650 cereal plant jobs could be
lost if the divestiture relief proposed by the FTC staff were implemented. It was also reported that in two different instances in the last year, firms responded to FTC opposition to
sale of a corporate division with threats that plants would have to be closed. At least one of
the firms evidently suggested that the FTC would deserve the blame for resulting unemployment. 51 FTC. Watch, June 30, 1978, at 6, 21.
186. TASK FORCE CHAIRED BY TREASURY UNDERSECRETARY ANTHONY SOLOMON, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT: A COMPREHENSIVE PROGRAM FOR THE STEEL INDUSTRY (1977)
(on file at Catholic University Law Review office) [hereinafter cited as SOLOMON REPORT].
187. Id at 13. The reference price approach is only the latest step to be criticized for its
anticompetitive effects. The government's action in protecting steel from foreign imports
has been the subject of controversy for years. See Sea of Troubles, supra note 183, at 78. It
has been argued that high tariffs on crucial imports have been sought by steel in order to
limit the profits of firms on the fringe of the steel oligopoly. Ginman & Costello, Vertical
Market Power, the Structure of Tarriffs andAntitrust Policy, 19 ANTITRUST BULL. 421, 42829, 434 (1974). In this way the dominant vertically integrated firms prevent others from
challenging them through backward vertical integration. Id The steel industry has also
obtained the assistance of the executive branch in negotiating voluntary import restraints by
foreign producers. One presidential statement indicated that such action is designed to deal
with "the serious problem that excessive imports have posed for our steel workers and our
steel industry." Press statement of President Nixon on May 6, 1972, cited in, Cartelization,
Executive Sanction, andthe Antitrust Laws.- The Steel Import Case, 18 ANTITRUST BULL. 853
(1973) [hereinafter cited as Cartelization]. The executive action was challenged as an im-
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explained that the mechanism would provide the Secretary of the Treasury
with a basis for initiating antidumping investigations without prior industry complaint. 188 The trigger prices would be based on the costs of production of the most efficient foreign steel producers. Investigation would
be undertaken when prices below the trigger are found. 189 In part, this
new procedure was evidently a response to industry criticism of the cumbersome nature of existing antidumping procedures. 190 The report also
recommended, among other measures, tax benefits in return for industry
commitment to steel plant modernization,19' expedited Justice Department
consideration of proposed joint ventures and mergers, 192 and possible gov93
ernment funding of research and development.'
Arguably, the steel industry's plight is the result of market failures
which operate in an oligopolistic industry. Although steel claims it is subject to unfair competition from Japanese and European firms dumping
their products below cost in American markets, critics of the industry indicate that its difficulties are more attributable to antiquated plants and technology.' 94 Thus, it may be argued that the sluggish pace of steel
proper exercise of presidential power and a violation of the Sherman Act. Consumers
Union v. Rogers, 352 F. Supp. 1319, 1322-23 (D.D.C. 1973), modofled and a/'d sub. norn.,
Consumers Union v. Kissinger, 506 F.2d 136 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1004
(1975) (despite dictum that Sherman Act was not intended to preempt presidential authority
over foreign commerce, the Sherman Act issue was not resolved since plaintiff stipulated
dismissal of that issue). Likewise, there has been debate over whether the antidumping
laws, (19 U.S.C. § 160 (1976)), which allow private firms to institute penalty proceedings
against foreign producers selling below "fair value", are anticompetitive. Epstein, The Illusory Conflict Between Antidumping and Antitrust, 18 ANTITRUST BULL. 1 (1973); and comments in response and reply at 19 ANTITRUST BULL. 369, 377 (1974).
188. SOLOMON REPORT, supra note 186, at 14. "Dumping" is defined as:
sales in the United States below 'fair value' that injure or are likely to injure a U.S.
industry. Fair value is generally established from the home market prices of the
exporter ... [H]Qme market prices as a reference for determining the 'fair value'
of imported merchandise may be disregarded if substantial sales in the home market have been made at prices below the cost of production not permitting the recovery of all costs within a reasonable period of time. If such home market prices
are disregarded, fair value is, as a rule, to be established from the 'constructed
value' of the product, meaning its cost of fabrication, plus statutorily mandated
minimum additions of 10% for overhead and 8% for profit.
Id at 10-11.
189. See id at 12-14.
190. The report attempted to head off antitrust critics with the assertion that policy toward steel must "expedite relief from unfair import competition ... in a manner which will
not preclude healthy competition in the U.S. market." Id at 8.
191. Id at 22-23.
192. Id at 33.
193. Id at 34.
194. 80% of Japanese steel and 72% of German steel is produced through the advanced
basic oxygen furnace process as compared with 63% of United States-made steel. The remainder of domestic steel continues to be made in the older open-hearth furnaces. Sea of
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technology's development in the United States is attributable to the oligopoly conditions under which the industry operated until foreign competition
became severe.
The view that the steel industry is noncompetitive domestically and as a
result requires special dispensations to meet competition abroad is not,
however, universally shared. A recent FTC staff study concludes that foreign producers have made inroads into the American market because of
lower costs, not dumping. 195 Accordingly, the study is strongly critical of
"reference prices" which would impose a tariff on steel priced below cost.
The study contends that such minimum pricing would invite the creation
of a foreign steel cartel if the minimum price is set higher than some firms
might otherwise charge. 196 Although the Carter administration's trigger
price policy does not establish actual minimum prices, the prospect of antidumping proceedings for pricing below cost could arguably induce pricing behavior similar to that which would prevail if actual minimum prices
197
were set.
The optimistic view of existing competition in steel 198 and the opposition to reference prices expressed in the FTC staff report implies a conclusion that traditional antitrust enforcement approaches will adequately
protect consumers without damaging the industry. In steel, however, relying on market forces augmented by trustbusting is at least questionable for
two reasons. First, as with the ruinous competition among the railroads of
Troubles, supra note 183, at 74. For years the American steel industry has been criticized
for its poor innovation record by academic economists. Adams & Dirlam, Big Steel, Invention and Innovation, Q.J. OF ECON. 167 (May 1966). A recent report from within the business community authored by Charles A. Bradford of Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., concluded that ultimately it is not steel imports but differences in costs and efficiency
that are at the root of the problems in the industry. See Sea of Troubles, supra note 183, at
74. Japanese labor productivity, the report contends, is 50% above that of the United States
on a ton-per-man-per-year basis, and Japanese coke-making is also more efficient. Id
195.

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, BUREAU OF ECONOMICS, THE UNITED STATES

STEEL INDUSTRY AND ITS INTERNATIONAL RIVALS 239 (1977) [hereinafter cited as FTC
STUDY].

196. Id at 559-63.
197. The FTC study was evidently prepared prior to issuance of the Administration's
trigger price proposal and cannot, accordingly, be viewed as commenting directly on that
proposal. See Administration's Comprehensive Program For the Steel Industry, Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Trade of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 65 (1978). Nevertheless, the thrust of the argument in the FTC study suggests a different understanding of the "healthy competition" which is the expressed goal of the Solomon
Report.
198. Surprisingly, the study reads in some parts like a defense of the industry. See FTC
STUDY, supra note 195, at 44 (concentration is declining); id at 67 (profits have been below
average rather than excessive); id at 168, 220 (prices after 1960 have "mimicked" competition and are not "administered"); id at 482 (the pace of innovation in the steel industry has
been "efficient."). See also C. ROWLEY, STEEL AND PUBLIC POLICY (1971).
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old, the social consequences may be unacceptable. If inefficient steel firms
are allowed to fail, investments may be wiped out and thousands of steelworkers may be unemployed, followed by shock waves through the rest of
the economy. A Treasury study noted that "[m]assive worker layoffs...
represent a serious human tragedy for many families and can cause severe
disruptions for whole communities." 199 The reference in both past and
present presidential statements to the need for protection for both business
and labor from unfairly priced imports 2°° indicates that however theoretically plausible, the completely competitive solution is probably not politically feasible. This view was apparently adopted in the approval of the
Lykes-LTV merger.
Second, in the current state of the industry, its proponents may be right
that mergers and joint ventures are necessary. 20 1 Merger allows a company that is strong in one phase of production but weak in another to
remedy its weaknesses without unduly augmenting the overall capacity of
the industry through duplication of facilities. An example is the 1971
merger between National Steel and Granite City Steel. National's Portage, Indiana plant had obtained hot rolled coils from National's Great
Lakes plant, but the system was thrown out of balance as the Great Lakes
plant became able to use more of its own coils. Thus, National looked
elsewhere and purchased coils from other firms including Granite City,
which had a greater capacity for producing coils than its remaining relatively obsolete facilities could absorb. The relationship was eventually ce20 2
mented by merger.
Increased merger activity in steel, however, could aggravate the already
concentrated character of the industry. Currently, small steel companies
face a serious problem in obtaining access to ore supplies because deposits
are largely owned by the major firms and require huge amounts of capital
to develop. 20 3 Increased concentration in steel could give the industry
even greater control over prices and inhibit the already sluggish pace of
innovation.
199. SOLOMON REPORT, supra note 186, at 7.
200. See Cartelization,supra note 187, at 853-54.
201. An author of a portion of the FTC Study cautioned elsewhere that "U]oint ventures
or even mergers among all but the largest enterprises may have to be tolerated." Mueller,
Book Review, 19 ANTrrRUST BULL. 901, 915 (1974) (Steel-Industry Economics: An International Review of Some Recent Literature).
202. HOGAN, supra note 121, at 29-30. Mergers and joint ventures may allow United
States firms to duplicate the advantages obtained by steel in Japan as a result of government
planning. In Japan, the government owned central bank funnels investment to the companies which, in its view, should expand. See Sea of Troubles, supra note 183, at 78.

203.

SCHERER, supra note

15, at 87.
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Thus, the steel industry well illustrates the difficulties of achieving the
objectives of antitrust without trustbusting. If the antitrust laws are relaxed to assist the steel industry, some mechanism should be found to prevent economic exploitation of any resulting increase in market power.
The choice among alternative approaches should consider the potential
consequences for economic influence on political decisions. The steel industry is a specific illustration of a "strategic position" exercised in the
political process to achieve economic benefits. The layoff of thousands of
workers and the prospect of major economic dislocation was a "resource"
rapidly translated into responsive action by the government. The Carter
administration quickly acted to accommodate the steel industry with various benefits including merger approval and the "trigger price" mechanism
to afford increased protection from low-priced foreign imports. 2°4 This
action does little to diminish the influence of steel on subsequent political
decisions, and may not be in the economic interest of the consumer.
It is important to recognize that whether or not the major steel companies exercise decisive power in a market context, does not necessarily determine their influence in the political sphere. Optimistic assessments of
trends away from tight oligopoly may be largely irrelevant in judging political influence. This is because the ultimate source of influence is not
"big business" or businessmen, but a complex of economic forces. Due to
these forces, the steel companies, the steel workers, and their allies, possess
the resource of strategic position, which gives them significant influence in
the political process. The lack of congruence between conventional measures of market power and political power may even become an inverse
relationship. Decline in market power may, at least temporarily, become
a source of political leverage. It may be that dominant firms resort to the
political process to shore up their positions because of declining market
power. That the health of the nation requires that dominant firms not be
permitted to fail is a claim which a politician ignores at his peril.
The steel industry epitomizes the dilemmas faced by antitrust enforcement officials concerned with the ultimate impact of economic power on
the political process. Even if the industry is sufficiently decentralized and
competitive to satisfy antitrust standards, these standards are evidently not
204. See note 190 and accompanying text supra. There have been additional reports
that the Administration's receptivity to steel industry desires for tax benefits and other government assistance accompanied industry decisions to relent in its opposition to the Administration's position on natural gas deregulation. Wash. Post, Sept. 7, 1978, § A, at 2, col. 1. It
has also been reported that steel firms have complained that the trigger price program was
not being implemented to stop the rising level of imports. Critics of the industry argued,
however, that the continuing high level of imports was due to unwarranted price hikes by
domestic firms. Wall St. J., Sept. 1, 1978, at 12, col. 1.
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enough to forestall the industry from wielding significant influence in the
political process. On the other hand, if departure from the market is required through relaxation of the antimerger laws and protection from imports, the salutary effects of decentralization on democratic politics are
attenuated. The question, in either case, is what additional or substitute
policy toward the steel industry is available which would be consistent
with maintenance of democratic politics.
One alternative to private enterprise is government ownership of the entire steel industry as has been attempted in Britain and elsewhere. 20 5 A
compelling argument can be made, however, that the economy is just too
complex for administrators, however wise, to duplicate the performance of
the market, much less surpass it.2° 6 Moreover, the substitution of concentrated economic power in government hands is no more appealing from a
political point of view than is such concentration in private hands. Nonetheless something less than total government ownership of the steel industry might introduce a new competitive element into the industry. One
possibility is for the government to set up a competing firm on the TVA
model. Another, perhaps more plausible, suggestion is government takeover or purchase of controlling ownership in an existing firm. 20 7 Shepherd suggests this might be accomplished through a national development
bank with its own capital and authority to arrange consortia with other
financial units. 20 8 From the standpoint of competition, even the possibil205. SHONFIELD, MODERN CAPITALISM 96 (1965).
206. See authorities cited supra note 141.
207. The different ways of constituting government corporations, including the varying
degrees of governmental and private stock ownership and administrative controls, are surveyed in WILCOX, supra note 115, at 464-93; Miller, Public andPrivateEnterprisein the U.S.,
in PUBLIC AND PRIVATE ENTERPRISE IN MIXED ECONOMIES (W. Friedmann ed. 1974); M.
FAINSOD, L. GORDON, & J. PALAMOUNTAIN, JR., GOVERNMENT AND THE AMERICAN ECONOMY 737-51 (3d ed. 1959). The scope of government enterprise in the United States in-

cludes railroads in Panama and Alaska, electric power in the Tennessee Valley, the
profitable Government Printing Office, banking and credit (Public Works Administration,
Reconstruction Finance Corporation), operation of public lands, the largest life and annuity
business in the world (Social Security), the Post Office, COMSAT, and the Corporation for
Public Broadcasting. A former manager of British Steel recently remarked that "[t]here's
more hidden nationalization in the U.S. than there probably is in [Britain]." State Ownership European Style, N.Y. Times, May 28, 1978, § 3, at 1, 2, col. 5. [hereinafter cited as
European Style].
In connection with the Lykes-LTV merger, a Youngstown community coalition proposed
to purchase the Campbell Works. The Attorney General called the local effort "fundamentally important." [1978] ANTITRUST TRADE REG. REP. (BNA), at A-22 (June 22, 1978).

208. SHEPHERD, supra note 23, at 204. For a similar proposal modeled on the New
Deal's Reconstruction Finance Corporation and offered by a partner in the financial house
of Lazard Freres, see Rohatyn, A New AFC. Is ProposedforBusiness, N.Y. Times, Dec. 1,
1974, § 3, at 1, 12. Mr. Rohatyn recognizes the potential in his proposal for economic planning and suggests that by allocating equity capital the R.F.C. could "facilitate major restruc-
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ity of takeover by outside management would end the de facto immunity
from takeover enjoyed by large firms and thus introduce a spur to improved performance. Government control could be limited by law to a
certain number of years to reduce the likelihood of creating new vested
interests. 209
Another option short of total government control was tried with some
success in the United States during World War II. At that time the Controlled Materials Plan 2 10 covered steel, copper, and aluminum as points of
leverage that would affect the rest of the economy. 2 "1 Still another option
is partial central planning, whereby the government could funnel investment to companies in need of expansion in order to achieve balanced development. 212 This option could be accompanied by price controls to
protect consumers. During the war, for example, it was found that price
controls worked best in oligopolistic industries. 213 Nevertheless, these approaches may contain some of the defects which have been encountered
21 4
with existing regulatory schemes.
One variant on price controls that has been employed in England is to
condition price rises on an outside efficiency audit of management, which
would help assure, presumably, that increases are justified. 21 5 Another
technique for constraining the effect of market power on prices is a proposal for steering private enterprise to public objectives through tax incentives. 2 16 Instead of setting prices through a regulatory commission,
incentives would be provided for a firm to price steel in a manner necesturing for the public purpose." Id. at 12, col. 3. For a discussion of similar thinking during
the New Deal, see A. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT: THE COMING OF THE
NEW DEAL 432 (1958).
209. SHEPHERD, supra note 23, at 203-04.
210. Under the Plan, the government concentrated its efforts on these industrial materials on the assumption that the use of other resources could be adapted interactively without
benefit of such planning. LINDBLOM, upra note 141, at 316.
211. Id
212. This is done, for example, in Japan. See Sea of Troubles, upra note 183, at 78.
213. SCHERER, supra note 15, at 415. Prices are probably easier to police where few
firms are involved.
214. See notes 223-24 & 255 infra.
215. SHEPHERD, supra note 23, at 212. For similar reasons, outside audits of public enterprise are employed in France. See SHONFIELD, supra note 205, at 195.
216. G. MEANS, PRICING POWER AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 296-321 (1962).

The tax

incentive approach could be applied not only to steel, but to any industry identified as one in
which oligopoly has proceded to the point where prices are not subject to market forces.
One variant of the tax incentive approach would subject the 2000 largest firms, comprising
85% of United States business output, to tax incentive wage guidelines. Firms reaching
settlements over the guidelines would be penalized by raising corporate taxes or disallowing
deductions. Silk, How Carter Can Stop Inflation, N.Y. Times, June 18, 1978, § 6 (Magazine), at 12, 91-92. As Silk notes, economists Henry Wallich, Sidney Weintraub, and Arthur
Okun have each advanced similar proposals. Id at 91.
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sary to achieve a targeted fair rate of return based upon the estimated cost
of capital. Firms that did not meet this requirement would be subject to
an excess profits tax and those that satisfied the guideline would receive tax
benefits. For example, management salary programs which key compensation to economic performance, measured by the degree to which prices
reflect costs, would receive favorable tax treatment. 21 7 Business could also
be given the alternative of voluntary divestiture or breakup. If efficiencies
would not be lost by return to a more competitive atmosphere, manage218
ment and stockholders might prefer such a course.
Yet another proposal which might minimize the adverse effects of market power envisions incentives provided to firms which would decentralize
their operations, creating autonomy of ownership and accounting. 21 9 The
goal is to substitute administrative decentralization and accountability for
that of the market.
Each of these alternatives may be assessed in terms of their success in
achieving the objectives which would be fulfilled by a fully competitive
market-that is, in terms of its consequences for efficiency and consumer
welfare. Since each alternative involves government participation and a
different relationship between economic and political institutions, each approach should also be evaluated for its political consequences.
It was suggested earlier that important consequences of economic power
include influence over matters in the immediate interest of the economic
group, influence over other matters of national policy, and influence over
the attitudes of the electorate. Important resources affecting these outcomes were designated as strategic position, wealth, information, and organizational skill. A crucial aspect of the political process through which
resources are converted to outcomes was identified as the allocation of
roles between expert managers, technicians and bureaucrats, and lay voters and politicians. 220 It was also suggested that institutional arrangements should be sought to express the public interest and enhance the
ability of the electorate to play its democratic role as the ultimate arbiter of
social goals.
Application of this analytical framework to the options for dealing with
the steel industry makes it clear that generalized categories like private and
217. MEANS, supra note 216, at 301-03.
218. Id at 313.
219. SHEPHERD, supra note 23, at 221. For an attempt to impose such decentralization
on AT&T, see [1977] ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA), No. 806 at A-4. For an
argument that such autonomy could more readily be created if the firms in question were
first nationalized, see Martin, Does Nationalization Hold Any Promisefor the American
Economy, 11 J. OF ECON. ISSUES 327, 333 (1977).
220. See notes 179-181 and accompanying text, supra.
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public, or regulated and deregulated, do not provide a sufficient guide for
action. Private ownership and government ownership present two different approaches to accountability with respect to the use of resources.
Each, in varying degrees, is subject to both market forces and governmental supervision or regulation. In the private form, management is held
accountable in some greater or lesser degree by stockholders and by the
danger of potential loss of market position or threat of takeover. Outside
governmental supervision exists in varying degrees and for varying purposes. In its public incarnation, business may be subject to market forces,
but it is also subject to internal governmental controls. A flow of information is channeled to and from the relevant supervisory agency, and goals
may be set in varying degrees by statute and coordinated by governmental
22 1
bodies.
The more autonomy a government corporation has and the more its performance is assessed in terms of the traditional standards of the market
such as growth and profits, the more it resembles a private firm. The more
the private firm is subject to government supervision and the more the
standards for measuring its performance are set by statute and regulation,
the more it resembles a government enterprise. Obviously the terms "private" and "public" or "regulated" and "deregulated" are oversimplifications. In reality, the contrasting modes of accountability are but two ends
of a spectrum. Thus, the decisive distinction for purposes of social control
of economic resources is not private versus governmental ownership.
When market forces are minimal and resources are concentrated in a few
hands-whether private or governmental-management will probably be
subject to weak constraints and will have wide discretion in the use of
222
resources.
If we turn from broad labels, however, to the various kinds of regulation
and government ownership, more precise conclusions are possible. From
the standpoint of economic influence on politics, the situation of moderate
governmental supervision we call regulation is often as unsatisfactory as
private or government monopoly. Under such regulation, governmental
involvement has sometimes been employed to limit accountability through
market forces and yet resources are left primarily in the hands of private
companies which are able to use them for their own purposes. This is
221. SHEPHERD, supra note 23, at 203-04.
222. Thus, close administrative supervision through government channels, with all the
bureaucratic diseconomies it entails, is more necessary for government monopolies than for
government firms participating in a mixed enterprise market and subject to the discipline of
competition.
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familiar in the transportation industries, 223 but the same phenomenon can
be observed in steel. The quiescence of antitrust enforcement is accompanied by the use of tariff and antidumping laws to protect the industry from
competition. At the same time, the control of the industry over wealth,
information, skill, and strategic position is largely undisturbed. These resources can be used to extract further benefits, such as merger approval or
224
tax breaks from the political system.
Moreover, these resources are available to influence foreign policy, domestic elections and other matters as they may impinge on the interests or
the personal predelections of steel and its allies. While this observation is
not intended to impugn the motives of those associated with the steel industry, it does recognize that in the political sphere as in the economic,
unexercised power may one day be exercised and that an absence of past
225
abuse cannot be a complete defense.
The traditional regulatory mode also has perverse effects on the roles of
the electorate and politicians in the political process. In democratic theory, the exercise of political power must be accountable to the electorate.
While the role of experts and managers is to clarify and implement
choices, the electorate and its representatives have the responsibility for
ultimate value judgments. In order for the electorate to exercise this responsibility, however, political choices must be framed at a level of generality that is understandable to the lay person. 2 26 In order for the options
presented to include the widest range of interests, there must be some coordination and integration of proposals. Thus, it has been said that in order
227
to hold political power accountable, it must, to some degree, be focused.
This point of view is exemplified in the frequent observation that the
presidency is often a more representative institution than the Congress.
The electorate is best able to perceive and choose alternatives framed in
the general terms typical of presidential initiatives which are only subsequently addressed by Congress. Because the President's constituency is
national, when initiative lies with the President, the likelihood of inclusive
interest aggregation (that is, consideration given to the widest spectrum of
interests) is increased. In the traditional regulatory situation, however, the
223. See PROMOTING COMPETITION IN REGULATED MARKETS ch. 2-4 (A. Phillips ed.
1975).
224. See notes 183-185 and accompanying text supra.
225. Mr. Justice Douglas made this point in the economic context in United States v.
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 221 (1940). In the absence of continued administrative supervision, those who fix reasonable prices today could set unreasonable ones tomorrow.
226. See note 181 and accompanying text supra.
227. PRICE, supra note 180, at 267.
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independent agency form insulates decision making from presidential initiative. This does not, of course, remove the agency from politics. Instead, political influence takes place on an ad hoc basis through
congressional committees, individual lobbyists, congressmen, or White
House staff. In formal proceedings, issues are often framed in narrow,
technical terms and thus it is difficult for the general public to exert its
228
wider interest.
The steel example demonstrates, however, that the independent agency
form is not wholly responsible for the exclusion of broader interests from
policymaking. In the wake of private litigation challenging the Executive's arrangement of voluntary import restraints among foreign steel companies, 2 29 Senator Philip Hart complained to the Attorney General that
the administration's position in the private suit amounted to an attempt to
arrogate congressional lawmaking authority by ignoring the Sherman
Act. 230 Concern about the balance of payments and loss of jobs due to
imports should not, the Senator said, lead to "tossing out" the separation
of powers. 231 Thus, Senator Hart's complaint that the Executive was ex228. These phenomena have been the subject of frequent comment.

See W. CARY,

POLITICS AND THE REGULATORY AGENCIES (1967); G. KOLKO, THE TRIUMPH OF CONSERVATISM (1963); R. NOLL, REFORMING REGULATION (1971); Huntington, The Marasums of

the ICC in BUREAUCRATIC POWER IN NATIONAL POLITICS 73-86 (F. Rourke ed. 1965);
Jordan, Producer Protection, Prior Market Structure and the Effects of Government
Regulation, 15 J. OF L. & ECON. 151-76 (1972); Wilson, The DeadHand Regulation, in THE
PUBLIC INTEREST 39-58 (1971).
A recent draft proposal of the Commission on Law and the Economy of the American Bar
Association may be valuable in improving the degree to which traditional regulatory
processes are responsive to wider public interests. Recognizing that traditional regulatory
agencies have frequently been given narrow missions which conflict with other public policies, the ABA Commission's draft proposal recommends that the President be authorized to
direct an agency to take up, decide, or reconsider regulatory issues which are of major
significance to statutory goals other than those of the particular agency. DRAFT REPORT BY
COMMISSION ON LAW AND THE ECONOMY, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, FEDERAL REGULATION: ROADS TO REFORM 101 (1978). Under the proposal, the President could modify or

reverse agency action on the designated issues. Id Congress would have seventy days to
react. Although Congress would not be permitted a legislative veto of the President's decision, the President's general authority would expire unless renewed by Congress, and Congress could withhold renewal if the President were persistently unresponsive to
congressional will. Id at 105. The ABA Commission draft also proposes an executive
order directing all federal agencies to conduct an inter-agency review under presidential
auspices to assess the impact of major regulatory actions on all relevant statutory goals. Id
at 107. With respect to both of the foregoing proposals the ABA Commission draft reflects
the concern of the present article in urging that in balancing conflicting policy goals, "[t]he
final authority ought to be an elected official, directly accountable at the polls for the success
or failure of his policies." Id at 110.
229. See Cartelization,supra note 187.
230. Id at 872-73.
231. Id Senator Hart further complained to the Secretary of State that there were reports that the State Department was encouraging foreign steel firms to ignore the district
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cluding both Congress and the courts from the policymaking process suggests that presidential involvement is no easy solution to the perverse
effects on the political process of attempting to hold economic power accountable through regulation. The Senator's reference to steelworker jobs
and to his lack of information indicate the continuing problem of developing policy that reflects diverse interests when firm industry control of resources remains.
Government regulation which is more narrowly directed toward affecting industry control of resources may help minimize domination of the
political process by special interests. Reporting requirements such as
those under the securities laws, 232 administrative inquiry pursuant to authority such as that granted by the FTC Act, 233 and requests by the public
under the Freedom of Information Act, 234 facilitate accountability by revealing information about industry conditions. Although a certain
amount of protection for confidential business information is necessary,
235
the current situation appears skewed unduly in favor of confidentiality.
An older form of regulation aimed at limiting resource accumulation in
private hands is taxation. Current proposals contemplate using tax incen236
tives to mimic competition, as with incentives for cost-related pricing.
These proposals are appealing and generate much interest 237 because they
dispense with the traditional regulatory apparatus and envision using regulation to induce competition rather than preclude it. The proposal for
inducing pricing in steel based on a fair rate of return, however, has some
of the same defects as traditional rate regulation and trigger pricing. Regulators with an accommodating attitude toward the industry might be persuaded to set a "fair rate" that acts as a floor, thus suppressing price
competition. 238 Moreover, the tax incentive approach, unless specifically
directed at market share or revenues,2 39 often seems simply to grant new
court's opinion regarding the possible continuing application of the antitrust laws. Hart
also complained to the Secretary of the Treasury that although the Customs Bureau was
collecting data and providing it to foreign firms to ensure enforcement of the restrictive
agreements, such data was not being provided to Congress. Id at 875-76.
232. See 15 U.S.C. § 77g (1976); 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, q, & w (1976).
233. 15 U.S.C. § 41 (1976).
234. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976).

235. For example, "[blecause the Census Bureau secrets all data on individual companies, agencies lack direct and timely information, and they must conduct their own research. . . ." SHEPHERD, supra note 23, at 147.

236. See notes 216-218 and accompanying text supra.
237. Indeed, interest in this approach amounts to something of a current fad. See, e.g.,
Schultze, The Public Use of Private Interest, HARPER'S, May, 1977, at 43.
238. BLAIR, supra note 118, at 670 criticizes Means' proposal further for lack of explication of the bonus mechanism. See MEANS, supra note 216 and accompanying text.
239. See SHEPHERD, supra note 23, at 198-200.
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benefits to existing successful firms, thus protecting the status quo. 24 °
Government ownership or control can appear in such a variety of forms
that the political consequences are not subject to easy generalization. Indeed, as already stated, government operation is simply one end of a spectrum of managerial autonomy and government supervision. In the
United States we have tended to create government corporations in instances where they do not directly compete with private firms. 24 ' Not sur-

prisingly, this often has the -same perverse effects on performance as
monopoly in private hands.242 Government participation in the market
through competing government firms or equity shares in "private firms,"
in contrast with government monopoly, provides a number of potential
advantages. 243 In broad terms, it establishes competing bases for accountability regarding the use of resources. 2 "4 To the degree that the market
240. Thus, for example, the proposal to impose charges for different kinds of pollution,
thereby creating incentives to reduce pollution, rewards the steel firm with the lowest costs
for reducing pollution. This is "precisely what is needed to achieve any given environmental standard at the lowest national cost." Schultze, supra note 237, at 56. The inefficient steel
firm, however, may have to close its older coke ovens. Workers may be laid off. Moreover,
when the ease with which a firm absorbs pollution charges or adjusts to avoid them depends
on its position of market power, the use of incentive controls may further existing anticompetitive tendencies. In that case, assisting the polluter to modernize rather than go out of
business may be an efficient long run approach. A government subsidy in the form of a
temporary share in ownership might be an appropriate vehicle and would be easier to monitor than the disguised subsidy of protection from imports.
241. Miller, supra note 207, at 298.
242. The policy dilemma for those concerned with the impact of economic power on
politics is well illustrated by the weapons industry. The current situation is often one of
public risk taking and private profits. Complete government ownership, however, might
aggravate political pressures from communities dependent on the weapons industry for employment. The bureaucratic principle of expanding domain might provide as much stimulus for overinvestment and overexpansion in weapons as the profit motive. SHEPHERD,
supra note 23, at 265. See also text accompanying note 207 supra.
243. One author states that "there is strong evidence in the public utility arena that competition between the two systems of organization [government and private firms], like competition among private businesses, is highly conducive to improved performance." (emphasis
in original). 2 KAHN, supra note 115, at 104. The idea that government enterprise could
function in a market context is an old one. See 0. LANGE & F. TAYLOR, ON THE EcoNOMIC THEORY OF SOCIALISM 98-99 (1938) for a discussion of marginal cost pricing by
government firms. For purposes of allocative efficiency it is competition, rather than the
form of ownership, which is decisive. See A. LERNER, THE ECONOMICS OF CONTROL
(1944). Thus it is possible to have a market composed almost entirely of government firms,
as was the case during the "New Economic Policy" in Soviet Russia and as is presently true
in Yugoslavia. G. GROSSMAN, ECONOMIC SYSTEMS 99 n.5, 100-04 (1967). See also WILCox, supra note 115, at 567. The degree to which market socialism mimics the market
composed of private firms may be illustrated by the fact that it is plagued by one of the same
diseases--monopoly. The Yugoslavs found it necessary to enact an antitrust law, although
critics believe it is not vigorously enforced. Sichel, The Threat to Market Socialism: The
Case of Yugoslavia, 16 ANTITRUST BULL. 389 (1971).
244. Advantages are lost by going too far in either direction toward all private firms or
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malfunctions in disciplining private industry, there is available to the public a source of skill and information to test industry claims. This is the
real meaning of the term "yardstick competition" made familiar by the
TVA. 245 Government participation in steel production would be one way
of testing the claim that prices actually reflect costs and that foreign firms
24 6
are dumping in the United States market.
The competition of government firms is also a way of undermining collusive attempts to restrict competition. By distributing resources among
competing bases of competition, the old antitrust objective of dividing resources can be served even where numerous private firms cannot exist.
all government. As Arthur Okun said recently in a related context, "a sound and viable
society will not put all its eggs in one basket. It will rely on many mechanisms for decision
making ..
" A. OKUN, FURTHER THOUGHTS ON EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY 30 (1977).
The aim of achieving competing forms of accountability may not be attained where dominant private businesses actually control the government firm. For example, the Communications Satellite Systems (COMSAT) was established as a hybrid corporation-privately
owned and operated for profit but with some of its directors appointed by the President and
subject to presidential supervision in its relations with foreign governments. Miller, supra
note 207, at 310-12. The Antitrust Division of the Justice Department sought to have the
major communications carriers such as American Telephone & Telegraph (AT&T) relinquish their control of COMSAT. Not the least objection to the interlock is that AT&T has
cable communications interests which conflict with COMSAT objectives. Id at 316, 320,
321. Amtrak is another instance where private carriers hold the stock of a quasi-public
company, heavily financed by the government. The arrangement has been criticized as a
vehicle for imposing responsibility on the government without authority. Friedmann, Some
Comparative Observations, in PUBLIC AND PRIVATE ENTERPRISE INMIXED ECONOMIES 368
(W. Friedmann ed. 1974).
245. The term "yardstick" derives from the intent to use a system of public power to
measure the performance of private firms which could not be tested by the market.
HAWLEY, supra note 78, at 325, 328, 329, 341. The value of government participation in the
market does not depend on exact compatability of costs and rates, which may be difficult,
although not impossible to achieve, since the government firm may have different rights and
liabilities. In Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973), the Supreme
Court found preservation of municipal power companies as competition for a regulated private firm protected by the antitrust laws, even though the municipal firms obtained some
power at special low rates from the Bureau of Reclamation. See Note, 87 HART. L. REV.
1720, 1741 (1974). For reasons set forth in the text accompanying note 251 infra, however,
if the government enterprise is employed as a tool to enhance competition it should be required ordinarily to cover its own costs and should be given no excessive advantage or disadvantage in relation to its competitors.
246. British Steel represents a policy of total nationalization rather than public-private
competition and thus is not illustrative of the present proposal. Nevertheless, British Steel
provides an example of the value of public access to information. Recently public pressure
brought about the release of company data concerning expected losses. See European Style,
supra note 207. If public action must be taken to shore up the steel industry, it seems
reasonable that it be predicated on full information. During the coal strike in the United
States in early 1978, miners who advocated government takeover of the industry argued that
such takeover would facilitate a public review of coal company "books" and reveal whether
the companies could afford the benefits demanded by the union.
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Government firms have been known to participate in collusion, 247 but the
incentives to do so may be less, or at least the likelihood of detection
greater.248 Moreover, a vigorous government firm reintroduces the spur
of competition in an oligopolistic industry. Referring to the Swedish
owned tobacco firm, Svenska Tobaks, the chairman of Philip Morris of
Sweden recently called the firm, "very tough, very efficient, very clever
. . . .There's not a bureaucrat in the house ... ."249
Government participation in an industry may also diminish the advantage of the strategic position held by private firms. This is not to say that
government control will eliminate the possibility of special interests taking
advantage of strategic position, 250 but once again, the advantage of government participation is in providing an alternative source of accountability. The speed with which the Executive Branch met the steel industry's
initial demands in the autumn of 1977 and the 1978 approval of the LykesLTV merger must be largely attributed to the visible nature of the steel
crisis, in sagging market positions and mass layoffs. A government company could assist in determining whether the layoffs were justified in business terms and could provide alternative means of cushioning the shock if
they were. If there is to be a departure from market forces, the old antitrust instinctive opposition to concentration of resources counsels against
perpetuating continuing concentration of resources in the same hands. In
this case the resource is strategic control of jobs.
Nevertheless, employing the government firm to cushion market forces
must be undertaken with restraint or the firm may become the captive of
new special interests. This raises the general issue of the impact of public
enterprise on the balance of electoral and managerial roles in the political
system. Although one purpose of public enterprise may be to provide a
degree of responsiveness to the public not found in the private firm, management nevertheless, requires a degree of autonomy to accomplish its
tasks. Indeed, if the government firm is to be judged by its performance in
the market, management should not ordinarily be distracted with responsi247. The government-owned British Petroleum reportedly engaged in payoffs to Italian
politicians, and Renault, the French-owned auto company, apparently conspired with its
private competitors to hold up prices. ENOLER, THE BROTHERHOOD OF OIL 216 (1977);
LINDBLOM, supra note 141, at 113.
248. Much depends on the balance struck between competition and accountability. See
note 251 infra.
249. See European Style, supra note 207. Kahn states that the salutary effect of the
rivalry of the government firm with private firms is a function not only of competition for
the same customers and the example of the yardstick, but the ultimate threat of government
takeover. 1 KAHN,supra, note 115, at 104.
250. A public employee strike, for example, is particularly effective in a monopoly industry such as transportation, due to the lack of realistic alternatives for many users.
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bility for implementing myriad other social policies. This suggests that
there may sometimes be a conflict between the use of public enterprise to
act as a check on private political power and its use for welfare purposes.
One of the weaknesses of left-wing theory has been its disregard for the
adverse political consequences of overreliance on government ownership
of industry to achieve welfare goals. 251 Ordinarily, the best approach
would be to implement particular social objectives through regulation imposed from the outside on a public firm just as it would be on a private
firm. For example, the state-owned Svenska Tobacks in Sweden is subject
to the same rule applicable to private firms that cigarettes may not be advertised by showing pictures of cigarettes in a "natural environment. ' 252
Once government ownership and participation in a given industry is invoked, another aspect of the relationship between economic and political
power must be faced. The existence of government ownership will not
automatically resolve the lack of policy focus referred to earlier as a weakness in traditional regulation. Where market forces are slight, any resolution of issues must be raised to a high degree of generality and
responsibility must be focused, if the electorate is to perceive and react to
the conduct of government firms. Otherwise, one may have merely substituted management by unaccountable government oligarchs for unaccount251. See SHEPHERD, supra note 23, at 287. A slight degree of governmental administrative oversight in the nature of periodic GAO and OMB audits and competition reviews by
the antitrust enforcement agencies could make for greater public accountability than is now
available with the private firm. This degree of accountability is worth some sacrifice in
efficiency. Involvement of the supervisory government department in the details of enterprise operation, however, risks diverting the firm from its competition enhancing role and
subjecting it to the political influences of powerful private pressure groups. For example,
the public corporations in Britain have had to strike a balance between "the two objectives
of businesslike management and political accountability." See WILCOX, supra note 115, at
566-68, 573.
252. See European Style, supra note 207, § 3, at 3, col. 1. The conflicting objectives
imposed upon government corporations are well illustrated with respect to the Tennessee
Valley Authority by the HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Special Small Business Problems
ofthe House Select Comm. on Small Business, The Impact of the Energy and Fuel Crisis on
Small Business, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), in which the following, sometimes conflicting
objectives were all discussed: keeping down costs to consumers, providing more contracts to
small coal operators, paying enough for coal to cover the costs of strip mine reclamation,
earning enough to cover all costs consistent with the Tennessee Valley Authority Act. Id at
146-50. See also National Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. TVA, 367 F. Supp. 122, 128
(E.D. Tenn. 1973), aI'd,502 F.2d 852 (6th Cir. 1974) (TVA environmental impact statement
adequate); Save Our Cumberland Mountains, Inc. v. TVA, 374 F. Supp. 846 (E.D. Tenn.
1972), affd without opinion, 480 F.2d 926 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 914 (1974)
(TVA not responsible for enforcing state statute pertaining to overloading trucks); and TVA
v. Hill, 435 U.S. 902 (1978) (Endangered Species Act, § 7, 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (1976), prohibited completion of TVA dam which would eradicate snail darter fish even though dam virtually completed).

19781

Beyond Antitrust

able private ones, and nothing is gained. This is the advantage of general
legislation such as the Humphrey-Hawkins bill 25 3 and the Carter energy
package. 254 Without addressing the merits of either program here, they
serve to illustrate the importance of comprehensive policy approaches in
the expression of interests in the process.
One weakness in the policy process relating to steel imports, however, is
that the imports have been treated in isolation from antitrust policy, aid to
steel workers, and rationalization of production. Now that the government has attempted such reconciliation, the opportunity for public debate
exists. Comprehensive treatment of the issues with the widest participation of interests would be facilitated if the program were submitted to Congress as a package. To the extent the Executive has authority to act
without congressional approval, some body such as the Congressional
Budget Office, Joint Economic Committee, or General Accounting Office
(GAO) should conduct periodic reviews of policy toward steel with particular attention to whether policy reflects consideration of, and an attempt to
reconcile diverse interests.
In assailing government planning, 255 conservatives have viewed it as an
253. The Humphrey-Hawkins bill, S. 50, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978), attempted to establish and translate into practice the right of all adult Americans to be employed. The bill
created an annual dialogue between the President, Congress and the Federal Reserve Board
regarding aspects of the nation's monetary and fiscal policy. A revised and considerably
less ambitious version of the bill was enacted on October 15, 1978. See The Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-523, 92 Stat. 1909 (1978). For a
comparison of the original and final versions of the bill, see Wash. Post, Oct. 20, 1978, § A,
at 17, col. 5.
254. President Carter's energy proposal, the National Energy Act, was passed by the
House of Representatives on Aug. 6, 1977. The Senate has broken the Act into five separate
bills which were recently enacted into law on October 24, 1978: The National Energy Conservation Policy Act, Pub. L. No. 95-619, 92 Stat. 3207 (1978); The National Gas Policy Act,
Pub. L. No. 95-621, 92 Stat. 3351 (1978); The Public Utility Regulatory Policy Act, Pub. L.
No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (1978); The Power Plant & Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978, Pub.
L. No. 95-620, 92 Stat. 3289 (1978); and, the Energy Production & Conservation Tax Incentive Act, Pub. L. No. 95-618, 92 Stat. 3174 (1978).
255. For surveys of the variety of planning employed in the western democracies, see
SHONFIELD, supra note 205 and GROSSMAN, supra note 243. The extent of American experience with central planning during the world wars is often forgotten. See G. SOULE & V.
CAROsso, AMERICAN ECONOMIC HISTORY 497-511, 552-58 (1957); G. FITE & J. REESE, AN
ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 513-22, 630-48 (2d ed. 1959); G. SOULE, PLAN-

NING USA 33-47, 133-41 (1967). The difficulty with these experiences, however, appears to
be similar to the difficulty experienced with NRA and efforts at partial planning attempted
by regulatory commissions. The fragmented nature of American politics meant that planning often amounted to delegating authority to business to supervise itself. One observer
concludes the War Industries Board (WIB) of World War I was used by business for its own
objectives. R. CUFF, THE WAR INDUSTRIES BOARD 177-82 (1973). As a government organization the WIB had enough credibility to protect business from public scrutiny, but was too
weak actually to control business. The decentralized administrative structure employed was
an "imperial bureaucratic system," in which the guiding principle was to try to appoint
administrative delegates who shared the values of the government, and "hope for the best."
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unwarranted intrusion in private affairs. 256 When resort is had to government involvement in the market, however, some degree of integrative programming may be crucial to ensure accountability. Economic power
unaccountable either to market forces or to those of the democratic political process is the worst of both worlds, whether embodied in private oligopoly or the edict of a government official.
B. Oil
Application of the foregoing analysis to the oil industry provides a perspective on its structure which is ignored by much current debate. Students of the industry seem to agree on very little of significance. Some
assert that the industry is not concentrated and has low profits. 257 Others
say the opposite. 258 Some contend that government action is necessary to
restore competition. 259 Others are forever insisting that competition could
break out at any moment and would do so if the government would only
keep its hands off.260 Commentators cannot even agree on so basic a
question of current debate as whether the administration's proposed Crude
Oil Equalization Tax 26 1 would produce an increase in prices to consumers.

26 2

Id. at 182. A similar critique has been directed at the planning in World War II. 0. GLAHAM, JR., TOWARD A PLANNED SOcIETY 73-75 (1976).

Thus, despite considerable success

with some aspects of planning such as rationalization of car distribution during government
operation of the railroads, see FITE & REESE, supra at 644-45, the political implications of
planning are ambigious. Those concerned with the impact of economic power on politics
should proceed cautiously toward increased planning. If the public interest is to prevail in
the process, mechanisms of political integration may need to be enhanced first. See note 181
supra. For a similar commentary on the British planning experience, see SHONFIELD, supra
note 205, at 88-89.
256. F. HYACK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1945).
Recognition of the importance for democratic accountability of coordinated policymaking
has come recently in the draft proposals advanced by the American Bar Association's Commission on Law and the Economy dealing with the traditional economic regulatory agencies.
See note 228, supra.
257. See Mead, Private Enterprise, Regulation and Government Enterprise in the Energy
Sector, in OIL IN THE SEVENTIES 129 (1977).
258. BLAIR, supra note 15, at 257, 294-320.
259. Id at 399-400.
260. Mead, supra note 257, at 137; M. ADELMAN, THE WORLD PETROLEUM MARKET
149, 159 (1972).
261. Originally proposed as part of the National Energy Act, the provision proposed a
three stage excise tax on domestic crude oil. It was designed to equalize United States and
world petroleum prices by 1980, and would have rebated tax proceeds to consumers. A
final version of the energy proposal without the excise. tax was enacted by Congress on
October 14, 1978. See the Energy Production and Conservation Tax Incentive Act, Pub. L.
No. 95-618, 92 Stat. 3174 (1978).
262. See Lichtblau, Pricing U.S. Oil Products, Wall St. J., Nov. 11, 1977, at 14, col. 3;
Phelps and Smith Respond, Wall St. J., Nov. 11, 1977, at 14, col. 3.
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One example of a favorable picture of the oil industry is that drawn by
Walter J. Mead in a recent essay. 263 Mead adheres to the view that the
industry is not highly concentrated and that profits are not excessive. Additionally, he claims that the rate of innovation has been high, and that
government intervention and regulation has been virtually all counterproductive. The only concession to an adverse role played by the oil industry comes when he accuses the federal government of introducing the
monopoly element into the industry by "rigging" the market. 264 Mead
concedes that "[ojf course, such government rigging came about as a result
265
of petitions from the oil industry.
A review of the history of oil since the turn of the century induces a
degree of skepticism toward Mead's serene view of the prospects of a laissez faire policy toward oil. In fact, it induces a degree of skepticism about
the likelihood of any policy toward oil. The truth may well be more complex than either the defenders of the market or the advocates of government intervention suppose-namely that the great oil companies have
been able to turn every kind of policy to their advantage, frustrating attempts to achieve more inclusive policy goals. Thus, in the oil industry
the need to weigh the political factor gains particular relevance. Without
resolving the issue of whether vigorous competition is theoretically possible, it is essential that whatever course is followed, programs should be
selected which redress the balance of interests reflected in the policy-making process.
The 1911 decision of the Supreme Court in Standard Oil Company of
New Jersey v. United States266 sealed the fate of the old Standard Oil trust.
The trustbusters, however, like Hercules in the Greek myth, soon found
that the hydra once slain had sprung many heads where before there had
been one. 267 During the depression, state prorationing programs 268 were
used by companies to restrict production and to maintain prices. Restriction, however, bore little relationship to the ostensible conservation objec263. See Mead, supra note 257.
264. Id at 138.
265. Id
266. 221 U.S. 1 (1911). See text accompanying notes 49-55 supra.
267. Stocking, Book Review, 19 ANTITRUST BULL. 623-24 (1974)(G. Nash, United States
Oil Policy, 1890-1964 (1968)).
268. The first such plan was passed in Oklahoma in 1927 and other states soon followed
suit. Production overcapacity led to efforts to maintain prices through state rationing. Although justified on conservation grounds, the withdrawal rate was not calculated to minimize waste. An attempt to provide the Secretary of the Interior with prorationing authority
was initially supported by major oil companies, but they backed off, in part due to the Secretary's alarming remarks about turning the oil industry into a public utility. HAWLEY, supra
note 78, at 212-18.
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tive of those laws. In California, where voters rejected a proration law,
the producers set up a "private" system. 269 Coupled with use of the tariff
and voluntary restrictions on imports, the Senate Small Business Committee found the national system a "perfect pattern of monopolistic control
over oil production, the distribution thereof among refiners and distribu' 270
tors, and ultimately the price paid by the public.
When World War II broke out, petroleum was one of the industries in
which the Antitrust Division shelved projected suits. 27 1 During the war,
when the military became uneasy about shortages, industry spokesmen
were able to quash proposals for United States acquisition of oil company
holdings in Saudi Arabia and for construction of a United States owned
refinery and pipelines in the Near East. 272 In the early 1950's as a result
of an FTC report, President Truman ordered suit to be filed against the
international oil cartel, challenging monopolistic control of foreign production and curtailment of domestic production. 273 The case was progressively eviscerated, however, by the novel step of transferring supervision of
the litigation to the State Department, and then curtailing the scope of the
charges and barring the Justice Department from seeking relief through
divestiture. At one point an Eisenhower aide explained that it had to be
assumed that enforcement of the antitrust laws against the oil companies
operating in the Near East was "secondary to the national security interest ....
274 Arguments at the time that national security would be ad275
vanced by enforcement, however, were ignored.
More recently, the Justice Department has been criticized for permitting
Continental Oil to acquire Consolidated Coal, allowing three major petroleum companies to dominate both the North Slope reserves and the Alaskan pipeline, and failing to oppose British Petroleum's acquisitions in the
United States. 276 Ralph Nader's Study Group on Antitrust Enforcement
compiled a long list of cases not filed by the Justice Department, cases lost
against the oil industry, or settled with what the Group thought were weak
consent decrees. It also indicated instances in which permission was
granted by the Justice Department through business review letters to tread
269. Id at 218.

270. Id

at

219 (quoting

LYNCH, THE CONCENTRATION OF ECONOMIC POWER (1946)).

271. Id at 442.

supra note 247, at 9.

272.

ENOLER,

273.

STAFF REPORT OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, THE INTERNATIONAL PE-

TROLEUM CARTEL (1952).
274. BLAIR, supra note

15, at 73.

275. Id at 71-76.

276.

ENOLER,

supra note 247, at 214.
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beyond the boundaries of the law. 277 Although arguments can be made to

justify some of these outcomes, there is considerable evidence that over the
years the oil industry has deflected most significant efforts to apply the
278
principles of the antitrust laws to it.
Outside the antitrust field, the record since World War II indicates that
the oil industry has frequently employed government to achieve its ends,
not always employing the most savory of means. Import quotas were in279
troduced in the 1950's and 1960's which supported high domestic prices.
It was reported that the Secretary of the Treasury, who was also a member
of the Cabinet Committee that recommended adoption of mandatory quotas, had a stake in increased oil prices due to transactions with oil interests
entered into prior to joining the government.2 80 Persons associated with
one oil firm reportedly gave $250,000 to the 1972 Nixon campaign. Apparently, after the election, efforts to revoke the firm's special import 1icense ceased, and the firm obtained an increase in import allocations. 28'
277. GREEN, supra note 15, at 283-93. See also GREEN, MORE & WASSERSTEIN, THE
CLOSED ENTERPRISE SYSTEM (1974).
278. In July, 1973, the Federal Trade Commission, In re Exxon, once again brought an
action against the major oil companies, charging them with monopolistic practices including
raising barriers to entry, limiting the supply of crude oil to independent refiners, and inflating prices. Although already over five years old, the case is still in its preliminary stages.
In re Exxon, complaintfiled, No. 8934 (F.T.C., July 7, 1973). The complaint was printed in
full in Eagman, FTC v. Exxon.: Oligopoly in the Petroleum Industry, 6 ANTITRUST L. &
ECON. 67 (1973).
279. See Mead, supra note 257, at 153. In one view, import quotas, as well as proration
plans, were the result of strong arm tactics by the dominant companies. See Wash. Post,
July 16, 1970, § A, at 1, col. 1; BLAIR, supra note 15, at 173-75. Another view, however,
concludes that these policies were actually the product of pressure by domestic independents
and local groups and that the majors would have been advantaged by being able to import
more oil. ADELMAN, supra note 260, at 149. This commentator observed that only when
independents and local interests won protectionist constraints were such constraints utilized
by the majors for price signaling purposes, which, in turn, surpressed competition among
those firms. Id at 198. It has been pointed out, however, that even when independent oil
companies secured voluntary import restraints, they obtained the support of the majors by
agreeing to base allocations on historical imports, a formula favorable to the majors. Thus,
even if the majors are not always the principal initiators of restrictive practices, they have
often been able to turn them to their advantage. Salamon & Siegfried, The Relationship
Between Economic Structure and PoliticalPower." The Energy Industry, in COMPETITION IN
THE U.S. ENERGY INDUSTRY 380 (T. Duchesneau, ed. 1975).
280. BLAIR, supra note 15, at 173-75; ENGLER, supra note 247, at 59; Nossiter, Wash.
Post, July 16, 1970, § A, at 1, col. 1.
281. HearingsBefore the Select Comm. on PresidentialCampaignActivities, Watergateand
RelatedActivities, PhaseIII, Campaign Financing,93d Cong., 1st Sess. 10,284-10,338 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as CampaignActivities]. See also, ENGLER supra note 247, at 65-66. For a
general discussion of oil import quotas see HearingsBefore the Senate Subcomm. on Antitrust
and Monopoly of the Comm. on Judiciary on Government Intervention in the Market
Mechanism, 91st Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. (1969-1970); Dam, Implementation ofImport Quotas:
The Case of Oil, 14 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1971).
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Three oil companies have been reported to have made illegal campaign
contributions of $100,000 each during the 1972 presidential campaign. 282
The chairman of one firm explained to a Senate Committee that a contribution was needed because his company was not "a large factor" in its
markets and it desired a "calling card" to obtain access to administrative
officials. 283 Large contributions have also been given by oil interests to
strategically placed politicians. Thus, four members of the Senate Finance Committee reportedly received no less than $330,000 collectively at
the time of the 1974 campaigns. 284 Large political contributions of varying degrees of propriety have additionally been made by the oil companies
285
in foreign elections.
The interrelationship between oil interests and the making of United
States foreign policy may be indicated by a few examples. Currently a
foreign tax credit is given for certain taxes paid to foreign governments. 286
With respect to payments made to Middle East countries, this credit was
partly designed to accommodate growing demands by producer countries
for higher revenues from their own oil. Desirous of maintaining the good
will of governments in the Middle East, the State Department, working
with the National Security Council and the Treasury Department devised
the tax credit with the concurrence of major oil firms. 287 The credit has
been criticized as lacking justification as a credit against income because,
in some instances, changed circumstances made the tax more like a royalty
than a tax on profits.2 88 United States income taxes paid by the international oil companies have been low, averaging, for example, less than five
282. See Campaign Activities, Part 13, supra note 281, at 5460-81; SENATE SELECT
COMM. ON PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES, FINAL REPORT, S. REP. No. 981, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess., ch. 4 (1974). See ENGLER, supra note 247, at 62-68 & nn.22-28; BUSINESS
WEEK, Sept. 21, 1974, at 84-87. See also N.Y. Times, Aug. 8, 1974, at 25, col. 6; id. Nov. 26,
1975, at 1, col. 1.
283. See Campaign Activities, Part 13, supra note 281, at 5802, 5439-59 (testimony of
Orrin E. Atkins). S. REP. No. 981, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 460 (1974); ENGLER, supra note 247,
at 66.
284. NEWS FROM COMMON CAUSE, March 11, 1975; ENGLER, supra note 247, at 64.
285. HearingsBefore the Senate Subcomm. ofMultinationalCorporations ofthe Comm. on
Foreign Relations, on Multinational Corps. and United States Foreign Policy, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess., Pt. 12, at 4-58 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Hearings] (testimony of B.R. Dorsey, Chairman of the Board, Gulf Oil Corp.). See also ENGLER, supra note 247, at 110-13 & nn.32-36
and sources cited therein. For a further discussion of the politics of oil, see S. FREEMAN,
ENERGY: THE NEW ERA 177-98 (1974).
286. For a recent ruling discussing the foreign tax credit and citing prior rulings, see Rev.
Rul. 78-61, I.R.B. No 78-8 (Feb. 21, 1978). See also 26 U.S.C. §§ 901-908 (1976) and Rev.
Rul. 55-296, 1955-1 C.B. 386.
287. Hearings,supra note 285, Pt. 4, at 83-128, Pt. 8, at 341-78. See also ENGLER, supra
note 247, at 118.
288. Hearings,supra note 285, Pt. 4, at 83-128 (testimony of Stanford G. Ross) and Pt. 8,
at 341-78. See also ENOLER, supra note 247, at 119.
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percent in 1972.289 Thus, the supposed benefits from maintaining cordial
relations with the producer countries may have been purchased at the expense of the American public, although the interest in comity was perhaps
as strong for the oil companies as it was for the State Department. When
the Internal Revenue Service recently proposed tightening the tax credit
rules, however, controversy within the Treasury Department was reported
with respect to the impact of such a move on the Carter administration's
29°
relations with business.
Foreign aid has been employed to assist the oil companies. The United
States Information Agency prepared pamphlets for distribution in Ecuador by major oil firms, extolling the benefits of private enterprise to fore291
stall criticism of United States' investments as imperialistic.
Suspension of foreign aid to various countries has also been employed as a
292
stick to produce compliance with the demands of private oil companies.
293
Reportedly, one such action weakened a moderate government in Peru.

The United States government seems to have seen its role in the Middle
East as principally one of maintaining amicable relations with the producer states rather than one of participating in negotiations concerning
terms of trade in oil.294 On occasion, the United States government's def-

erence to established commercial relationships in the Middle East has resulted in efforts to protect the domain of the major oil firms. Thus, in the
1960's the State Department persuaded one firm not to make an offer to
Iraq for developing oil concessions, on the theory that the firm's actions
would undermine negotiations by other firms which had lost their concessions. 29 5 State also intervened with foreign governments, particularly
296
Italy, when Iraq sought bids from foreign oil firms.
289. Hearings, supra note 285, Pt. 4, at 104 (statistics compiled by committee staff);
STAFF OF SENATE SUBCOMM. ON MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS, 93D CONG., 2D SESS.,

OIL CORPORATIONS AND UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 92 (Comm. Print 1975) [hereinafter cited as REPORT]. See also ENGLER, supra note 247, at 119.

290. Wash. Post, Nov. 30, 1977, § A, at l, col. 4. Butsee Rev. Rul. 78-63, I.R.B. No. 788 (Feb. 21 1978), revoking Rev. Rul. 55-296, 1955-1 C.B. 386.
291. ENGLER, supra note 247, at 105-06. See Hearingsbefore the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, on the United States Information Service AppropriationsAuthorization, Fiscal
Year 1973, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 232-33 (1972).
292. See Hearings before the Senate Subcomm. on Western Hemisphere Affairs of the
Comm. on Foreign Relations, on U.S. Relations with Peru, 91st Cong., ist Sess. 91 (1969)
(statement of Richard Goodwin). See also ENOLER, supra note 247, at 106.
293. Hearings,supra note 292, at 91 (statement of Richard Goodwin); ENGLER, supra
note 247, at 106.
294. ENGLER, supra note 247, at 123-24.
295. REPORT, supra note 289, at 102; ENGLER, supra note 247, at 124-25.
296. ENGLER, supra note 247, at 125. See Hearings,supra note 285, Pt. 8, at 532-55;
Wall St. J., Feb 15, 1974, at 1, col. 1; REPORT supra note 289, at 102.
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To foster a desirable pro-Arab political climate, oil firms have supported
groups such as the Americans for Middle East Understanding, which work
among educational, business and church groups to promote understanding
of Arab positions and culture.2 97 In a 1973 letter to stockholders and employees, one major oil company reportedly cautioned that many Arabs feel
that Americans do not "hold in proper regard the national interests of the
Arab states. '2 98 The letter urged "that the United States should work
more closely with the Arab governments to build up and enhance our relations with the Arab people .... *"299 The oil firms have also applied direct pressure. When the October War of 1973 broke in the Middle East, a
memorandum to President Nixon from four major oil companies warned
3°
against any new military aid to Israel.
With the foregoing survey of the history of government policy toward
oil, we can return to Professor Mead's proposals for a laissez-faire approach to oil. In dismissing alternatives as less efficient, Mead quotes a
1975 Federal Energy Administration report which asserted that there is
"no basis" for concluding that public companies are more efficient and
"evidence is available" to suggest the contrary. 30 No concession or even
recognition is given to the non-economic reasons, pro or con, for government regulation or public enterprise. Government is blamed for the monopoly element in the oil industry, but there is no elaboration of the role of
the private firms in bringing this about beyond mentioning that the government action was at the "petition" of the industry. 30 2
Such narrow analysis has the virtue of simplicity, but appears unrealistic. Even if in some theoretical model, the oil industry presents a competitive picture, the record suggests that the companies are too large in
resources to insulate government from their influence. If Exxon were to
divest all but its crude oil and exploration facilities, it would still be the
largest privately owned company in the world. 30 3 In 1970, oil accounted
for thirty percent of all American foreign investments, forty percent of
297. ENGLER, supra note 247, at 137. See STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 93D CONG., 2D SESS., REPORT OF THE SPECIAL STUDY MISSION TO THE MIDDLE

EAST 6 (Comm. Print 1974).
298. Letter from Otto N. Miller, Chairman of the Board, to Standard Oil of Calif. stockholders (July 26, 1973), cited in ENGLER, supra note 247, at 138.
299. Id
300. Reprinted in Hearings, supra note 285, Pt. 7, at 546-47; ENGLER, supra note 247, at
139.
301. Mead, supra note 257, at 148 (citing Nossaman, Waters, Krueger, Marsh & Rioridan, An Evaluation of the Options of the United States Government in its Relationship
to United States Firms in International Petroleum Affairs A-47 (Report to the Federal Energy Administration, Feb. 1975)).
302. See text accompanying notes 264-265 supra.

303.

BLAIR,

supra note 15, at 382.
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American investments in underdeveloped countries, and sixty percent of
American earnings from underdeveloped countries. 3°4 Thus, the issue is
not whether government will interact with the oil companies, but how, in
fact, it will do so.
Thus, even if those who say oil is a workably competitive industry are
correct, oil may be an example of an industry which illustrates that what is
satisfactory from an economic standpoint may not be satisfactory for the
health of democratic politics. Indeed, part of the political potency of the
oil industry may be attributable to the community of interests on some
issues among the major companies and smaller firms. 30 5 The protection
of small firms through existing regulatory and antitrust efforts may not be
enough to protect the political process. As a result, policies supplementing
the antitrust approach merit consideration.
There is reason to believe that public policy relating to oil reflects an
imbalance of resources between public and private interests. The adverse
effects of this imbalance are familiar-unwarranted influence over the political process in achieving the industry's economic objectives, excessive
influence in other areas of public policy such as foreign policy, and unde30 6
sirable influence in shaping the general climate of belief and opinion.
Repeatedly, as with antitrust prosecutions and import quotas, the national
security argument has provided the industry with the strategic position to
achieve many of its objectives. The oil industry's monopoly of information resources has forced governmental reliance on CIA data, 30 7 and, as
noted, money has been liberally employed to achieve political objectives.
304. ENGLER, supra note 247, at 105. See also C. ISSAWI & M. YEGANEH, THE EcoNOMICS OF MIDDLE EAST OIL 108 (1962).
305. See note 280 supra. SALAMON & SIEGFRIED, supra note 279, at 382, suggest that the
perversion of government regulation follows a pattern. When competition threatens, the
majors foment a crisis atmosphere and urge that regulation is necessary to protect the "little
guy." Id If regulation becomes inconvenient it can be attacked later as anticompetitive.
Id Thus, government involvement can be used or discarded as private advantage dictates.
306. See Salamon & Siegfried, supra note 279, at 318 (discussing evidence linking oil
firm size to successful tax avoidance). With respect to oil company influence on public
opinion, Salamon and Siegfried note that the industry has spent millions of dollars to propagate their view of the "energy crisis." Id at 383.
307. Herman Fanssen, an energy expert at the Library of Congress, and an official at the
Department of Energy recently noted that there is little alternative to reliance on the CIA.
Wash. Post, April 23, 1978, § A, at 1, col. 6. Yet the motives of the CIA have been criticized. There have been charges and speculation that its estimates were designed to support
the Carter energy program or to influence United States relations with Israel and the Arabs.
James Akins, former United States Ambassador to Saudi Arabia and former director of the
Office of Fuels and Energy at the State Department, said that a report prepared by the CIA
Bureau of Economic Research on Saudi Arabian oil fields was "pernicious" in giving the
Saudis an excuse to cut production in the face of United States efforts to step up production
to avoid a world oil shortage. Id at 16, col. 6.
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If the efficiency argument against public participation in the oil industry
were much clearer than the cautious Federal Energy Administration statement quoted by Mead, there would still be a political case for such a public
role.
Better access to industry information could be achieved by special audits
or by special legislation which, although it would not alter the structure of
the industry, would require the companies to accept public members on
their boards. It could also be achieved by government ownership participation. Senator Adlai Stevenson once urged the creation of a public corporation to act as a costing yardstick, which would develop publicly owned
gas and oil in competition with private enterprise. 30 8 Another natural
area for a government corporation is energy research and development,
because the government already finances industry R&D efforts. 309 In
1971, a proposal was advanced for a Coal Gasification Development Corporation, jointly managed and funded by government and industry.3 10
The proposals for government participation have the advantage that
they would not only help break the industry's hold over information, but
could help lessen industry leverage over public policy, gained from its strategic position. It is possible that government companies would have
joined in the pressure for oil import quotas in the 1950's, or urged the
withholding of foreign aid to produce concessions, or advocated limitations on military aid to Israel. It is even possible that they might illegally
308. Senator Stevenson first proposed the creation of a federal oil and gas corporation on
Nov. 7, 1973 in an amendment to the Oil & Gas Regulatory Reform Act of 1973, S. 2506,
93d Cong., Ist Sess. (1973). The purpose of the corporation was to "explore for, develop
and produce the large deposits of oil, and natural gas on lands owned by the Federal Government." 119 CONG. REC. 36115 (1973). Stevenson emphasized that the legislation was
not intended to provide a first step in nationalizing the American petroleum industry.
Rather, it was designed to serve as "a spur, a yardstick, an incentive" for private oil companies and a device to restore competition in the private market. Id at 36116. However, no
action was taken on the measure. Similar proposals were introduced by Senator Stevenson
on April 8, 1974, see 120 CONG. REC. 5398 (1974), and again on Feb. 17, 1975, see 121
CONG. REC. 3158 (1975). Again, no action was taken on either bill.
309. See Energy Research and Development Act, Pub. L. No. 93-438, 88 Stat. 1233
(1974), (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 5811 (1976)).
310. ENGLER, supra note 247, at 169. Freeman suggests that the government should
serve as an energy "supplier of last resort." FREEMAN, supra note 285, at 320-22. He states
that:
[o]rdinarily the public could expect competitive market forces to assure that supplies offered for sale would be ample. But bitter experience has shown us that
clean energy supplies are scarce in relation to potential demand. As discussed
earlier, government has become less able to carry out programs or enforce laws
that Big Oil disapproves.
Id at 320-21. He also suggests that a United States Fuels Supply Corporation could "buy
energy from abroad, contract for development of fuels on federal lands. . . build refineries,
develop synthetic plants ..
" Id at 322.
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contribute money to political campaigns. They would, however, be subject to different incentive systems and means of accountablility.
Thus, government corporations might be utilized to implement competitive principles espoused by the antitrust enforcement agencies, much as
those agencies advocate competition before regulatory commissions such
as the Civil Aeronautics Board and the Interstate Commerce Commission.
In a situation similar to the one in which oil import quotas were demanded
by industry, the public companies could advocate a competitive approach.
Employing their own resources of skill and information, the government
companies could be in a position, when justified by the facts, to argue credibly that national security would not be adversely affected by following
competitive principles. 31' Moreover, although government funds can be
as misused in political campaigns as private money, the scrutiny of the
opposition party and of the various governmental auditing agencies would
be at least as reliable as external review of private discretionary authority.
Total reliance on one means of accountability would be foolish, but the
current approach leaves too much potential for abuse beyond public scrutiny. Finally, although the tension between the government firm's political responsiveness and its role as a profit-making entity was noted earlier
in connection with steel, there may be instances in which the capacity to
give priority to political policy goals may be vital to the public interest.
For example, it may have been desirable to accommodate Iraq's terms for
their oil concessions in spite of reduced profits for American firms, since
frustration by the United States of Iraqui efforts to obtain bids from firms
not already established in Iraq may have contributed to the increased Soviet influence in Iraq.3 12 When oil interests impinge on foreign policy,
and if the public must pay higher energy prices to accommodate either the
oil interests or foreign policy objectives, it is important that the firms be
subject to close public scrutiny. For these purposes, a properly accountable government firm may be necessary.
In addition to redressing the balance of resources between private and
public interests, the previous analysis calls attention to the need for development of public policy at a level of generality that can be addressed by
lay politicians and voters. This may require some degree of comprehensive programming as has been taking place in the presidential energy
package proposals.3 1 3 For all the criticism of these proposals, they have
provided some debate over major alternatives and an opportunity for a
311. For an example of such recent pro-competitive action by TVA, see text accompanying notes 382-83 infra.
312. See ENGLER, supra note 247, at 125.
313. For a brief description of the Carter administration proposals, see THE NEW REPUBLIC, April 30, 1977, at 5-8. See also note 254 supra.
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much wider expression of interests than either a regulatory commission
approach or total laissez-faire-"deregulation"-would allow. In contrasting the Ford and Carter proposals, one magazine remarked that both
would make oil and gas more expensive. 3 14 The Ford windfall profits tax
would have been refunded to companies that invested in new energy
projects, thus returning the increased revenue "back to the economy without changing the structure of the economy. ' 315 By contrast, Carter intends to distribute the windfall directly back to consumers, and by
providing incentives for conservation and development of new energy
sources, he would "channel money away from established patterns of investment. '' 31 6 These alternatives are at a level of generality that the layman can understand and accept or reject in Congress and at the polls.
The record of public policy toward the oil industry raises difficult questions for antitrust enforcement and other approaches to control the industry. The frustrating length of litigation in the Exxon case and the debate
over whether divestiture would be consistent with efficiency are probably
less important than the question of whether the public can ever control the
industry through antitrust enforcement alone. The question is one of political reality: whether in the face of the political organization and influence wielded by a great and vital industry, antitrust enforcement can ever
muster the popular support to sustain and win a long drawn-out struggle.
Without abandoning antitrust, other means of introducing competition
and accountability, including public corporations and continued comprehensive federal programming, should be employed. If these approaches
are designed in a manner which will redress the balance of private and
public resources and expand the range of interests heard in the policy
making process, the power of the oil industry to resist legitimate antitrust
enforcement may ultimately be reduced as well.
C

The Influence ofAdvertising on Public Opinion

The emphasis on deconcentration in antitrust is inadequate to deal with
the influence of economic power on politics. The steel industry provides
an example of a situation in which antitrust may be inadequate because
strong economic pressures are forcing departure from the decentralized
market approach. The oil industry illustrates yet another situation in
which antitrust may fail to achieve its political goals, because the decentralization adequate for workable competition is inadequate to forestall
unwarranted political influence. Advertising represents a third situation
314.

THE NEW REPUBLIC,

315. Id
316. Id

April 30, 1977, at 6.

See also note 261 supra.
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in which the antitrust approach fails to deal with the political influence of
economic power.
The concern here is with advertising as a force which channels the energy of society in the direction of private consumption and wants as opposed to public needs. Because advertising attempts to project a vision of
happiness linked to individual consumption, the deconcentration approach
of antitrust is not likely to alter significantly the overall impact of the advocacy of private consumption by advertising.
It may be argued that this function of advertising is not objectionable
and is not inconsistent with democracy. If people respond to advertising
with their dollars, they indicate through "consumer sovereignty" that they
desire a society oriented toward personal consumption. Sociologist
Daniel Bell argues that the current theme of American society is hedonism-indeed that hedonism is all that is left of the triad of Protestant economic drive, sobriety, and a sense of destiny that gave America its
purpose. 3 17 But he suggests that this situation is dangerous because "[t]he
foundation of any liberal society is the willingness of all groups to compromise private ends for the public interest. '31 8 The alternative is polarization and group fighting, or cynical bargaining in which the powerful
3 19
benefit at the expense of the weak.
The issue then, is not whether people have chosen the current situation,
but whether, for the survival of a healthy liberal democracy, it is reasonable to consider an alternative which the electorate might also choose.
Stated in terms of the analytical model employed above, the inquiry is
whether resources can be channeled better to enhance those means by
which the electorate can play its role in discerning and expressing common
320
purposes.
Advertising is believed to be one source of barriers to entry and thus,
excessiye market power. The barriers may be erected intentionally, by
proliferation of brands, or the barriers may result from the economies of
large-scale promotion. 32' To the degree that advertising does produce
barriers to entry, it may affect the political process by augmenting economic power. Advertising may, however, have a more pervasive, though
less readily measurable effect on politics through its influence on political
attitudes and beliefs. As V.0. Key observed, "[tihe great political triumph
317. BELL, supra note 148, at 21, 224, 281.
318. Id at 245.
319. Id
320. See note 181 and accompanying text supra.
321. For a discussion of advertising as a cause of barriers to entry, see COMANOR &
WILSON, supra note 121. Regarding economies of large-scale promotion, see note 335 and
accompanying text infra.
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of large-scale enterprise has been the manufacture of a public opinion fa'3 22
vorably disposed toward, or at least tolerant of, gigantic corporations.
The favor curried by advertising may accrue not only to individual corporations, but also to the objectives and products of the market as opposed
to those social goods which the market fails to provide. Although the
United States is sometimes thought of as a "welfare state," in comparison
with other industrial nations it has a low rate of expenditure on social programs, and a correspondingly poor record on such indices of civilization as
infant mortality and the availability of housing and public transportation.323 Contrasted with America's condition of enormous overall wealth
and material abundance, this situation has come to be known as one of
"private wealth and public squalor. '324
322. V.O. KEY, POLITICS, PARTIES AND PRESSURE GROUPS 108 (4th ed. 1959). For a
discussion of business influence over the mass media apart from advertising, see EPSTEIN,
supra note 177, at 212. Advertising has also been criticized as socially wasteful and ethically repugnant. K. BOULDING, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 513-14 (4th ed. 1966). In this view,
much, if not most advertising is said to lack information content. Instead, it is designed "to
build up in the mind of the consumer irrational preferences for certain brands of goods."
Id at 513. The advertiser juxtaposes liquor in association with flowers, cigarettes with
beautiful women and so on, in an effort "to associate the commodity in question with something else which the consumer likes or with the avoidance of something which the consumer
seeks to avoid." Id at 620-21. A study of sixth grade school children revealed that about
one-fifth of the children believed that commercials lie most of the time, and a large proportion of that one-fifth believed that all adults lie most of the time. Lane, Happiness, Virtue &
Justice, YALE ALUM. MAG. & J. 46, 48 (April 1978). Commenting on this study, political
behaviorist Robert Lane said, "[p]erhaps the weakest link in the ethical defense of capitalism, then, is the license given to the 'self-regulating market' in advertising." Id For a
favorable view of advertising, however, see J. BACKMAN, ADVERTISING & COMPETITION
(1967).
323. See Harrington, The Big Lie About the Sixties, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 29, 1975,
at 15-19. According to a recent report by the Department of Commerce, the infant mortality rate in the United States is substantially higher than in other leading industrial nations.
Based upon deaths which occurred under one year of age, per 1000 live births, the United
States infant mortality rate was 18.5%, as compared with: Canada, 17.1%, Japan, 11.7%
Finland, 12.0%, France, 13.3% and, Sweden, 10.8%. OFFICE OF FEDERAL STATISTICAL POLICY & STANDARDS, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, SOCIAL INDICATORS FOR 1976 at 213 (1977).
324. One obstacle in dealing with the imbalance between public and private goods is the
difficulty in measuring the imbalance. (For the meaning of public goods see notes 116 and
121, supra.) Since, by definition, the availability of public goods cannot be measured by
market means, it is impossible to determine whether public goods are over or underproduced. See Samuelson, Aspects of Public Expenditure Theories, 40 REV. OF ECON. &
STAT. 335 (1958). As Alfred Kahn states, the determination of whether the allocation of
resources produced by the market satisfies social welfare is a political or philosophical determination, not an economic one. 1 KAHN, supra note 115, at 67. It is probably true, however, for reasons stated in note 330 infra, that there is a tendency for public goods to be
under-produced relative to voter preferences, and research and analysis can reveal people's
preferences. This can aid in determining the appropriate quantity of public goods made
through the administrative or political process. In discussing the trade-off between economic equality and efficiency, Arthur Okun urges "a crystalization of social attitudes toward
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In the years since World War II there has been a significant increase in
United States government expenditures-from 12.8% of the Gross National Product in 1945 to 22.4% in 1970.325 Federal welfare expenditures
rose from $14 billion in 1950 to $180 billion in 1975.326 Nevertheless,
most of the increase in welfare expenditures is due to the increase in payments to the elderly under social security, veterans' benefits and medicare. 327 While these programs are desirable, the increased payments are
largely a response to the legitimate claims of a growing elderly population
rather than an increased national commitment to public goods generally.
Indeed, such increases in public outlays as have developed appear to have
precipitated resentment and conflict, as signified by Proposition 13, the
California property tax cut referendum, 328 and other signs of "taxpayer
revolt."

329

Arguably one great contributing cause of this situation is the pervasive
influence of private economic power in shaping the culture, partly through
advertising, into one heavily oriented toward private consumption of
goods. As Professor Galbraith puts it, "The advertising of the individual
automobile company seeks to win consumers from other makes. But the
advertising of all together contributes to the conviction that happiness is
associated with automobile ownership. ' 330 Affluence has ambivalent imthe trade-off" as a prerequisite for their implementation through the political process.
OKUN,

supra note 244, at 32.

325. BELL, supra note 148, at 233 n.16.
326. Id
327. Id
328. The Jarvis-Gann Initiative, Propositions 13 on the California primary ballot, was
passed on June 6, 1978 by a voter margin of 65-35%. The proposition amends Art. XIII of
the California Constitution by limiting real property taxes to 1%of the property's "full cash
value," and requires that any change in state taxes enacted for the purpose of increasing
revenue must be imposed by an act passed by not less than two-thirds of al members elected
to the legislature. The amendment also provides that no new ad valorem taxes on real
property, or sales or transaction taxes on sales of real property may be imposed. The
amendment became effective for the tax year beginning July 1, 1978. 39 STATE TAX REV.
(CCH) 1-2 (extra ed., June 8, 1978). For reactions to the amendment and predictions as to
its impact, see Wash. Post, June 7, 1978, § A, at 1, col. 1; Id, Aug. 23, 1978, § A, at 3, col. 4.
329. According to the Washington Post, "26 states are already in the process of considering adopting some formal tax spending limitation." Wash. Post, June 2, 1978, § A, at 1, col.
1. State and local tax cut proposals met with mixed voter reaction, however, in the 1978
mid-term elections. Wash. Star, Nov. 8, 1918, § B, at 1, col. 3.
330. J. GALBRAITH, ECONOMICS AND THE PUBLIC PURPOSE 140 (1973). There are, of
course, other reasons for the imbalance in fulfilling private and public needs. The influence
of business occasioned by its control of resources has already been discussed. See note 181
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plications. Conceivably it might be the precondition for liberation from a
compulsive concern with individual material well-being. Alternatively,
however, by disassociating demand from physical needs, it might provide
an endless field for exploitation by the persuasive power of advertising. 33 1
The current imbalance between private and public goods warrants efforts to foster a more inclusive vision of the good life than that projected
by commercial advertising. If this effort only produced a greater willingness to sacrifice at current levels on behalf of the community, it might enhance social peace. Of course, willingness to sacrifice depends not only on
a commitment to public goods, but on a belief that responsibility for
financing public expenditures is fairly shared and that the agencies respon332
sible for implementing public programs are competent.
Thus, while the problem of expenditure in the public interest is multifaceted, advertising represents a massive expenditure of resources in a
way which may inhibit the electorate in performing its role of expressing
the public interest. The instinct of antitrust when it finds concentrated
resources is to divide them, but the advertising problem poses insurmountable difficulties for this approach to economic influence on politics. For
example, antitrust advocates say that the automobile industry could be
333 It
broken into eight or ten firms without sacrificing economies of scale.
is questionable, however, whether this would be a sufficient result from the
standpoint of economic influence on politics. Each of the new firms
would still rank in sales among the Fortune 500. 334 Moreover, it is unclear whether the proposals for breakup account for the problem of economies of large-scale sales promotion thought to be present in consumer
supra. It has also been suggested that the incentives for business action which will advance
its interests are much greater than for dispersed members of the public to do the same. See
M. OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF

GROUPS 35 (1965).

Also, individuals are more likely to be informed about matters affecting

them in their capacities as income earners than on other subjects. Thus, political platforms
tend to be composed of special interest planks, but their composition might differ if voters
were more fully informed. See Downs, Why the Government Budget is Too Small in a
Democracy, in PRIVATE WANTS AND PUBLIC NEEDS 90-95 (E. Phelps ed. 1965).
331. J. GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE 202, 210 (1967). In 1977, $37 billion
was spent throughout the United States economy on advertising. ADVERTISING AGE, Jan.

19, 1978, at 88.
332. Despite the current "tax revolt," (see notes 328-29 supra), a recent poll shows that
Americans consider tax reform to achieve greater fairness as a more pressing item on the
public agenda than tax reduction. Wash. Post, Aug. 6, 1978, § D, at 5, col. 1. It is no
accident that private interests have fought tax reform; but bureaucratic opposition to civil
service reform may be equally contrary to the effort to gain enhanced support for public
expenditures.
333. See, e.g., White, A Proposalfor Restructuring the Automobile Industry, 7 ANTITRUST
L. & ECON. REV. 89-90 (1975).

334. Id at 94.

1978]

Beyond Antitrust

goods industries. 33" An antitrust decree breaking up the automobile companies could, perhaps, restrict advertising to prevent the economies of
large scale promotion and the use of model changes from resulting in
reconcentration. To the degree that effective competition is maintained,
consumers would presumably pay less for cars; perhaps they might even
buy more cars. But there is the dilemma and the irony. The antitrust
approach can assist people as consumers in obtaining what is available in
the market at a competitive price. It does not, however, assist people as
citizens in obtaining what the market will not provide.
The dilemma for antitrust is different here from the one presented by the
steel industry. In contrast to the steel industry, automobiles cannot be
considered a sick industry. Profits have generally been well above average
for a manufacturing industry, as has been the increase in labor productivity.336 In the classical model of antitrust, breaking up monopoly was supposed to improve performance and restore efficiency. In the steel
industry, we find that relaxation of antitrust restraints may be necessary to
improve performance. In the automobile industry-as well as in other consumer-oriented industries like soap, cosmetics, cigarettes, beverages, and
toilet goods-the problem may not be low performance, but performance
that is in a sense too high. At least, it is too high if one is concerned about
the social imbalance between expenditures for consumer goods and public
337
goods.
Although by itself the antitrust approach might not rechannel resources
into the public sector, it may be consistent with reducing advertising.
335. Asch & Marcus, Returns to Scale on Advertising, 15 ANTITRUST BULL. 33 (1970).
Advertising succeeds through repetition; thus, impact increases with expenditure. For a
smaller firm, the expenditure on advertising attributable to one unit of production must be
much higher if the smaller firm is to remain competitive. Thus, in the 1950's, General
Motors and Ford Motor Co. each spent about $27 per car on advertising while comparable
figures were $48 for Chrysler Corp., $64 for Studebaker-Packard, and $58 for American
SCHERER, supra note 15, at 96. By differentiating products through advertising,
industry leaders can sustain five percent price margins over potential new entrants for as
long as ten years. Id There is some controversy over the degree of correlation between
advertising and concentration. See Ekelund & Gramm, Advertising and ConcentratiowMore
on Tests of the Kaldor Hypothesis, 16 ANTITRUST BULL. 105 (1971); Miller, Advertising and
Competition.* Some NeglectedAspects, 17 ANTITRUST BULL. 467 (1972). But it is fairly clear
that model changes have been a significant factor in concentration in the auto industry,
Motors.

BLAIR, supra note 118, at 338.

336. See White, supra note 333, at 98-99.
337. Professor Galbraith argues that the antitrust policy which could augment performance would also give the large manufacturing firms added leverage over market sectors with
more numerous competitors: "If they fulfilled the hopes of their supporters. . . the antitrust
laws would make development more unequal by stimulating development further in precisely those parts of the economy where it is now greatest." GALBRAITH, supra note 330, at
217.
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There is evidence, for example, that concentration sometimes affects advertising intensity.3 38 Moreover, as already stated, limits on advertising
could be incorporated in antitrust decrees. 339 Nonetheless, since there is
no recognition in antitrust cases of the political significance of advertising,
any use of the antitrust laws to deal with these implications would depend
on proof of advertising's consequences for competition. Such an ad hoc
approach to enforcement is not well adapted to a form of economic influence on the political system which derives from the level of advertising in
the economy as a whole, rather than from the influence of advertising on
competitors.
A number of proposals to address the problem raised above may be considered. The first aims at limiting resources spent for advertising in contrast to the traditional antitrust approach of dividing them. In England in
1966, the Monopolies Commission recommended a forty percent decrease
in advertising by Unilever, Ltd. and Procter & Gamble, accompanied by a
twenty percent reduction in wholesale prices. 34° In addition to legislating
upper limits on advertising, a progressive tax on certain levels of advertising could also be considered. 34' The problem with such restraint is that
non-price competition would probably shift to other forms. Also, in view
of the Supreme Court's recent and proper solicitude for "commercial
speech, '342 there should be some hesitancy in limiting advertising in ways
not related to such state interests as health, safety or veracity.
Another approach would counter the resources spent by private firms on
advertising by augmenting resources available for alternative sources of
information. This could be accomplished through various means. The
Chairman of the FTC recently said, "[W]e are more comfortable finding
ways to give voice to counter messages than suppressing messages which
raise such public issues as health, environment, energy, or resource
338. Miller, supra note 335, at 468-78.
339. See text accompanying note 336 supra. See also Turner, Advertising and Competition, 26 FED. BAR J. 93, 96 (1966).
340. SCHERER, supra note 15, at 344. These recommendations met with only partial
success, however. After respondents threatened to relocate their operations to the European
continent, the government agreed to a compromise settlement which allowed the company
to introduce new soap products priced 20% below existing brands. Id at 344-45.
341. Id at 345.
342. First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (state could not bar corporation from expenditure to influence referendum); Bates v. Arizona State Bar, 433 U.S. 350
(1977) (prohibitions against the advertising of legal services violate constitutional right to
free speech); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748 (1976) (commercial advertisement is constitutionally protected). Directly relevant to the present article was the Court's comment in Belioui that the dissent's view of the
first amendment would allow the prohibition of "information advertising on such subjects of
national interest as inflation and the worldwide energy problem." 435 U.S. at 782 n.18.
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waste. ' 343 He suggested that the Commission is looking for ways to produce "counter advertising," perhaps with a first objective, the encouragement of energy conservation. 344 One possible method along these lines is
to subsidize groups attempting to present alternative views. Recently the
Consumer and Corporate Affairs Minister of Canada announced the
award of $48,000 to the Consumers Association of Canada to support work
on behalf of consumers affected by Bell Canada's application for a telephone rate increase. 345
One means of increasing public exposure to differing sources of information is to provide information and advertising by government agencies
and corporations. A recent symposium on the subject conducted by the
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research (AEI) reveals
both the kinds of criticism leveled at public advertising and the far-reach346
ing implications of the controversy.
Government advertising may be difficult to define, but from military
recruiting, to zip code ads and Smokey the Bear posters, it already involves
well over $100 million annually and places the government about seventeenth among advertisers in the United States.347 Sixty percent of these
expenditures go for military recruiting. 348 The next largest government
advertisers are the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the
Postal Service, and the Department of Housing and Urban Development.

349

Throughout the AEI symposium, the various participants repeated several criticisms of public advertising. It was said that advertising by government lacks the check of competition that prevails in the market. 350 In
343. [1978] ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 850, at A-8 (quoting Feb. 2,
1978 speech by FTC Chairman Pertschuk to an Amercan Advertising Federation conference). For a discussion of the role of government in providing information to the public,
see T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF ExPRESSION 645-53, 697-716 (1970).
344. [1978] ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 850, at A-8.
345. [1978] ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 860, at A-26.
346. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ADVERTISING (D. Tuerck ed. 1978) [hereinafter cited
as Tuerck].
347. Clotfelter, The Scope of Public Advertising, in Tuerck, supra note 346, at 11 (1976

figures).
348. Id at 27.
349. Id

350. See Tuerck, Introduction, in Tuerck, supra note 346, at 3 (public advertising limits
consumer to single "brand"); Wagner, Advertising and the Public Economy" Some Preliminary
Ruminations, in Tuerck, supra note 346, at 97 (absence of alternative suppliers strengthens

the "selling position" of the government); Staaf, Homo Politicusand Homo Economicus: Advertising and Information, in Tuerck, supra note 346, at 135 (lack of independent sources of
information causes distrust in public advertising).

Theoretically, consumers cannot be

duped for long by the persuasive arts of advertising in the private market since the availabil-
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addition, bureaucrats were viewed as principally interested in expanding
their own domain and thus prone to over-advertise and to use advertising
with a low information content, designed primarily to persuade. 35 1 Finally, participants stated that the character of public goods is such that
even after their consumption, it is difficult to assess their quality, thus in352
creasing the likelihood of oversupply.
The first of the above criticisms corresponds to an image of the market
and of government which may frequently be false. Business is neither so
efficient a check on business, nor is the government as monolithic as pictured in this image. One of the AEI commentators asserted that the public cannot obtain information on the relative efficiency of competing
government bureaus "because there are no competing bureaus. ' 353 Experience, however, is to the contrary. Government bureaus are constantly
disagreeing with each other, challenging each other, and even suing each
other. 354 On the private side, as has already been stated with respect to
the automobile industry,355 one or a few large advertisers can sometimes
drive others from the market and limit consumer choice, in part through
the use of advertising. Thus, to characterize the contrast between the market and government, as did several AEI symposium participants, as the
institutions of "exchange" versus those of "coercion" 356 is myopic. Conity of a better alternative product will lead the consumer to abandon a product purchased
due to misinformation or some psychological ploy.
351. Tuerck, The Theory of PoliticalAdverising, in Tuerck, supra note 346, at 74; Wagner, supra note 350, at 98-99; Wyse & Davies, A Baynesian Approach to Advertising as
Information, in Tuerck, supra note 346 at 107, 127.
352. Wagner, supra note 350, at 96-97, 105 (symposium discussion); Wyse & Davies,
supra note 351, at 150-530.
353. Staaf, supra note 350, at 153.
354. Recently the FTC strongly criticized the approach of the Interior Department with
respect to offshore leasing of oil and threatened to seek legislation providing a larger policymaking voice for antitrust enforcement agencies. [1978] ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP.
(BNA) No. 860, at A-4. Similarly, the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Industry and
Trade, recently suggested that the antitrust laws may "needlessly impair" the ability of
American companies to compete with foreign conglomerates. Remarks prepared for delivery before the 1978 Chicago World Trade Conference, April 5, 1978. See also United States
v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (dispute within the Executive Branch over presidential tapes).
355. See note 335 supra. Another example of the limited character of the advertising
messages received by consumers may be obtained from examination of advertising and sales
promotion expenditures among the five top advertisers of soaps, cleansers and related products. For 1975 such expenditures (in millions of dollars) were Proctor & Gamble $360,
Colgate-Palmolive $108, Lever Bros. $85, S.C. Johnson & Son $36, Clorox $26.7. ADVERTISING AGE, Aug. 23, 1976, at 1. These disbursements represent 7.9, 9.8, 11.0, 12.5 and 3.7
% of the respective companies' incomes from sales.
356. Tuerck, supra note 350, at 6.
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cern that one view of reality will dominate information provided the public is a legitimate concern, whether the purveyor is business or government.
Moreover, even if the market were more an arena of competition than it is
and the government less, the one alternative that the market does not portray in its advertising is an alternative to itself. The public is entitled to
some information about those things the market cannot provide.
The argument about bureaucrats expanding their own domain and
manipulating advertising to persuade is not a criticism of government advertising but of all advertising and of the competitive personality. Moreover, bureaucrats are constrained by budgets, by political pressures, and
occasionally by their consciences. A representative of the Advertising
Council, which handles much public advertising, told the AEI group that
during the thirty-three year life of the Smokey Bear campaign, the number
of forest fires in the U.S. was cut in half while saving seventeen billion
dollars in natural resources. 35 7 He also suggested that the Smokey campaign was not "seeking to aggrandize the United States Forest Service, or
35 8
the National Association of State Foresters, or to perpetuate their job."
Finally, the argument about the difficulty of judging the quality of public goods is not an argument about advertising but an argument about public goods. The implication is that the mechanism by which people choose
public goods-that is, the political process-does not adequately elicit and
register voter preferences. As Arthur Okun has said, "Most contemporary
arguments that oppose altering the market's verdict do not rely on enthusi3 59
asm for the market, but instead . . . vilify political decision making."
Without denying the many defects of the political process, total reliance on
the market has never been possible or tolerable.
This leads to a more general reflection on AEI's critique of public advertising. The critique reflects an unwillingness to challenge power derived
from sources other than the government. The fear is of a "monopolistic
public sector that tends to encroach upon and drain the independence and
vitality of the competitive private sector. ' 360 This one-sided fear leads to
a remarkable conclusion. In discussing regulation of political advertising,
one AEI participant said, "the advantages of regulating political campaign
contributions and expenditures to avoid another Watergate must be balanced against the loss of individual freedom .... ,,361 This statement
357.
358.
359.
360.
361.

Wagner, supra note 350, at 101 (symposium discussion).
Id
OKUN, supra note 244, at 27.
Tuerck, supra note 350, at 6.
Staaf, supra note 350, at 157.
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reveals an unusual conception of the meaning of the word "freedom."
Freedom is evidently defined to mean the freedom of large campaign contributors; and any restraint imposed by government is considered a restraint on their freedom. However the exercise of choice by the voter is
also freedom, and the restraint on large contributors imposed by the government is intended to widen the scope of the freedom of individuals.
Moreover, to the degree that criticism of the campaign finance laws for
restricting freedom is directed at aspects of the law which restrict organizations such as corporations and unions, the critics fall into the fallacy of
personification, referred to earlier, by equating a restraint on organizations
with a restraint on individuals. 362 The individual is preyed upon by organization in all forms-private and governmental. The dangers of both
private and governmental propaganda are real. The task for intellect,
however, is to discern means of controlling both private and public power
so that the individual can thrive in a society that provides scope for the
development of all aspects of personality.
Augmenting the public information or advertising role of government
agencies is not a fool-proof method of countering the influence of narrow
economic interests. As with virtually every other attempt to counter special interests, public advertising can be manipulated for private purposes.
For example, a proposal for government funding for an Advertising Council campaign on the American free enterprise system was criticized recently for its business slant. 363 Public advertising will not automatically
be advertising which redresses the balance between public and private interests. Thus, following the Corporation for Public Broadcasting (CPB)
example, 364 public advertising should be held accountable through budget362. See note 170 and accompanying text supra. The fallacy causes some of those who
wish to defend freedom to misperceive the character of the threat. As Professor Price states:
The most fundamental disagreement between the nations of the Western political
tradition and those of the Communist world does not turn on their attitudes toward
private property. The greatest mistake in the Western political strategy consists in
committing itself to the defense of property as the main basis for the preservation
of freedom.
Price, supra note 180, at 161-62. Price argues that the real difference between East and West
is a differing attitude toward monopoly over interpretation of truth. Id at 156-62. In the
present context, the point is that the availability of different sources of information and
different perspectives on the truth may be as important for freedom as unrestrained decision
by private organizations.
363. See Clotfelter, supra note 347, at 22.
364. See generally Miller, supra note 207, at 323-32. CPB was established by act of
Congress to make non-commercial educational television and radio available nationwide.
81 Stat. 368 (codfied at 47 U.S.C. § 5396 (1976)). CPB was a classic case of a political act
designed to fill a gap in market performance. The commercial networks did not believe it
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ing, auditing, and reporting and should emphasize information rather than
exhortation. For instance, one form of "advertising" might be to subsidize academics willing to study and report on government programs. Another form might be to subsidize artistic representations of public
programs.
Any augmentation of the public information function must accommodate the need for competing views. Otherwise one has merely substituted
one unfettered advertising source for another. The government's propagation of its view of the Vietnam War became particuarly repugnant because the government sought to control all available information and stifle
criticism inside and outside the administration. 365 Thus, agencies engaging in advertising should be required to make available all information
which forms the basis for any claims. Opportunity should be available for
rebuttal or criticism from other public agencies, as well as private par3
ties. 66

Once public opinion has crystalized to the point where it has brought
about the enactment of a program to deal with a social problem, it seems
reasonable to provide the public with information about the program.
Until now government advertising has principally been employed for military and space programs. There is a need for a more inclusive spectrum of
information on matters of public interest-such matters as welfare, health,
energy conservation, transportation, and environmental protection.
would be worth their while to seek the specialized audience thought to be interested in educational television. Fears of government domination were dealt with by barring CPB from
owning stations and by prohibiting it from engaging in political activity, editorializing, or
taking sides in support of a political candidate. The General Accounting Office conducts an
annual audit of CPB and reports to Congress. Miller, supra note 207, at 325. CPB has
produced several successful programs, and its funding to local stations was instrumental in
starting the Public Broadcasting Environmental Centre which produces programs on the
environment. Id. For a recent account of CPB's development and of its problems, see
STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON COMMUNICATIONS OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND
FOREIGN COMMERCE, 95TH CONG., IST SEss. 227-75, OPTIONS PAPER, (Comm. Print 1977).

365. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); D. HALBERSTAM, THE
BEST AND THE BRIGHTEST 369, 584-87, 599

(1972).

366. The problem of maintaining balance in the deluge of information directed at the
public illustrates the difficulties created for liberty and democracy by technology-in this
case, the technology of mass communications. The first amendment was not designed in
contemplation of a technology and society in which the voices of a few could drown out that
of the public. Nevertheless, an authority potent enough to restrain the loud voice of private
advertising (other than to prevent deception or in the interest of health and safety) might
itself drown out competing voices. Resort to counter advertising, through enhancing the
information function of government, must be cautiously undertaken within carefully drawn
guidelines. The task is to prevent the misuse of government to perpetuate the dominance of
the voices of the few-whether they are the old powerful voices of the private sector or the
voices of new governmental vested interests.
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The problem of the balance of information directed at the public parallels the more general problem of the balance of political power. The difficulty of resolving defects in current relationships forestalls and obscures
the costs of inaction. The worst approach would be to assume that safety
can be found in a label; that power and dominance are dangerous when
lodged in the government but not in a "private" institution. The task is to
redress imbalance of power wherever it occurs. With respect to information, the current imbalance is toward the advertising of articles of private
consumption.
The ultimate discovery by the public of itself, to use John Dewey's
phrase, will be implemented by a shift in attitudes regarding taxing and
spending. 367 Industrial structure may decisively affect the balance of resources in society. It may also have some influence on the allocation of
roles between the electorate and its representatives on the one hand and
managers and administrators on the other. In the background, however,
affecting both use of resources and performance of roles, is the nature of
the attitudes and beliefs of the public. The public's discovery of itself is
simply the discovery by the electorate that there are public interests. One
step toward achieving this self-discovery may be a shift in the expenditure
of information resources. When confronted with an imbalance of resources the antitrust approach traditionally is to divide them. But to discover itself the public must rather than divide redirect a flow of resources
which projects a vision of reality tied to individual consumption, suggesting implicitly to the public that the only interests worthy of pursuit are
private.
IV.

ANTITRUST-AN OLD PURPOSE,

A

NEW ROLE

Columnist Richard Strout, a veteran of over forty years in the Washington press corps, recently observed that "a social trend may change nations
but not cause headlines-not for a while at least. '368 Strout was commenting on a recent Senate staff report that found most of America's top
companies are linked together by interlocking directorates and on a report
that the top two hundred corporations own two-thirds of all assets used in
36 9
manufacturing.
367. GALBRAITH, supra note 330, at 296. In the United States, intentional reallocation of
massive amounts of resources from consumer to public goods has occurred during wars. See
Dietrich, The Role ofAntitrust During Phase 11,17 ANTITRUST BULL. 419,420(1972). Beginning with the Fourth Plan in the 1960's, the French attempted to guide production to attain
certain social objectives, choosing to avoid what one participant called "a civilization of
gadgets." SHONFIELD, supra note 205, at 227.
368. TRBfrom Washington, THE NEW REPUBLIC, May 6, 1978, at 2. See also TRB at
Eighty, THE NEW REPUBLIC, March 18, 1978, at 16-17.
369. See STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON REPORTS, ACCOUNTING AND MANAGEMENT OF THE
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About the time that Strout came to Washington, the aging Progressive
scholar, Vernon Parrington, described the origins of Strout's social trend.
The lost cause of slavery, said Parrington "carried down to defeat much
more than slavery, it carried down the old ideal of decentralized democracies, of individual liberty .... ",370 With the great economic transformations during and after the Civil War, "the nation hurried forward along
the path of an unquestioning and uncritical consolidation, that was to
throw the coercive powers of a centralizing state into the hands of the new
37
industrialism.", '
In the years that followed the Civil War, the defenders of the old values
struggled to maintain them in the face of great social transformation. The
Sherman Act was one such effort to maintain the old decentralization.
But from the beginning there were those who counseled against trustbusting, arguing either that it would damage efficiency, or that only the regulatory powers of an activist state could keep industrial power at bay. In
retrospect, it now appears that as controversy sharpened, the defense of
democratic values went astray. Liberals placed too much faith on the
state as a protector of individual liberty and conservatives too readily identified the individual with the great collectivist corporate organizations. As
a more balanced and critical spirit has reasserted itself, it is perhaps no
accident that the current President directed criticism during the 1976 campaign at both business and government. Now the country is propelled
forward toward an increasing amalgamation of government and corporate
power-but perhaps without the unquestioning attitude of which Parrington wrote.
For the old policy of antitrust and its proponents, a continuing issue is
how to achieve the social and political objectives of antitrust when orthodox antitrust enforcement must be abandoned. The greatest weakness in
the antitrust tradition-perhaps in our political philosophy-is that it provides no real theory for preserving liberty where economic or practical necessity obviate the possibility of reliance upon the market. At least as far
back as Wilson, there is the ambivalent suggestion that while concentrated
economic power might "chill, check and destroy" freedom, size itself is no
offense.
Many liberals used to think that the weakness in our society was its tiSEN. COMM. ON GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS, INTERLOCKING DIRECTORATES AMONG THE MAJOR U.S. CORPORATIONS, 95TH CONG., 2D SESS. (Comm. Print), excerpted in TRADE REG.
REP. (CCH) 50, 366 (1978).
370. V. PARRINGTON, 2 MAIN CURRENTS IN AMERICAN THOUGHT 473 (1958 ed.).

371. Id at 474.
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midity in resorting to government action. 37 2 Recent history, however, discloses that the problem is not failure to resort to government action, but a
failure to do so in a way consistent both with the rights of individuals and
broader public interests. Despite rhetoric and changing parties, the amalgamation of political and economic power continues. Conservatives decry
this continuing trend, but offer no solution apart from turning back the
clock. 37 3 The modern history of liberty is tied to the market, 374 but its
future may be bleak if we cannot devise a theory of liberty apart from the
market.
Here, paradoxically, in an emerging world beyond the classically competitive market, indeed, beyond the old antitrust, is a new role for antitrust
policy. The antitrust tradition provides a source of support for those who
seek a program aimed at controlling the political effects of economic
power. The old idea was that such effects would be checked by the magic
of deconcentration. But where deconcentration is not possible or where it
is not enough, the task for the new antitrusters is to bring together the
sources of popular feeling and the realities of a transformed society. Analytically what is necessary is a systematic assessment of the resources generated by the economic system and their potential impact on the balance of
roles in the political process. The attempt to provide such an assessment
above leads to the following tentative conclusions.
First, there is a role for vigorous enforcement of existing antitrust laws
wherever their application is possible and for creativity in improving the
traditional antitrust remedies. Many of the legislative initiatives currently
under consideration fall into this category. 375 These measures may be all
to the good. They do not, however, deal with instances where deconcentration will not work or where undue economic influence on politics exists
despite the presence of workable competition. Moreover, these measures
372. See, e.g., authorities cited in
373. See, e.g., B.

HAWLEY,

supra note 78, at 172-76.

GOLDWATER, CONSCIENCE OF A CONSERVATIVE

(1960); M.

FRIEDMAN,

(1962).
374. See LINDBLOM, supra note 141, at 162.

CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM

375. They are largely attempts to short-circuit the tortuous process of antitrust litigation
and achieve the antitrust result through legislation. In addition to the "no-fault" monopoly
bill discussed earlier, see note 10 supra and accompanying text, consideration has been given
to legislative limitations on horizontal integration by oil and gas companies seeking to acquire coal and uranium assets. Also, the Senate Antitrust Subcommittee is concerned about
ownership of common carrier pipelines by integrated oil companies, and according to the
chairman of the subcommittee, there is continuting interest in reducing immunities and increasing competitiveness in regulated industries. Finally, there is the hope that means can
be devised of expediting antitrust litigation, either by simplifying proof requirements, or by
procedural improvements. 329 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 9-10 (April 17, 1978).
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may simply lack political viability. The various approaches to oil company divestiture have been tabled in both House and Senate. 376 One
long-time FTC staffer told a congressional committee that the reason behind the failure of the FTC to restructure any monopolized industry in its
sixty years is the lack of congressional interest in such action. 377 Quoting
a former FTC Commissioner the staffer said, "When Congress tells the
Commission to do something about the country's monopoly problem, the
Commission will do it. Until then. . you are wasting your time. 37 8
For all these reasons, various means were suggested above for simulating the results of the competitive market, including incentive regulation
and competing government corporations. This is the second role for antitrust and the antitrust enforcement agencies-as advocates for competition
beyond the traditional market. The agencies have already evidenced interest in this role in the regulatory process. Another, but largely untried
field of action is the government corporation. Various ownership arrangements are possible. It has been argued, for instance, that some proportion
of private ownership, as in the dynamic Dutch State Mines, produces a
creative tension between public policy and commercial objectives. 379
Whatever form it takes, the objective is for the public firm to act as "a
gadfly, fulfilling a function rather like that which has been assumed by the
Swedish co-operative movement in the field of consumer goods and services-looking for places where private enterprise is soft or where its prices
38s0
are too high or its profits too large.
One criticism of this use of government corporations is that in Europe
government companies have sometimes been as lacking in vigorous advocacy of competition as their private brethren. 38 ' It is precisely here that
an emerging role for antitrust exists. The European nations lack a strong
antitrust tradition. In the United States, however, success may be more
likely as antitrust takes a new lease on life, reincarnated as the advocate of
competition within the government. Moreover, the public companies
376. [1978] ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 830, at A-2.
377. Hearings Before the Select Comm. on Nutrition andHuman Needs, 1975 Food Price
Study, Part 1-FoodPrices.- The FederalRole, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 96 (1975) (statement of
Charles Mueller), reprinted in Mueller, FTC and the Monopoly Problem.- Trustbusting: A

Revolutionary' Concept in America, 7 ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REV. 9, 23 (1975).
378. Id at 104.
379. SHONFIELD, supra note 205, at 190 & n.34. The success of the Dutch State mines
was reflected in its development into the chemical field and other areas. Two-fifths of its
share capital is privately owned. Id
380. Id. at 191.
381. SCHERER, supra note 15, at 420.
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themselves can be given incentives to assume an aggressive competitive
posture. Recently the Tennessee Valley Authority sued ten foreign and
three domestic companies for fixing uranium prices, claiming damage to
the agency amounting to 120 million dollars. 38 2 T.V.A. sued not only
under the antitrust laws but under a statute banning conspiracies, collusion, and agreements to defraud T.V.A. or defeat its purposes. 3 83 It is not
difficult to imagine an economy with significant numbers of public corporations in which vigorous antitrust enforcement still exists.
A more serious difficulty in employing public enterprise in the manner
suggested is political opposition by private business. There appears to be
no legal obstacle to the proposal. T.V.A. and other public enterprises
have survived legal challenges to their competition with private business. 38 4 The history of T.V.A. indicates, however, that strong opposition
from private business can be expected. The point can only be resolved
through the political process. Legal analysis can assist, however, by establishing standards that will strike a fair balance between public and private
enterprise.
There are developments in American law that could well form the basis
for such a balance between public and private enterprise. 385 In United
States v. GeneralElectricCo.,386 the federal district court held that T.V.A.
is a "person" within the meaning of the Clayton Act and therefore entitled
to sue for treble damages. The court quoted the explanation of the origin
of government corporations provided by the Supreme Court in Keifer &

Kelfer v. Reconstruction Finance Corp:3 87 "Because of the advantages enjoyed by the corporate device compared with conventional executive agencies, the exigencies of war and the enlarged scope of government in
382. N.Y. Times, Nov. 19, 1977, § B, at cot. 2. The action was transferred by the Judicial
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation to the Northern District of Illinois. In re Uranium Industry
Antitrust Litigation, Docket No. 342, (J.P.M.L., July 31, 1978).
383. TVA has also been a vigorous advocate of increased competition in the coal industry. See TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY, THE STRUCTURE OF THE ENERGY MARKETS: A
REPORT OF TVA's ANTITRUST INVESTIGATION OF THE COAL AND URANIUM INDUSTRIES,
(1977). TVA's action includes analysis, testimony before congressional committees and
communication with the FTC and Antitrust Division of the Justice Department. Id at 4-9.
384. See Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464 (1938); Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S.

288 (1936).
385. Extensive law already exists on the subject in Europe. The gist of the outcome
appears to be judicial requirements that public enterprise neither exceed nor abuse its statutory charter and adhere to such requisites of due process as stating the grounds for any
action which conflicts with private rights. Friedmann, supra note 244, at 384, 387.
386. 209 F. Supp. 197 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
387. 306 U.S. 381 (1939).

1978]

Beyond Antitrust

economic affairs have greatly extended the use of independent corporate
facilities for governmental ends. '388 Once created as a corporation, "you
have a person, and as a person one that presumably is subject to the general rules of law."' 38 9 Accordingly, as a "person," government corporations should be subject to suit under the antitrust and other laws just as
39 °
they themselves can sue.
In addition to innovations in traditional trustbusting and new inititatives
to simulate competition, the third task for antitrust is to recognize that its
purposes may require methods which go beyond antitrust. There must be
a recognition that proponents of political liberty cannot rely exclusively
upon the market or even imitation of market processes. Because it is
designed to maximize market forces, antitrust will be insufficient where the
initial dissatisfaction is with the operation of the market, or where economic and social imperatives impel a non-market solution. The overall
failure of the economy to generate sufficient social goods and the self-perpetuating barrage of consumer-oriented advertising were cited as one example. Ways of enhancing the public information function were
discussed as possible remedies. It was also suggested that when government involvement with industry becomes necessary, either through public
enterprise or regulation, that some enhancement of the coordinating capabilities of the political system may be necessary in order to make government involvement accountable to the democratic process. Some
compromise may be necessary between the decentralizing objective of antitrust and the prerequisites for accountability through the political process.
388. 209 F. Supp. at 203-04, quoting 306 U.S. at 390.
389. 209 F. Supp. at 205, quoting Sloan Shipyards Corp. v. United States Fleet Corp.,
258 U.S. 549, 567 (1922).
390. Recent decisions taking a restrictive view of exemptions from the antitrust laws for
regulated or municipal corporations point in the right direction. See, e.g., Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978) (person, as defined by antitrust laws, includes
cities, regardless of their plaintiff or defendant status in actions alleging antitrust violations);
Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976) (state action exemption does not extend to
utility company program despite Public Service Commission's approval). Exemptions
should be explicit in the statute authorizing creation of a government corporation so that
compensating measures can be effected to avoid undue impact on private interests. Alternatively, if private interests are to be overridden, it should be necessary for that result to be
made explicit, ensuring that the result is accomplished, if at all, through the democratic
process. K. Watson and T. Brunner offer interesting suggestions concerning the antitrust
principles that should apply to the conduct of regulated utilities. Watson & Brunner, Monopolization by Regulated "Monopolies": The Search For Substantive Standards, 22 ANTITRUST BULL. 559 (1977). Many of these suggestions could apply to public enterprise as
well.
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Thus, the concern with economic influence on the political process leads
one quite far-to scrutiny of the fragmented nature of our political parties
and legislative process and to other legislative remedies such as campaign
finance law and conflict of interest legislation. The contribution of the
antitrust tradition is that it reflects an instinctive opposition to concentrated economic power, in part because of the potential influence of such
power on the democratic process. The old instinct was sound. With increasing departures from the market, however, we are forced to supplement the old rule of thumb that safety for democracy lies in the
decentralized market. What is required beyond the market is a systematic
approach to minimizing the impact on the democratic process of the various resources generated by the economic system. It should be clear by
now that the object is not merely one of controlling "big business." The
object is to render power accountable wherever it may arise.
Recently, economist and former presidential adviser, Walt Rostow, has
suggested that impending natural resource shortages, as in oil, may soon
threaten the strangulation of the advanced industrial economies. 39 1 He
argues that neo-Keynesian public policy will not be enough to cope with
the threat and that centrally planned resource allocation will be necessary. 392 The alternative, he argues, is rationing, severe unemployment,
and a loss of social and political cohesion. 393 In turn this portends a shat394
tering of the strategic political-military balance in international affairs.
This prediction is simply an extreme version of what has already occurred
in many areas of our economic life. If we devote ourselves solely to arguing over the virtues of the market, we may find ourselves with literally no
idea of how to preserve liberty when the market is swept aside.
The suggestion here is that we should think harder about the economic
structures consistent with democratic government. This suggestion is
391. W. ROSTow, GETTING FROM HERE TO THERE 52 (1978).

392. Id at 38-53, 219-20. Rostow suggests that Keynes himself would have modified his
views in the face of changed circumstances.
I use the phrase neo-Keynesian economics for two reasons. First, the initial
Keynesian propositions have been clarified and greatly refined since the 1930's.
Second. . . Keynes was exceedingly sensitive to the relative price movements of
food and raw materials. It is most unlikely that he would have remained, like
most neo-Keynesians of our time, frozen to theoretical models and policy positions
rendered irrelevant by the course of events since the latter months of 1972.
Id at 38.
393. Id at 245, 249.
394. Id at 38-53, 224-45.
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based on the old recognition of "how unequal parchment provisions are to
a struggle with public necessity. '3 95 It is not on parchment, but on the
relationships among people and institutions that the survival of liberty depends.

395. THE FEDERALIST No. 25 (A. Hamilton) at 169 (M. Dunne ed. 1901).

